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Redistributing Optimally: Of Tax
Rules, Legal Rules, and Insurance
KYLE LOGUE* AND RONEN AVRAHAM**
I.

INTRODUCTION

From the beginning of the law and economics movement, normative
legal economists have focused almost exclusively on evaluating the ef
ficiency of alternative legal rules. The distributional consequences of
legal rules, therefore, have largely been ignored. It is tempting to con
clude that legal economists are hostile or indifferent to concerns of
distributional fairness. In fact, however, the discipline of economics
has a great deal to say about distributional policy.
The normative branch of economics, known as welfare economics,
has always been deeply concerned with distributional issues.1 It is not
that welfare economists purport to know a priori the "right" or "opti
mal" distribution of resources. To the contrary, the standard ap
proach among public finance economists has been to remain neutral
on the types of inequality in society that ought to be the target of
redistributive policy and how much, if any, redistribution is appropri
ate.2 If those same economists, however, were provided with a theory
of distributive justice, they then could build that theory into their
Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
Assistant Professor of Law, Northwestern University. We would like to thank Adi
Ayal, David Bradford, Richard Craswell, Steve Croley, Hanoch Dagan, Tsilly Dagan, Jim
Hines, Louis Kaplow, Deborah Schenk, Steven Shavell, Daniel Shaviro, David Weisbach,
and participants at the Bar-Ilan University Faculty Seminar (Israel), the University of
Chicago Law & Economics Workshop, the NYU Tax Policy Colloquium, the Stanford Law
School Distributive Justice Colloquium, the Stanford Law & Economics Workshop, and
the 2002 ALEA Conference at Harvard Law School for helpful comments. We also thank
the Cook Fund and the John M. Olin Foundation at the University of Michigan Law
School for generous research support. All errors in this Article are, of course, our
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1 The most comprehensive exposition of the welfarist approach to evaluating public pol
icy is found in Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 1 1 4 Harv. L. Rev.
961 (2001) [hereinafter Fairness I]. They subsequently turned their article into a book.
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shaven, Fairness Versus Welfare (2002) [hereinafter Fairness 11].
2 See Kaplow & Shavell, Fairness II, note 1, at 27 ("[W]e do not endorse any particular
view about the proper distribution of well-being or income."); Kaplow & ShaveII, Fairness
I, note 1, at 988 (same); see also Harvey S. Rosen, Public Finance 1 42-60 (5th ed. 1999);
Joseph E. Stiglitz, Economics of the Public Sector 94-103, 476-79 (3d ed. 2000).
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framework for evaluating public policy.3 Indeed, economists have cre
ated mathematical models of tax regimes to accommodate any num
ber of theories of distributive justice: from the Rawlsian maximin
criterion, which manifests a special concern for the well-being of the
least advantaged members in society, to the various versions of utilita
rianism, which, depending on the assumptions, can justify complete
equalization of income or redistribution from the worse off to the bet
ter off.4 Again, while economists are able to build these theories into
their models, they typically do not endorse any particular theory of
distributive justice.
Many economists and most law and economics scholars, however,
are far from neutral with regard to how to accomplish redistribution.
To the contrary, although (as far as we know) no polls have been con
ducted on this question, we believe it is a safe bet that a majority of
legal economists hold the following view: Whatever amount of redis
tribution is deemed appropriate or desirable, the exclusive policy tool
for redistributing to reduce income or wealth inequality should always
be the tax-and-transfer system.s Under this view, the legal system, by
contrast, should never be used to reduce income inequality, but in
stead should be used only to achieve efficiency. To put this view in
more colloquial terms, the legal system should be used only to maxi
mize the size of the pie; the tax-and-transfer system should be the ex
clusive means of slicing it.
This conventional economic view of the appropriate division of
functions between the legal system and the tax-and-transfer system
3 Indeed, determining how best to achieve society's preferences regarding distributional
fairness is one of the primary objectives of the economic subliterature on optimal taxation.
See, e.g., William Vickrey, Agenda for Progressive Taxation {1947); J.A. Mirrlees, An Ex
ploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation, 38 Rev. Econ. Stud. 175 (1971).
Both Vickrey and Mirrlees were the 1996 recipients of the Nobel Prize in Economic Sci
ences. See Press Release, The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, The Sveriges Rik
sbank (Bank of Sweden) Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel for 1996
(Oct. 8, 1996) (last modified Aug. 27, 2002) http://www.nobel.se/economicsnaureates/1996/
press.html (mentioning their contributions regarding redistributive taxation).
4 See generally Rosen, note 2, at 147-54 {discussing different views as to whether gov
ernment should undertake redistributional policies and summarizing the implications for
redistributive policy of Rawlsian and utilitarian social welfare functions). For a compre
hensive formal treatment of different theories of distributive justice, see John E. Roemer,
Theories of Distributive Justice (1996).
5 See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics 124-27 (2d ed.
1989); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient Than the
Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. Legal Stud. 667 (1994) [hereinafter Legal Sys
tem]. As tax scholars know, the term "income" is far from self-defining. The same is true
of the terms "consumption" and "wealth," which commonly are suggested as alternative
tax bases. In Section II we say a few words about what we mean by the term income for
purposes of this Article. As have the other participants in the redistributive rules debate,
we take no position on whether income or consumption or wealth is the best measure of
ability to pay but generally regard them as interchangeable for this analysis.
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also seems to have produced a clear division of labor among welfarist
policy analysts. 6 On the one hand, tax scholars who apply the
welfarist framework evaluate alternative tax regimes according to
their ability to produce the desired level of revenue for the govern
ment to spend on public goods while at the same time producing the
smallest amount of distortion and satisfying society's distributional
preferences. On the other hand, legal economists in nontax fields
spend their time evaluating legal rules-such as the private law doc
trines of contract, property, and tort-solely on the basis of those
rules' ability or inability to correct market failures: to internalize ex
ternalities, minimize transaction costs, provide efficient investment in
centives, and generally help achieve allocational efficiency in the
economy.7 It is this division of labor that justifies the legal econo
mists' tendency to ignore distributional concerns.8
6 "Welfarism" refers to a normative political theory that calls for government policy
decisions to be made solely on the basis of their effects on the welfare of individuals in
society. Kaplow & Shavell, Fairness II, note 1, at 3-4. Sometimes welfarism is equated
with welfare economics. See generally id.
7 For a list of justifications for this division of labor among welfarist policy analysts, see
Kaplow & Shavell, Fairness II, note 1, at 31-35; Kaplow & Shavell, Fairness I, note 1, at
992-95.
8 Chris Sanchirico calls this justification for legal economists' exclusive focus on the effi
ciency of legal rules the "new efficiency rationale." Chris William Sanchirico, Deconstruct
ing the New Efficiency Rationale, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 1003, 1007 (2001) [hereinafter
Efficiency Rationale]. The new efficiency rationale, as Sanchirico notes, has roots in the
basic theories of welfare economics. In fact, this conventional view among legal econo
mists can be understood as deriving from the Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare
Economics, which is centrally important to the law and economics movement and to nor
mative economics generally. The Second Theorem states, in effect, that under the condi
tions of perfect competition a market economy can lead to any Pareto optimal point, that
is, any efficient point, provided the government has the ability to make a lump sum redis
tributive transfer of wealth. Recall that a "Pareto optimal" point is a distribution of re
sources in society that is efficient, that is, a point from which no one can be made better off
without making someone else worse off. Such points are normatively significant, according
to the welfare economist, because reaching a Pareto optimal point means that, from a
particular starting point in terms of resource entitlements, all available gains from volun
tary trade have been made. Thus, achieving Pareto optimality maximizes social welfare if
one assumes that the initial allocation of wealth was consistent with society's overall distri
butional preferences as embedded in its social welfare function and that all trade is fully
informed and voluntary. The innovation of the Second Theorem is to show that, even if
the initial allocation of resources is inconsistent with the social welfare function, the fully
competitive market nevertheless can maximize social welfare (including society's distribu
tional concerns) if there is a perfectly nondistortive (or lump sum) system for making redis
tributive transfers. Thus, the Second Theorem contains in it the division of functions
between legal rules (correcting market failures and promoting competitive markets) and
tax rules (correcting distributional inequities). This division of labor remained even when
it became clear to scholars that no practical means of making nondistortive lump sum
transfers exists. A major theme in this Article is that this division of labor has been drawn
too starkly, and that the choice of the optimal policy instrument depends on comparative
institutional advantage.
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The economists' emphasis on the tax-and-transfer system as the pri
mary means of redistribution is unremarkable. As we argue in Sec
tion Ill, a good case can be made that the tax-and-transfer system
should be the primary instrument for achieving society's income- or
wealth-redistributive goals. What is somewhat remarkable, however,
is the claim that the tax-and-transfer system should be the exclusive
tool for income redistribution.9 What is more puzzling is the almost
exclusive focus on money income or wealth as the target of redistribu
tive policy. Of course, for economists and welfarist policy scholars
generally, well-being rather than income or wealth is the ultimate tar
get. Income or wealth is merely a proxy for the underlying character
istic of subjective well-being.10 Therefore, those scholars would likely
9 We recognize that, within the discipline of economics, there continue to be vigorous
debates over the extent to which various policy instruments should be designed to further
redistributive goals. To take just two examples, economists continue to debate whether it
would be desirable to use distributional weights in regulatory cost-benefit analysis, e.g.,
Arnold C. Harberger, On the Use of Distributional Weights in Social Cost-Benefit Analy
sis, 86 J. Pol. Econ. S87 (1978), as well as the use of educational subsidies rather than wage
subsidies or other direct cash transfers, e.g., Richard Layard, Education Versus Cash Re
distribution, 12 J. Pub. Econ. 377 (1979). Nevertheless it is our assumption that, at least
among legal economists (that is, economists or economics-minded scholars who have ap
pointments in law schools) there would be a consensus that, in fact, such policy tools as
cost-benefit analysis and education subsidies should be kept separate from redistributive
policy (that is, should be justified solely on efficiency grounds), with redistribution again
limited to the tax-and-transfer system. (As for precisely what we mean (or what the litera
ture means) by the distinction between legal rules and tax-and-transfer rules, see Section
II.)
In addition, like most legal economists, it seems that most contemporary classical liberal
philosophers-the architects of modern distributive justice theory-advocate redistrib
uting exclusively through the tax-and-transfer system. See, e.g., John Rawls, A Theory of
Justice 274-80 (1971). The argument seems to be that redistribution through a tax-and
transfer system is less restrictive of liberty and the ability to choose one's preferred path in
life than are redistributive legal rules. See Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 276-312 (1986)
[hereinafter Law's Empire] (arguing that the concern for other people's well-being is the
responsibility of the government and not of the citizens in their daily transactions utilizing
private property). For a critique of this sort of liberty-based defense of tax-and-transfer
rules as the exclusive domain of redistributive policy, see Anthony T. Kronman, Contract
Law and Distributive Justice, 89 Yale L.J. 472 (1980).
10 In this Article, although we do not adopt the welfarist framework that seems to un
derlie most of normative economic scholarship, including law and economics scholarship,
we assume, as explained more fully in Section IV, that some differences in well-being will
be of concern to redistribution-minded policymakers. We note, however, that the debate
over the use of redistributive legal rules has been conducted largely in welfarist terms.
E.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the
Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J. Legal Stud. 821,
822-25 (2000) [hereinafter Legal Rules]; Kaplow & Shavell, Legal System, note 5; Sanchir
ico, Efficiency Rationale, note 8; Chris William Sanchirico, Taxes Versus Legal Rules as
Instruments for Equity: A More Equitable View, 29 J. Legal Stud. 797 (2000) [hereinafter
Taxes]. As we argue below, we believe that our framework should be attractive to
welfarists as well as nonwelfarist policy analysts. See text accompanying notes 261-70. In
deed, our entire framework can be recast in purely welfarist terms.
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agree that the ultimate target for a redistribution-minded policymaker
should be differences in overall well-being, not merely differences in
wealth or income.11 But those scholars nevertheless focus primarily
on income or wealth as the relevant measure of or proxy for well
being. 12 That is, they tend to focus on monetary measures of well
being to the exclusion of other, nonmonetary measures. 1 3 Moreover,
they never take a position regarding the best redistributive policy tool
for nonincome-related measures of inequality of well-being, even
though a comprehensive redistributive policy, even under the econo
mists' welfarist approach, should be concerned about a broader range
of inequalities of well-being.
In this Article we develop a general framework for choosing the
optimal redistributive policy instrument or combination of redistribu
tive policy instruments, whatever one's vision of distributive justice
might be. There are many different approaches to evaluating ques
tions of distributive justice and redistributive policy. From all of the
various approaches, however, it is possible to separate out two types
of questions: First, what is the appropriate equalisandum (the thing to
equalize, or the thing to redistribute with respect to)? Second, assum
ing a given equalisandum, what limitations should be imposed on its
redistribution?14 As to the first question, the "equality of what?"
11 For example, Kaplow and Shavell clearly understand that, from a welfarist perspec
tive, to the extent that the distribution of resources is considered important, it is the distri
bution of overall well-being (and not just the distribution of income) that matters. See,
e.g., Kaplow & Shavell, Fairness II, note 1, at 30 ("[T]he distribution of income may matter
to social welfare because it affects the distribution of well-being, and, under the welfare
economic approach, social welfare may depend directly on how equally well-being is dis
tributed among individuals."). Kaplow and Shavell, however, prefer to talk only in terms
of income redistribution "for convenience" and because "much analysis of distributive is
sues refers to the distribution of income and because many redistributive policies operate
through individuals' incomes." Id. at 28-20 n.25.
12 The economists' focus on money income typically is not an explicit assumption in
their models, but rather is implicit in their analysis, which tends to treat income as the
primary measure of differences in well-being. See, e.g., Joel Slemrod & Jon Bakija, Taxing
Ourselves: A Citizen's Guide to the Great Debate Over Tax Reform 51 (2d ed. 2000)
("There are two distinct aspects to the fairness of a tax system. The first, called 'vertical
equity' by economists, concerns the appropriate tax burden on households of different
levels of well-being. It is about how much tax should be paid by a family with $200,000 of
income, versus a family with $50,000 of income, versus a family with $10,000 of income.").
1 3 One important exception to the standard approach is Sanchirico's work on redistribu
tive rules, discussed throughout this Article. As we discuss in greater detail below, see text
accompanying notes 148-51, one of Sanchirico's main contributions, on which we build in
this Article, is to show that there are other important proxies for well-being besides income
or wealth. See generally Sanchirico, Efficiency Rationale, note 8; Sanchirico, Taxes, note
10.
14 Although we present these two questions as being independent of each other, we are
aware that they are interrelated. Specifically, one can favor a specific equalisandum pre
cisely because of the limitations it implies. Nevertheless, we find it methodologically useful
to divide the issues in this way.
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question, political theorists have given a myriad of responses.15 For
some the concern is solely with inequality of "welfare. "16 For others it
is equality of "primary goods."17 For others it is equality of "re
sources."18 For others it is equality of "access to advantage"19 or "op
portunity for welfare"20 or "capability to achieve functionings."21 In
fact, one of the main objectives of distributive justice theorists seems
to be to define a single equalisandum that can capture all our intu
itions about an egalitarian society.22
In this Article we do not attempt to distinguish among these differ
ent, sometimes overlapping conceptions of what should be equalized.
We aim instead to analyze the purely functional. question of what
would be the ideal redistributive policy instrument in various settings
given some theory about what we want to redistribute. Under this
approach, we need only adopt some fairly general and uncontroversial
assumptions about society's main egalitarian intuitions and get on
with our project. To that end, and to simplify the analysis and mini
mize controversies over alternative visions of the good, we assume
that any redistributive policy should acknowledge that some types of
differences in well-being are worth intervention, independent of the
1s The importance of the question, as Amartya Sen observes, lies in the fact that the
judgement and measurement of inequality is dependent on the choice of the equalisandum.
Further, "[e]quality in terms of one [equalisandum] may not coincide with equality in the
scale of another. For example, equal opportunities can lead to very unequal incomes.
Equal income can go with significant differences in wealth. Equal wealth can coexist with
very unequal happiness. Equal happiness can go with widely divergent fulfilment of needs.
Equal fulfilment of needs can be associated with very different freedoms of choice. And so
on." Amartya Sen, Inequality Reexamined 2 (1992).
l6 John E. Roemer, Equality of Resources Implies Equality of Welfare, 101 Q.J. Econ.
751 (1986) [hereinafter Equality].
1 7 Rawls, note 9, at 62-63, 92.
1 8 Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part I: Equality of Welfare, 10 Phil. & Pub. Aff.
185 (1981); Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part II: Equality of Resources, 10 Phil. &
Pub. Aff. 283, 300-01 (1981) [hereinafter Equality of Resources] (including mental and
physical capacity as resources).
19 G.A. Cohen, On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, 99 Ethics 906, 916 (1989).
20 Richard J. Arneson, Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare, 56 Phil. Stud. 77, 77
(1989).
21 Sen, note 15, at 4, 39-55.
22 Although there is considerable disagreement among distributive justice theorists con
cerning the proper framework or vocabulary for analyzing issues of distributive justice, the
theorists seem to share many of the same intuitions. For example, most would agree that
an individual's inordinately expensive tastes or bigoted feelings toward certain groups
should not be taken into account when making egalitarian calculations. Certain versions of
welfarism include this approach. See, e.g., John C. Harsanyi, Problems With Act-Utilitari
anism and With Malevolent Preferences, in Hare and Critics: Essays on Moral Thinking
89, 96-98 (Douglas Seanor & N. Potion eds., 1988) (arguing that certain preferences, even if
entirely informed and rational, should be given no weight in the evaluation of social pol
icy); see also Kenneth J. Arrow, Some Ordinalist-Utilitarian Notes on Rawls's Theory of
Justice, in Kenneth J. Arrow, 1 Collected Papers of Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and
Justice 104 (1983).
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individuals' underlying resources. In a similar manner we assume that
some differences in resources can justify redistributive intervention,
irrespective of overall well-being.23 We also assume that not every
inequality provides a justification for compulsory redistribution. For
example, we generally do not consider differences (in well-being, op
portunity for welfare, access to advantage, whatever) that stem from
differences in physical attractiveness to be an appropriate justification
for redistributive policy.24
As to the question of what limitations should be placed on redistrib
utive policy with respect to a given equalisandum, here too we do not
try to defend any particular theory. Rather, we simply make some
assumptions that we believe will resonate with widely held intuitions.
For example, we assume that government redistributive policy should
not target inequalities (of well-being, resources, or whatever) that re
sult from individuals' informed, voluntary choices. Thus, we assume
that any redistributive policy should seek to equalize inequalities that
are the result of individuals' differing initial endowments of talent,
wealth, opportunities, and the like-differences that derive entirely
from an individual's genes or from her unchosen social and environ
mental circumstances.25 In addition, we assume that redistributive
policy should target inequalities of well-being that result from things
that happen after an individual is born that affect the individual's well
being, such as a debilitating injury or illness that is not the direct prod23 Thus we adopt a sort of mixed "resourcism" and welfarism approach to issues of dis
tributive justice. We are by no means the first to adopt such an approach. See, e.g., Sen,
note 15, at 12-38; Cohen, note 19, at 921. To get a sense of the implications of such a mixed
approach, consider Cohen's example of the allocation of wheelchairs to the disabled. Co
hen, note 19, at 917-18. The example involves a person whose legs are paralyzed and who
needs an expensive wheelchair to get around. Cohen argues that egalitarians will recom
mend giving him a chair before they ask about the welfare level to which the person's
paralysis reduces him. The reason is that " [w)hen compensating for disability, egalitarians
do not immediately distinguish between the different amounts of misery induced by similar
disabilities in people who have different (dis)utility functions. They propose compensation
for the disability as such, and not, or not only, for its deleterious welfare effects." Id.
(emphasis omitted). This is because " [!Jame people need [wheelchairs] to be adequately
resourced, whether or not they also need them to be, or to be capable of being, happy." Id.
at 918.
2 4 To rule out differences in physical appearance as a redistribution-worthy source of
inequality may strike some as giving away too much. Of course, whenever one tries to
draw distinctions between those types of inequality that deserve compulsory redistribution
and those that do not, there will be an inevitable measure of recourse to one's own intu
itions on the subject. And that is true here as well. We should emphasize that nothing
essential in our functional analysis turns on our choices of assumptions regarding which
types of inequality will justify redistribution.
25 See generally Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction 75
(1990) ("People's fate should depend on their ambitions (in the broad sense of goals and
projects about life), but should not depend on their natural and social endowments (the
circumstances in which they pursue their ambitions).").

Imaged with the Permission ofN.Y.U. Tax Law Review

164

TAX LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:

uct of the person's life choices. In sum, we assume for the purposes of
this Article that redistributive policy should try to eliminate or reduce
only those inequalities that are attributable to "brute luck." Or, to
use Ronald Dworkin's terms, we assume that a redistributive policy
should be "endowment-insensitive" but "ambition-sensitive,"26 and
we seek to provide a framework for choosing the optimal redistribu
tive policy instrument to achieve that goal.
For bona fide distributive justice theorists, our decision to focus on
brute luck-based inequality of well-being without providing a full de
fense of that assumption will be controversial. Presumably, however,
most of those who object will complain that our theory provides too
narrow (too stingy) a justification for compulsory redistribution. That
is, one might argue that the government also should try to redress
some types of inequality that are not the result of pure brute luck.27
We do not necessarily disagree. We limit our analysis to brute luck
based inequality, however, because it seems relatively uncontroversial
that compulsory redistribution can be justified at least with respect to
brute-luck-based inequality.28 Moreover, focusing on brute-luck
based inequality responds to the legitimate efficiency concern of
moral hazard inherent in any redistributive scheme-that is, the worry
that the availability of redistributive transfers will distort incentives in
various ways, such as by undermining work incentives.29
26 Dworkin, Equality of Resources, note 18, at 293, 330; see also Cohen, note 19, at 908
(arguing that "the primary egalitarian impulse is to extinguish the influence on distribution
of both exploitation and brute luck"). Brute luck, as distinct from "option luck," arises
when an individual's misfortune is involuntary and is not the result of a risk she could have
avoided. Welfarists therefore should find the distinction between brute luck and option
luck similar to issues associated with moral hazard. Thus, they too should find this distinc
tion relevant. Our conception of brute luck is somewhat broader than Dworkin's, how
ever. For us, brute luck arises when an individual's misfortune is not the result of a risk she
reasonably could have avoided.
21 For example, some would argue that the focus on the brute luck/choice distinction is
misguided, because it is nonexistent. Every choice, the argument goes, is the result of
one's genetic, environmental, and social circumstances. See, e.g., John E. Roemer, Equal
ity of Talent, 1 Econ. & Phil. 151 (1985). On this view, what should be equalized is well
being defined generally. Roemer, Equality, note 16. By adopting brute luck-based ine
quality as our redistributive target, we obviously reject this extreme version of determin
ism. We adopt instead the view that individuals should be held responsible for (and left to
live with) the results of at least some of their informed choices.
28 See Kymlicka, note 25.
2 9 In addition, some will object to our use of brute luck-based inequality because such a
norm is impossible to apply. Every difference in well-being, the argument goes, is attribu
table to an unknowable mix of brute luck and choice. We do not underestimate the seri
ousness of this concern. Indeed, perhaps the most important and difficult task of the
redistribution-minded policymaker is to develop reliable and, to the extent possible, pre
cise ways of distinguishing the effects of individual choice from the effects of brute luck. In
any event, these complaints are irrelevant to the main purpose of this Article. Although
we explain our comparative advantage framework through the lens of a particular redis
tributive goal (reducing brute luck-based inequality), the framework at the most general

Imaged with the Permission ofN.Y.U. Tax Law Review

2003]

REDISTRIBUTING OPTIMALLY

165

Thus, our approach will be to assume that the policymaker30 has
decided that some amount of redistribution is called for with respect
to inequality of something, whether it is income, wealth, capabilities,
or well-being. Which types of inequality should be so targeted and
how much are questions that we leave unanswered.3 1 We focus on the
institutional structures the policymaker should use to achieve
whatever redistributive goals it has chosen?32
Our general conclusion is that the redistribution-minded poli
cymaker should choose the system that has a comparative advantage
at redistributing with respect to the particular type of redistribution at
issue. If we focus for the moment on the dichotomous choice between
legal rules and tax-and-transfer rules (as the literature has tended to
do), we answer this question by asking two related but independent
questions: First, which of the two systems is the "better observer"
with respect to the type of inequality that is being targeted? (That is,
which system has a comparative advantage at observing the character
istic with respect to which redistribution is desired?) Second, which
system is the "better redistributor" with respect to that type of ine
quality? One major theme of our analysis is that, whereas one institu
tion may have a comparative advantage at measuring the particular
type of inequality at issue, another institution may have a comparative
advantage at doing the actual redistributing. For example, in some
situations we may want to use the legal system to observe the relevant
level could be applied to different conceptions of redistributive policy. We have tried,
however, to choose a redistributive goal that is consistent with a wide range of theories of
distributive justice.
30 We use the term policymaker as if there were a single decisionmaker whose decisions
somehow reflected the democratic will of society-the proverbial benevolent dictator.
Thus, for most of this Article, we ignore problems of preference aggregation or public
choice concerns. We return to this point in the Conclusion.
31 For most of this Article, we assume that a redistribution-minded policymaker would
likely regard each type of inequality as being largely independent of the other types of
inequality. Thus, for example, if it could be shown that the tax system is the optimal policy
instrument for dealing with income inequality, then a policymaker that seeks to use a dif
ferent policy instrument to redistribute with respect to, say, differences in genetically de
termined health prospects can ignore income differences. This assumption appears, on first
blush, inconsistent with the standard assumption of welfarists that there is only one, unified
criterion that the policymaker should care about (namely, individual well-being) and that
whatever policy instrument is used to redistribute should take into account all available
"proxies" for that unobservable characteristic. In Section IV, however, we argue that our
independence is in fact consistent with the welfarist approach. See text accompanying
notes 259-72.
32 We realize that the choice of type and amount of redistribution may be linked to the
functional question of which structure will be chosen to implement whatever redistributive
policy is chosen. Our analysis assumes, however, that it is both conceptually possible and
analytically useful to separate the institutional question (which we explore in this Article)
from the substantive redistributive question (which we seek to avoid).

Imaged with the Permission ofN.Y.U. Tax Law Review

166

TAX LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:

type of inequality or proxies for inequality and then have the tax-and
transfer system make the redistributive transfer.
Which brings us to another major theme of our analysis: The two
existing categories-legal rules and tax-and-transfer rules-do not ex
haust the universe of redistributive policy instruments. Even if every
policy instrument in some way could be characterized with some com
bination of those labels, it is not ultimately labels that we care about.
It is institutional design. And our view, stated most generally, is that
the policymaker should choose whatever institutional design works
best for each type of targeted inequality. Nevertheless, it makes sense
to begin the analysis with a look at the traditional categories; there
fore, in Section II we provide a working definition of those terms.
Section III adopts the legal rule/tax rule dichotomy and focuses on
the type of redistributive policy choice that has dominated the redis
tributive rules debate to date, that is, the question of income redistri
bution. Hence, if we assume that the policymaker has decided to
engage in a given amount of income redistribution (say, from the rich
to the poor), what is the best policy tool for achieving that goal?33
Applying our comparative advantage framework, we conclude that
the tax-and-transfer system probably is in general better at observing
or measuring individual income. After all, the tax system is designed
largely, if not primarily, with that task in mind. We also conclude that
the tax-and-transfer system is probably the better redistributor, for
practical reasons having to do with the so-called "contracting around"
and "haphazardness" problems associated with income-redistributive
legal rules. Thus, with respect to dealing with income inequality, we
generally side with those who believe that the lion's share of income
redistribution should be done through the tax-and-transfer system, al
though there may be some relatively small, supplementary role for the
legal system in redistributing income. We also show, however, that
one of the primary justifications for never using legal rules to reduce
income inequality-the so-called double distortion argument34-has
been overstated. By the same token, however, we show that certain
arguments that have been made to support always using legal rules to
reduce income inequality35 also have been overstated.
Also in Section III, we examine some existing behavioralist justifi
cations for using an income-redistributive "tort tax," such as a tort
rule that requires "rich defendants" to pay a special income tax when
held liable in court. Such a tort tax, some argue, might have some of
33 Although the literature focuses on income inequality, it is understood that most of the
same arguments could be made with respect to inequality of wealth as well.
34 Kaplow & Shaven, Legal Rules, note 10; Kaplow & Shaven, Legal System, note 5.
35 Sanchirico, Efficiency Rationale, note 8; Sanchirico, Taxes, note 10.
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the desirable characteristics of a probabilistic income tax: In particu
lar, such an implicit tax might have less of a distortive effect on work
incentives than a standard direct income tax.36 Our analysis of the
tort tax, however, suggests that, even if an income-redistributive tort
rule were feasible, the presence of liability insurance would under
mine its nondistortive character, making it more like a direct tax with
one important difference: Liability insurance companies rather than
the IRS would determine and collect the taxes. Thus, whether a sup
plementary tort tax would be desirable would depend, interestingly,
on whether it would be desirable to have at least part of the income
tax administered by private insurance companies rather than by a sin
gle administrative agency such as the Service. If one sees value in
privatizing such government functions (in order to benefit from the
effects of competition), a modest tort tax might be a useful adjunct to
the existing tax system.
Whereas Section III analyzes the existing redistributive rules de
bate, and thus focuses on the problem of reducing income inequality,
Section IV changes gears significantly. In Section IV, we take seri
ously the idea that there are other types of inequality that society
might want to reduce via redistribution. (Or, to put the analysis in
welfarist terms, there are other proxies for welfare inequality that so
ciety might want to take into account.) And it is with respect to non
income sources of inequality (or nonincome proxies for well-being)
that the tax-and-transfer system no longer has the clear comparative
advantage. Indeed, we identify some examples in which the legal sys
tem arguably has an advantage over the tax system as a means of
redistribution.
In Section IV, using an example from the field of insurance law, we
explore how antidiscrimination rules can produce a sort of horizontal
redistribution (cross-subsidization across consumers) that is not only
feasible but arguably more efficient than the tax-and-transfer alterna
tive. Section IV begins by asking whether a rule forbidding insurance
companies from using certain types of genetic information in their un
derwriting decisions might result in a redistributive transfer (from the
better off to the less well off) in a way that minimizes administrative
costs. Here again, we compare the legal rule approach (which in this
case takes the form of a nondiscrimination norm) to a tax-and-transfer
alternative. What we show, however, is that the choice of the optimal
redistributive policy instrument in this case is more complicated than a
simple choice of legal rule versus tax rule. Instead, the best choice
may lie somewhere between those two extremes. For example, one
36 Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51
Vand. L. Rev. 1653 (1998) [hereinafter Behavioral Economics].
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intermediate solution might entail a contract-based legal rule forbid
ding insurance companies from discriminating on the basis of disease
related genes together with a law requiring the purchase of insurance.
Compulsory private insurance, of course, begins to resemble vari
ous social insurance alternatives, such as Medicare or Social Security,
which in turn have some of the characteristics of a tax-and-transfer
regime. That is, the distinction between premiums and taxes begins to
break down, as does the distinction between benefit pay-outs and in
kind transfers. As a result, the analysis in this Section-and the les
sons from norms of nondiscrimination in private insurance markets
may have important implications for the optimal design of social in
surance arrangements. For example, it is worth exploring the extent
to which cross-subsidization within Medicare (from the well to the
sick) can be understood as a relatively efficient system of horizontal
redistribution. In any event, our point in this Section is to shift the
focus away from simple comparisons of the paradigmatic cases of legal
rules and tax regimes to a more subtle discussion of mixed regimes,
especially those involving various types of insurance mechanisms.
Section IV also analyzes two types of nonincome-based inequality
that arguably can be reduced best via a tort rule. We explore the ex
tent to which pain and suffering damages can be justified as a type of
redistributive transfer from the better off (those who do not experi
ence personal injuries) to the worse off (those who do). If such a re
distributive transfer is something that society deems appropriate, we
argue that the tort system has a comparative advantage with respect to
making such transfers. We also consider a type of inequality that has
been discussed in the existing redistributive rules literature: inequal
ity with respect to an individual's "accident-proneness"-or the innate
(in)ability to avoid accidents. For example, the aged or the disabled
may have an inherently lower ability to avoid certain types of acci
dents. Or, to use the law and economics term, such individuals have
"high costs of care."37 If society determined that redistribution with
respect to this sort of inequality were appropriate, how should it be
done? Applying our comparative advantage framework, we explore
the possibility of a negligence standard in which the due care standard
is defined subjectively (based on each individual's own "cost of care")
rather than objectively (based on the cost of care of the hypothetical
reasonable person). We argue that a due care standard that is at least
somewhat tailored to the individual's circumstances can be justified
both on efficiency and distributive justice grounds.
37

Michael B. Dorff, Why Welfare Depends on Fairness, 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. 847, 889

(2002).
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In this Article, then, we show that in applying our comparative ad
vantage framework, income redistribution may be best accomplished
primarily through the tax-and-transfer system (with some possible
room for a supplementary lump sum tort tax), but there are nonin
come measures of inequality with respect to which the legal system
should play an essential redistributive role. Although we provide a
framework that we believe can be useful in analyzing any question of
redistributive policy, we explore in detail only a limited set of applica
tions, on the theory that we cannot do everything in one article. In
particular, most of our applications involve cash transfers, and only
certain types of cash transfers.38 The one important exception in
volves the example of horizontal redistribution in insurance markets,
where a nondiscrimination rule with respect to genetically determined
diseases would produce a sort of in kind redistribution-that is, redis
tribution in the form of medical care. Moreover, except for a brief
discussion in the Conclusion, we overlook a whole range of other
types of redistributive policies, including, most prominently, disability
law,39 antidiscrimination law more generally (that is, beyond the con
text of insurance), as well as anything having to do with the scope of
property rights.40 Although our comparative advantage framework
may indeed apply in those areas as well, such an inquiry is beyond the
scope of this Article.
II. DEFINING SOME TERMS
As mentioned in the Introduction, in applying our comparative ad
vantage framework, we generally follow the convention within the
38 Although economists tend to favor cash transfers over in kind transfers, we believe
that any comprehensive theory of distributive justice must take into account in kind trans
fers (such as regulating disabled individuals' access to public areas) as well antidiscrimina
tion laws in general. The rationale behind the economists' preference for cash rather than
in kind transfers is that cash is more fungible and thus permits transferees to have a greater
degree of control over what the subsidy ultimately goes to pay for. Stiglitz, note 2, at 397400. For economists, it is almost always a good idea to let individuals decide what is in
their own best interests. Even economists, however, will acknowledge some limits to this
principle in cases in which there are good reasons to doubt that the transferees will make
choices that are in their own long-run best interests. For example, even economists are
willing to be paternalistic with children or with addicts of various sorts. Id. at 401-05. In
addition, economists may accept in kind transfers if necessary to avoid externalities or if in
kind transfers can be viewed as a sort of public good expenditures. As an example of the
latter type of expenditure, it might make sense from an economist's perspective to install
ramps in public places to accommodate individuals in wheelchairs if such ramps can be
understood as a sort of public good.
39 See generally Mark Kelman, Strategy or Principle? The Choice Between Regulation
and Taxation (1999).
40 See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85 Va. L. Rev. 741 (1999)
[hereinafter Takings] (demonstrating how progressive distributive considerations can be
grafted onto takings law without unduly hindering efficiency and other concerns).
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literature of using the terms tax-and-transfer system and legal system
. as if their meanings are clear and obviously distinct from each other.
Of course, neither is true. One way of illustrating this point is to note
that any legal rule could be recharacterized semantically as a sort of
tax-and-transfer regime. For example, a tort liability rule can be
recharacterized as a tax on tort defendants accompanied by an equal
transfer to the tort plaintiff, with the administrator of the tax-and
transfer regime being the courts and, to some extent, private insur
ance companies.
But to recharacterize a tort rule in this way does not change the fact
that a tort rule is in many important ways different in institutional
design from, say, the income tax. In our view the choice faced by the
redistribution-minded policymaker is not so much an either/or deci
sion as a more general question of institutional design.41 Neverthe
less, it still makes sense at least initially to focus (as the existing
literature has done) on a few core examples that do fit rather nicely
into these categories. It is also important, as mentioned in the Intro
duction, to understand and explore the other institutional designs
available to the policymaker. To that end, one major objective of this
Article is to begin to examine some of the intermediate redistributive
policy options that lie somewhere between the extreme examples that
have been the focus of the debate to date. For now, though, we ex
plain what we (and others) generally mean by these dichotomous cat
egories of tax-and-transfer system and legal system.
We begin with the tax-and-transfer system. A tax might be defined
as money or other resources collected by the government from indi
viduals or firms.42 Taxes typically are determined by applying a tax
rate (or series of tax rates, in the case of a progressive tax) to a given
base of a particular taxable unit. It is the taxable unit (individual or
corporation) that is legally responsible to pay the taxes. Taxes usually
are imposed for one of three reasons: (1) to raise revenue to spend on
public goods such as national defense or a legal system, which, by as
sumption, the unregulated market cannot provide or cannot provide
satisfactorily by itself, (2) to fund redistributive transfers either in cash
or in kind from one group to another (usually from the better off to
the less well off, or so we hope), or (3) to internalize externalities and
41 Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex
Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 Yale L.J. 1 163 (1998). We are not the first to recog
nize the multifaceted nature of the choice that faces the redistribution-minded poli
cymaker. See, e.g., Kelman, note 39.
4 2 Taxes also could take the form of in kind payments. For example, the military draft
could be thought of as a type of tax for which payment must be made in the form of time
devoted to military service. Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 524 (5th ed.
1998).
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enhance efficiency. One can imagine taxes on a wide range of tax
bases, from those as broad as income or consumption to those as nar
row as sales of cigarettes.
On the transfer side, dollars raised through taxes can be spent in
various ways.43 For example, they can be spent on public goods. Un
less those public goods provide benefits to taxpayers precisely equal
to (or in proportion to) the amount of tax they pay into the system,
the provision of such public goods will effect some degree of redistri
bution.44 In addition, tax dollars can be transferred directly to the
least well off in society either as cash subsidies or some type of in kind
benefits.45 Thus, one cannot determine the overall distributional ef
fect of a tax-and-transfer system by focusing solely on the tax side or
exclusively on the transfer side. Both sides of the ledger must be
taken into account. The paradigmatic example of a tax-and-transfer
regime seems to be an income tax that includes a transfer compo
nent-that is, individuals whose annual income rises above a given
amount pay taxes to the government, and those whose income falls
below a given amount receive a transfer from the govemment.46 The
latter part of the system sometimes is called a negative income tax.
The participants in the redistributive rules debate seem to use the
term legal rules to mean such private law fields as tort law, contract
law, and property law and such nontax public law fields as environ
mental law, product safety regulation, and labor law.47 Thus, legal
rules are, essentially, all private law and all nontax public law. Spe
cific examples of legal rules that have been characterized as redistrib
utive, or potentially redistributive, include products liability rules
making producers responsible for personal injuries caused by their
products,48 consumer lending laws that limit the amount of interest
that lenders can charge,49 minimum wage laws,50 and housing codes.51
43 Alternatively, in kind tax payments of, say, labor can be devoted to any number of
public purposes such as military service.
44 Polinsky, note 5, at 120.
45 Kelman, note 39, at 103. Such redistributive transfers themselves can be viewed as a
sort of public good, in the sense that, without government compulsion, the same degree of
redistribution from rich to poor could not be achieved.
46 See Kronman, note 9, at 498-99.
47 In his classic book, Polinsky includes such fields as nuisance law, contract law, auto
mobile accident law, environmental law, and products liability law within his analysis of
"legal rules." Polinsky, note 5.
4 8 See Alan 0. Sykes, Reformulating Tort Reform, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 153, 1159 (1989)
(reviewing Peter W. Huber, Liability: The Legal Revolution and its Consequences {1988));
Gregory Keating, Distributive and Corrective Justice in the Tort Law of Accidents, 74 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 193, 194 (2000) (arguing that concepts of distributive justice should inform tort
law generally).
49 Kronman, note 9, at 473.
50 Id.
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With respect to some legal rules, the effect of the rules is to allocate
risks between parties-between buyers and sellers, producers and
consumers, drivers and pedestrians, polluters and the state.s2 As a
result, legal rules, private and public, often give rise to insurance mar
kets, as individuals or firms seek to shed the risk associated with those
rules.s3 It makes sense, then, that if the full distributional effects of a
redistributive legal rule are to be considered, the effects of the appli
cable liability insurance market-such as the price and terms of the
standard liability policies-also should be considered. Although some
participants in the redistributive rules debate have recognized this
fact,s4 we attempt to incorporate more fully into our general frame
work the role of liability insurance as part of the so-called legal
system.
One other term that we should define at this point is "income." As
other scholars writing in this literature have done, we focus on income
as the primary measure of economic well-being and thus assume that
income inequality is a primary target of any redistributive policy.ss
Although for nontax experts, the meaning of the term income may
seem obvious, any tax scholar, and any law student who has taken the
introductory federal income tax course, knows otherwise. Giving
flesh to the concept of income occupies a substantial fraction of the
voluminous Code and even more voluminous regulations. Moreover,
there is a large tax policy literature devoted to the question of what
constitutes income. We do not expect to offer a comprehensive defini
tion of income in this small space. We offer a tentative, functional
definition to get things started, a definition shaped by the purpose of
our analysis.
At the most general level, an individual's income can be understood
as a proxy for the more salient but unobservable underlying character
istic of "ability to pay taxes." And this notion of ability to pay in
cludes both the individual's human capital (that is, her earning power)
and financial capital (for example, the return from her inherited
wealth). We also define income to be roughly what the Code calls
"adjusted gross income," which consists of an individual's wages and
salary (income from human capital) as well as her rents, interest, and
dividends received (income from financial capital) net of business-re5 1 Bruce Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of
Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 Yale. L.J. 1093
(1971).
52 Polinsky, note 5, at 132-33.
53 Id. at 53-55.
54 See, e.g., Jolls, Behavioral Economics, note 36, at 1663-67.
55 See note 5.
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lated expenses.56 What the tax lawyer or tax scholar immediately will
notice about this definition of income is its omission of certain deduc
tions, such as those for extraordinary medical expenses and for casu
alty losses. We left those out intentionally, because whether to allow
such deductions is a version of the question that this Article primarily
addresses. That is, deductions for medical expenses or casualty losses
should be allowed, under our framework, only if the income tax sys
tem is the optimal system for achieving distributional equity with re
spect to those characteristics.
III.

INCOME REDISTRIBUTION: THE CURRENT
REDISTRIBUTIVE RULES DEBATE

A.

Applying the Comparative Advantage Framework

The question this Section addresses, and the question on which the
literature has focused, is what redistributive policy instrument or mix
of instruments is the best means of redistributing with respect to in
come inequality. Or to put the question in the spirit of the existing
redistributive rules debate: Should redistribution with respect to in
come always be left exclusively to the tax-and-transfer system or is
there some role for income redistribution through the legal system?
In our view, two further questions facilitate the choice of the optimal
redistributive policy instrument-especially when comparing legal
rules to tax rules: (1) Which institution (the tax system or the legal
system) is the "better observer," that is, which is better at measuring
each individual's income? and (2) Which institution is the "better
redistributor," that is, once we have the information about income,
which system should make the actual transfers? Again, these func
tions could be performed by the same institution or by different insti
tutions, and in some cases, by both.
1.

The Better Observer

It seems uncontroversial that the income tax system would be a bet
ter observer than the legal system when it comes to measuring in
come. After all, the whole enforcement tax system (including the
Code, the Service, and the like) was designed largely with that task in
mind-to define the concept of income, to establish a set of tax rates
that apply to different levels of income so as to assure the desired
level of progressivity (or lack of it), and to set up a system of enforce
ment (including wage withholding, information returns, and the threat
of audits) to induce the maximal level of compliance with the minimal
56

IRC § 62.
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amount of enforcement costs. Even those who support some redis
tributive role for the legal system seem to assume that something like
the existing income tax regime would remain in place, at least as a
source of information about individuals' relative incomes.57
We do not claim that the existing income tax system is perfect or
even nearly perfect. As far as we are aware, no one holds that view.
All existing tax systems have flaws, and the U.S. system is no excep
tion. Indeed, most tax policy scholarship is devoted to pointing out
the many imperfections in existing tax regimes in this country and
elsewhere. But the relevant comparison is between an idealized tax
and-transfer system, after the flaws have been fixed (or minimized),
and an idealized legal system, also devoid of flaws. Thus, the question
we are interested in is which system, by its nature, would be the better
proxy observer with respect to income. And again, if that is the ques
tion, the obvious answer seems to be the tax-and-transfer system.58
2.

The Better Redistributor

The second part of our comparative advantage analysis requires the
policymaker to ask whether the legal system or the tax-and-transfer
57 For example, even Sanchirico, who clearly sees some legitimate redistributive role for
the legal system, never advocates outright abolition of the income tax. See generally
Sanchirico, Efficiency Rationale, note 8.
58 One qualification to this conclusion might be that the legal system could provide a
sort of back-up audit function to the income tax system. That is, even if we need to have
something like the existing tax system as a means of gathering certain basic pieces of infor
mation about the vast majority of taxpayers' income levels, it might be useful if courts were
to gather (and perhaps share with the Service) a more detailed picture of the wealth or
income of the parties before it. The Service, for example, used to have a program called
the Taxpayer Compliance Management Program ("TCMP"}, whose purpose was to subject
a small number of randomly-selected taxpayers to a very comprehensive audit, much more
comprehensive than the general audits performed by the Service. The purpose of the
TCMP audits was to produce information about taxpayer compliance behavior that could
assist the Service in its enforcement efforts, including its decisions regarding where to focus
its enforcement resources. Congress abolished the program in 1998. In an effort to mea
sure compliance in a less burdensome manner, the Service plans to implement a new pro
gram known as the National Research Program ("NRP"), which also will review randomly
selected returns. See George Guttman, IRS Moving Ahead on Taxpayer Compliance Sur
vey, 95 Tax Notes 833 (May 6, 2002) (describing the now-extinct TCMP as well as the
NRP). One possible alternative or supplement to the TCMP would be to have courts, in
nontax cases, perform a similar function as part of implementing a redistributive legal rule.
This, if we imagine courts seeking to engage in some measure of income redistribution via,
say, tort law, we might imagine the courts relying not merely on the parties' tax returns,
but engaging in full scale audits. Giving courts this sort of in-depth audit responsibility
might even be better than having the Service do it in cases in which, because of the nature
of the lawsuits, information concerning the parties' financial situation is relevant for rea
sons independent of distributional policy. To be clear, we do not argue for replacing the
tax system generally as a means of observing individual incomes, but rather argue for sup
plementing the tax system with the legal system.
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system is the better redistributor. The manner in which the tax-and
transfer system redistributes income is fairly straightforward: High in
come people are taxed more than low income people, with the lowest
income folks receiving transfer payments. For now, assume that
something like our existing tax-and-transfer system will be used to
gather information about each individual's income level. It is still con
ceivable that that information might be used by courts in various ways
to equalize income between parties to lawsuits (or to equalize income
between groups of parties who are likely to be involved in lawsuits).
Income redistribution through the legal system could be accomplished
in two general ways.
First, there could be "class-based" redistributive rules, which seem
to be what some commentators have in mind when they talk about
redistributive legal rules generally.59 Examples of these would include
employment rules that are "pro-worker," property rules that are "pro
tenant," or product liability rules that are "pro-consumer." The ratio
nale behind such class-based redistributive rules would be that em
ployees (vis-a-vis employers), tenants (vis-a-vis landlords), and
consumers (vis-a-vis product manufacturers) are on average relatively
poor. In all of these examples, the group being redistributed from is
in a contractual relationship with the group being redistributed to, but
that need not always be the case. One also could imagine "pro-pedes
trian" auto safety rules or "pro-citizen" pollution control rules that
did not involve contractual relationships. 60 The theory behind any
such rules, again, to the extent they are justified on income redistribu
tion grounds, would be that one class of parties (employers, landlords,
manufacturers, or drivers) tends on average to be wealthier or to have
higher incomes than the class of parties benefiting from the rule.
An alternative to the class-based approach would be a "case-spe
cific" income-redistributive legal rule. To see how such an approach
would work, imagine a tort rule providing that if damages are
awarded in any tort case they must be adjusted upward or downward
depending on the relative incomes of the two parties involved in the
suit.61 Thus, if in a particular driver-pedestrian auto accident case, the
59

See, e.g., Polinsky, note 5, at 124-27.
See id. at 123-24.
It is not always clear whether scholars writing about redistributive legal rules have in
mind class-based redistributive rules or case-specific redistributive rules. See, e.g., Kaplow
& Shaven, Efficiency in Redistribution, note 10, at 669-70. On the one hand, when Kaplow
and Shaven discuss the issue in general terms, they seem to deal with class-based redistrib
utive rules. Yet, when providing models and examples, the rules Kaplow and Shavell dis
cuss seem fairly case-specific, in that each individual subject to the rule is supposed to pay
(or receive) tort damages in accordance with the difference between his and the other
party's specific incomes. Id. Sanchirico, too, is somewhat hard to pin down on this point.
In one place he seems to endorse case-specific redistributive rules. In his view, "specific
60
61
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injuring driver's income turned out to be higher than that of the in
jured pedestrian, the damages owed by the driver, if she were found
liable, would be adjusted upward. Alternatively, if the pedestrian
happened to be richer, the adjustment would go the other way; the
damages would be reduced by the amount of the redistributive tax.
Again, if such a rule were adopted, it is our assumption that the tax
system would still be the primary proxy observer, in the sense that the
courts, applying a class-based or case-specific income-redistributive
rule, would use Service-gathered information regarding relative
incomes.62
Return now to our second question: Which system-as between le
gal rules and tax rules-is overall the better income redistributor? As
the literature on redistributive legal rules has developed, there seems
to be little disagreement that the tax-and-transfer system should be
used as one means of redistributing income, for the same reasons that
it should be used as a proxy observer. The real question is whether
there should be any income-redistributive role for the legal system.
As summarized in the Introduction, the now conventional view among
some economists and most law and economics scholars is that all re
distribution of income should be done through the tax-and-transfer
system, and none through the legal system.63
Commentators have offered three distinct arguments in support of
this conclusion. First, it has long been argued that income redistribu
tion through certain types of legal rules is not feasible, because the
parties affected by the rule will contract around the redistributive as
pect of the rule.64 A second longstanding argument against income
redistributive legal rules is that, even to the extent such redistribution
is feasible, it is too haphazard-it is both underinclusive and overin
clusive-compared with the same sort of redistribution accomplished
through the tax-and-transfer system.65 The third and most recent ob
jection to income-redistributive legal rules, sometimes called the
double-distortion argument, says that any income redistribution that
feasibly can be accomplished through the legal system can be accomconditioning [of the redistributive legal rules] on the observable economic attributes of the
particular parties before the court is actually welfare-improving." Sanchirico, Efficiency
Rationale, note 8, at 101 1. Elsewhere, however, he suggests that class-based rules are what
he has in mind. For example, his discussion of the use of "multidimensional tax tables,"
discussed below at note 165, might be understood as getting at a sort of class-based redis
tributive legal rule. Id. at 1027-28.
62 It is with respect to the case-specific approach, however, that the courts could perform
a sort of random auditing function. See note 58.
63 See text accompanying notes 5-8.
64 See, e.g., Polinsky, note 5, at 122-23.
65 Id. at 125-27; Kaplow & Shavell, Legal System, note 5, at 674-75; Sanchirico, Effi
ciency Rationale, note 8, at 1051-56.
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plished more efficiently through the tax-and-transfer system, because
the redistributive legal rules inevitably involve two types of distortion
whereas redistributive tax-and-transfer rules involve only one.66
In the following Subsections, we address these objections to in
come-redistributive legal rules. We argue that the legal economists'
case for the exclusive use of the tax-and-transfer system for redistrib
uting income and for never using income-redistributive legal rules has
been overstated in several respects. In addition, we evaluate an argu
ment that has been made in favor of always using legal rules to redis
tribute income at least as a supplement to the tax system. We
conclude that this argument also is overstated. Our tentative overall
conclusion with respect to income redistribution is that we agree with
the legal economists' bottom line that the tax system should be the
primary redistributive policy instrument, although for purely prag
matic (nontheoretical) reasons.
B.

Evaluation of the Case for Never Using
Income-Redistributive Legal Rules

The Contracting-Around Argument

1.

A standard argument made by legal economists against using legal
rules as a tool for redistributing income is that, in a large class of
cases, redistributive legal rules simply will not work. Specifically, the
argument is that, with respect to legal rules that govern parties who
are in contractual relationships with one another, any attempt to re
distribute income through the legal rule in some sense will be con
tracted around.67 Thus, although the critics of redistributive legal
rules will concede that income redistribution is feasible (though no
noptimal) for legal rules governing strangers, such as drivers and
pedestrians or polluters and pollutees, they generally agree that redis
tribution with respect to contract-based legal rules is not feasible,
whether the contractual relationship in question involves a bilateral
monopoly, with the two parties bargaining over the surplus, or a com
petitive market situation, with prices and terms determined by market
forces.68 In either case, if the policymaker were to use a legal rule to
redistribute from one group perceived to be relatively wealthy to an
other group perceived to be relatively poor, the redistributive aspect
of the rule would be offset.
The way this contracting-around process would work depends on
the market setting in which the rule was designed to operate. First,
66

67
68

Kaplow & Shaven, Legal Rules, note 10, at 823-24.
See, e.g., Polinsky, note 5, at 122-23.
See, e.g., id. at 122-24.
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consider situations involving bilateral monopoly contractual relation
ships, for example certain landlord-tenant relationships. If a pro-ten
ant redistributive rule were introduced into such a setting, the parties
would simply undo the effects of the rule through ex ante bargaining
over price or terms or both. The result would be that the joint surplus
from the contractual relationship would be distributed between the
parties according to their relative bargaining power.69 And since the
superior bargaining power often would rest with the wealthier party, it
is doubtful that the resulting distribution of the contractual surplus
would be consistent with the redistributive aim of the policymaker.
Second, consider contractual situations that do not involve bilateral
monopolies but that instead arise under conditions of market competi
tion. In such settings parties would not literally contract around the
redistributive rule; rather, competitive forces in the long run would
cause prices and terms to adjust in a way that would offset the intent
of the rule.7° For example, if a special products liability "tax" were
adopted in order to redistribute from relatively rich manufacturers to
relatively poor consumers, the long-run outcome would be that the
prices would rise to offset the effect of the rule.71 For this reason, the
conventional law and economics version of the contracting-around ar
gument concludes that "whenever the parties to a dispute are in some
kind of contractual or market relationship, it may be difficult, if not
impossible, to use the legal system to redistribute income."72
These simple versions of the contracting-around argument, how
ever, are at best incomplete. For starters, in bilateral monopoly situa
tions, although bargaining can undercut the distributional objectives
of a redistributive legal rule, the design of rules can affect the division
of the contract surplus. Indeed, some legal rules are designed specifi
cally to alter the division of the surplus in contractual settings. Con
sider, for example, the rules enabling the creation of employee unions,
authorizing collective bargaining, and permitting workers to go on
strike. The very purpose of such rules is to change the division of the
contractual surplus and to shift some of the contractual surplus-some
of the wealth created by employment contracts-from employers to
employees.73
69

Id. at 122-23.
Id. at 123.
Id.; Kaplow & Shavell, Legal System, note 5, at 1.
n Polinsky, note 44, at 123.
73 We do not suggest, of course, that the rules authorizing collective bargaining are nec
essarily efficient. Our point here is that such rules are, in an important sense, redistribu
tive. Sanchirico makes a similar observation. Sanchirico, Efficiency Rationale, note 8, at
1047. For an analysis of wage data from the early 1900's that shows that employers were
able to pass on to their employees a significant part of the higher costs of higher post
accident compensation, but that the size of the wage offset was smaller for union workers,
70
11
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In addition, even in nonbilateral monopoly situations, the argument
that prices always will rise to offset any redistributive effect of legal
rules is an oversimplification. To the contrary, some scholars have ar
gued that whether legal rules can be made to redistribute from, say,
manufacturers to consumers depends on whether manufacturers are
able to pass on the entire amount of the cost increase to the consum
ers. 74 According to this argument, the extent to which manufacturers
will be able to pass on those costs depends on the relative elasticity of
demand and supply: The more inelastic the demand for and the more
elastic the supply of the product, the more manufacturers will be able
to pass on the costs to consumers. Following this reasoning, if demand
for the product is elastic and supply inelastic, manufacturers would be
relatively unable to pass those costs on to consumers. As a result,
consumers may benefit from the redistributive legal rule because they
get the full benefit of the rule but bear only part of the costs.75
Even this argument, however, is oversimplified. As Richard Cras
well has pointed out, this argument ignores the fact that introducing a
pro-consumer products liability rule not only would increase manufac
turers' costs but also would increase consumers' demand for the prod
uct in question. Once the shift in demand is taken into account, the
analysis becomes considerably more complex.76 In situations involv
ing homogeneous consumer preferences regarding a new pro-con
sumer rule, Craswell shows that consumers will be made better off
only if the rule is efficient-in the sense that consumers benefit from
the rule more than it costs manufacturers.77 In a more recent analysis,
Christine Jolls reached a similar conclusion with respect to "accommo
dation mandates," which she defines as a "requirement that employ-

see Price V. Fishback and Shawn Everett Kantor, Did Workers Pay for the Passage of
Workers' Compensation Laws?, at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=226547
(Dec. 1994). One might hold the view, of course, that rules enabling the organization of
labor unions and authorizing strikes are inefficient. Whether or not that is so is irrelevant
to our argument here, since the question we address is not whether redistribution through
contract-based rules is efficient, but whether it is feasible.
74 The observation that costs imposed through a contract-based redistributive rule might
not be fully passed on through the price was first made by Bruce Ackerman in discussing
housing codes. Ackerman, note 51, at 1105-08.
75 For a clear summary of this argument, see Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of
Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 Stan. L. Rev.
361, 366-68 (1991).
76 Id. at 368.
77 Id. at 372. Craswell points out therefore that, under the homogeneous consumer as
sumption, pro-consumer rules that pass on less than all of the manufacturer's costs to con
sumers will make consumers worse off. In fact, the best situation for consumers is a rule
that allows "more than 100 percent" of the costs to be passed on to consumers, in the sense
that consumers benefit from the rule by more than it costs manufacturers. Id.
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ers take special steps in response to the distinctive needs of particular,
identifiable demographic groups of workers."78
In other words, rules designed to be vertically redistributive in the
contract-based setting can be so only if they are also efficient. In our
view, although that conclusion is correct (under the assumptions), it is
not clear what implications follow from it. One response would be to
say that, if a pro-consumer or pro-employee rule is efficient, manufac
turers or employers already will have incentives to adopt it (to maxi
mize their profits), and we thus do not need a legal rule to force them
to do so. One of the main points of this Article is to disagree with that
assertion. Surely it is not the case that concluding that a rule is effi
cient (that the value to the employee or consumer exceeds the cost to
the employer or manufacturer) negates the rule's independent value
as a tool of distributive justice. Much of law and economics scholar
ship is devoted to analyzing market failures (or cognitive biases) that
prevent parties from reaching efficient bargains. And if a pro-con
sumer or pro-employee rule, which for market failure reasons has not
been adopted, can be supported both on efficiency grounds and distri
butional grounds, the case for adopting such a rule is clearly strength
ened.79 As we argue at length in Section IV below, there are a
number of instances in which a rule can be both efficient and redis
tributive in a desirable direction.
Moving beyond the assumption of homogenous consumers, in situa
tions in which consumers have heterogeneous preferences regarding a
particular pro-consumer rule, Craswell shows that distributional and
78 Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 223, 231 (2000). The par
adigmatic accommodation mandate would be the "reasonable accommodations" require
ment of the Americans With Disabilities Act. Id. at 225. Jolls concludes that, if related
antidiscrimination law is binding (that is, employers are not allowed to undermine the ac
commodation mandate by the reducing wages or employment levels of the targeted
group), then an accommodation mandate will make the targeted group better off only if
the value of the mandate to the group exceeds its cost to the employer. Id. at 246-51.
7 9 To take just one example, economist Jonathon Gruber studied the labor market ef
fects of introducing mandatory coverage for the expenses of childbirth in employer-pro
vided health insurance policies. According to traditional economic theory, the
introduction of such a mandatory, not-bargained-for term in the employment contract
should cause wages to fall by less than the cost of the benefit, because if wages fall by
100% of the cost of the benefit, then at least some of the employers would have provided
the benefit voluntarily. The study found consistently, however, that 100% of the costs
were shifted to employees through wage reductions and that there was virtually no reduc
tion in employment. Presumably, although the employees valued the benefit more than its
cost to the employer, the benefit was not being provided absent the mandate. Jonathon
Gruber, The Incidence of Mandated Maternity Benefits, 84 Am. Econ. Rev. 622 (1994);
see also Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to
Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471, 1506-07 (1998) (discussing Gruber study and
suggesting a behavioral explanation for lack of market provision of apparently efficient
term).
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efficiency concerns no longer necessarily converge and even defining
what is a pro-consumer rule becomes very complex.80 Depending
upon various consumer groups' willingness to pay for the product in
question and for the new pro-consumer rule, it is possible to conceive
of a situation in which a pro-consumer rule would result in a desirable
form of "horizontal redistribution" (from one consumer group to an
other, rather than from manufacturer to consumer) .8 1 Such a rule
would be very difficult to design, however, if the redistributive target
is income inequality among various consumer groups. s2
In sum, it is wrong to assert that redistribution through contract
based legal rules is impossible or infeasible. Contract-based income
redistribution can be accomplished under certain conditions.83 Never
theless, the difficulties raised by the contracting-around problem are
real. And as always, we are asking a comparative question: Given
that in some cases redistributive legal rules to some extent will be con
tracted around, is not the tax-and-transfer system a superior system of
redistribution? Although we remain tentative on this point, we con
clude that the contracting-around argument seriously weakens the
case for using contract-based legal rules to redistribute vertically, such
as from manufacturers to consumers or from employers to employees
in order to reduce income inequality.84 As we argue in Section IV,
so

Craswell, note 75, at 376-77.
Id.
82 Id. at 376-85. In Section I I I we offer several examples of contract-based redistributive
legal rules that, in fact, do produce a type of horizontal redistribution that is both desirable
and practical. Those rules, however, focus on nonincome measures of inequality. With
respect to income inequality, we tend to agree with Craswell that contract-based redistrib
utive legal rules-whether intended to produce vertical or horizontal income redistribu
tion-are impractical, when compared with the tax-and-transfer system.
83 In this Article, we focus on redistribution in the form of cash payments. If we were to
expand the analysis, however, to consider in kind redistributive transfers, there are exam
ples of contract-based redistributive rules that would not be fully contracted around. For
example, if the policymaker were to impose large fixed expenditures on employers or man
ufacturers designed to benefit relatively poor (or, more generally, less well off) employees
or consumers, the cost of those fixed expenses could not readily be passed on to employees
(through lower wages) or to consumers (through higher prices), as those are not marginal
expenditures.
84 Sanchirico, in his response to the contracting-around argument, contends that that
this argument does not provide a reason to prefer the income tax to redistributive, con
tract-based legal rules, because, among other things, the contracting-around problem is no
different from the problem of income shifting, which plagues the tax-and-transfer system.
Sanchirico, Efficiency Rationale, note 8, at 1047. Examples of income shifting include situ
ations in which high-tax individuals shift their income (at least the reporting of it) to low
tax individuals within their families, thus lowering the household's overall tax burden and
undermining the intended effect of the progressive rate structure. Id. at 1047 n.113. But
income shifting of this sort would be just as much a problem for income-redistributive legal
rules as it is for the direct tax on income. Under either system, special rules would be
necessary to prevent this sort of tax evasion. Perhaps the more relevant question is
whether something akin to the contracting-around problem would affect a direct tax on
81
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however, when we broaden the analysis to include nonincome mea
sures of well-being, and begin to consider the possibility of using con
tract-based legal rules to redistribute horizontally (through cross
subsidization), the contracting-around argument has little or no
application.
2.

The Haphazardness Argument

Commentators also commonly argue that income redistribution
through the legal system is more haphazard than income redistribu
tion through the tax system. This haphazardness complaint consists of
two separate concerns: the problem of inaccuracy and the problem of
underinclusiveness.85
a.

The Problem of Inaccuracy

The problem of inaccuracy is most acute with respect to class-based
redistributive rules, by which we mean, again, legal rules designed to
redistribute from a class of potential defendants to a class of potential
plaintiffs based on a determination that the average income of the
former class is greater than the average income of the latter. Exam
ples of class-based redistributive rules might include pro-consumer
product liability doctrines or pro-tenant property doctrines. There in
evitably will be some imprecision within the relevant classes. For ex
ample, pro-pedestrian auto accident tort rules (that is, rules that
tended to redistribute from drivers to pedestrians) would be a highly
imprecise redistributive tool. As Polinsky notes, "[i]t may be that
higher income persons are more likely to be drivers than pedestrians,
but certainly there are many low-income drivers and high-income
pedestrians."86 As a result of such inaccuracy, pro-pedestrian rules
would result in not only redistribution in the right direction (from rich
drivers to poor pedestrians), but also a great deal of redistribution in
the wrong direction (from poor drivers to rich pedestrians).
Not every class-based redistributive rule, though, need be so impre
cise. Some classes of potential defendants and potential plaintiffs will
income. Tax policy scholars generally assume that the incidence of direct taxes on individ
ual income tends not to be shifted through contractual relationships. See, e.g., Slemrod &
Bakija, note 12, at 71 ("The entire burden of individual income taxes is assumed to fall on
those families who have the legal liability, with no shifting at all of tax levied on either
labor or capital income."). The incidence of the corporate income tax is less clear. Id. at
68 ("Unfortunately, tracing the ultimate incidence of a tax levied on corporations, such as
the corporation income tax, is a very difficult and controversial matter.").
ss Polinsky, note 5, at 125-27; Kaplow & Shavell, Legal System, note 5, at 674-75;
Sanchirico, Efficiency Rationale, note 8, at 1051-56.
86 Polinsky, note 5, at 126.
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correspond more closely with the income classes that are the target of
redistribution. Some pollution control laws, for example, might be
targeted at manufacturers (or, even more precisely, at manufacturers
in certain industries) whose incomes are relatively high. So long as
the benefits of such targeted redistributive rules either were focused
on the relatively poor or spread evenly across the citizenry, such
targeted class-based redistributive rules could be relatively accurate.87
Critics of class-based redistributive rules, however, argue that no
matter how carefully the classes of potential defendants and potential
plaintiffs are drawn, redistributive rules by their nature can never be
as accurate as the income tax.88 The income tax, after all, is designed
primarily to separate individuals and firms into classes based on in
come. The main point of the Code is to provide a system for measur
ing and taxing the income of individuals and firms so that the amount
of tax each taxpayer pays is an explicit function (a simple percentage)
of that taxpayer's income. Thus, the Code, as well as the regulations
and judicial decisions interpreting it, define in excruciating detail all of
the items that must be included and that may be left out of the income
tax base and the tax rates that apply to that base for each individual
and firm. It is almost impossible to imagine that any class of potential
defendants or potential plaintiffs could be drawn so narrowly as to
approximate this level of accuracy of income measurement.
At this point in the debate, one might argue that the income tax is
rife with "loopholes," provisions in the Code that permit exclusions or
deductions for amounts that a "pure" or "ideal" income tax would
include in the tax base or gaps in enforcement due to poor system
design or lack of funding. Therefore, the argument goes, the income
tax is not as accurate as critics of redistributive legal rules would have
us believe and hence should not be held up as a perfect redistributive
tool. The implication of this argument is that redistributive rules do
not fair so badly by comparison. In our view, this response to the
inaccuracy critique makes an important contribution: It emphasizes
that the issue in this debate is always one of comparison, of relative
costs and benefits of alternative redistributive policy instruments.
Therefore, it is never enough to say simply that redistributive legal
rules are lacking in some respect, rather they must be lacking relative
to the tax system equivalent. The accuracy critique of redistributive
s7 Polinsky makes a similar observation. Id. at 125-27. Of course, there is an enormous
tax-incidence problem associated with this sort of redistributive rule. Even assuming that
the owners of capital rather than employees or customers would bear the incidence of such
a tort tax, many corporate shareholders (even shareholders in polluting manufacturers) are
middle- or low-income individuals. See id. (discussing a similar problem in the auto acci
dent context).
88 See, e.g., id. at 126-27 .

•
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legal rules, however, given a fair reading, does contain a comparative
argument. The claim is not that the income tax is perfect. Rather, the
claim is that, because the income tax is specifically designed to do di
rectly and precisely what legal rules can do only indirectly and deriva
tively, the income tax almost certainly will redistribute more
accurately than will a class-based redistributive rule.
To see the force of this point, consider the following question: If
class-based redistributive rules are to be used, how will the social
planner (the designer of the rules) determine the accuracy of the clas
ses in the first place? Presumably, by using some system akin to, or
identical to, the income tax. That is, the policymaker would need
some system for actually measuring the income of individuals and
firms (defining income in some way) in order to be sure that, when
using a redistributive legal rule, the classes of potential defendants
and potential plaintiffs provide an acceptably accurate set of redistrib
utive classes. And whatever income measurement system the poli
cymaker sets up will be subject to the same sorts of complaints
(regarding loopholes and the like) levied against the existing income
tax. Thus, complaints that the existing income tax has too many loop
holes or that it has large enforcement gaps may be persuasive in argu
ments concerning tax reform, but they are generally unpersuasive as a
response to the accuracy critique of class-based redistributive legal
rules.
The accuracy critique, however, has less (though not zero) force
when applied to a case-specific approach to redistributive legal rules.
To see how a case-specific approach would work, imagine a tort rule
providing that, if damages are awarded in any tort case, they must be
adjusted upward or downward depending on the relative incomes of
the two parties to the suit. Thus, if in a particular driver-pedestrian
auto accident case the injuring driver's income were greater than the
injured pedestrian's income, the damages owed by the driver, if she
were found liable, would be adjusted upward by some percentage of
the difference. Alternatively, if the pedestrian happened to be richer,
the adjustment would go the other way; the amount of the redistribu
tive tax would reduce the damages. Under this approach, the redis
tributive legal rule would provide the same degree of accuracy as the
income tax because the same measure of income, even the same tax
forms, would be used. Thus, to the extent the income tax is inaccurate
in measuring income, the same inaccuracy would show up in the case
specific redistributive rule. But there would be no additional inaccu
racy of the sort inherently found in the class-based redistributive rule.
In fact, one can imagine a case-specific redistributive approach that
would be more accurate than the existing income tax, at least with

Imaged with the Permission ofN.Y.U. Tax Law Review

2003]

REDISTRIBUTING OPTIMALLY

185

respect to the parties before the court. For example, a court applying
a case-specific redistributive rule would perform either an auditing
function (by looking beyond the returns to the parties' underlying
records) or an income-averaging function (by looking at returns from
more than one year). Either of those steps, however, would come at
considerable additional administrative cost, and the question again
would be: Why would such an auditing or income-averaging function
be performed more efficiently through the legal system than through
the tax system? It is at least plausible that there may be some efficien
cies to having the legal system perform these functions as a supple
ment to the tax system. After all, the parties are before the court
anyway and, at least for some types of litigation, already have reasons
to open their books to the court. But these are empirical questions.
b.

The Problem of Underinclusiveness

No matter how precisely a redistributive legal rule is drawn,
whether class-based or case-specific, redistribution through the legal
system inevitably would leave out some parties who, according to this
argument, ideally should be included: namely, those who are not in
volved in litigation. In other words, ignoring the effect of insurance
markets for the moment, the redistributive capacity of the legal sys
tem is inherently limited to plaintiffs and defendants or to whoever is
the subject of the legal rule. Thus, although a targeted redistributive
tort rule or pollution control rule could redistribute from some rich
manufacturers to some less-rich consumers, there would be other
high-income manufacturers untaxed and many low-income individuals
who do not benefit from this rule.89 Even under the case-specific ap
proach, redistribution would occur only from the rich to the poor who
happen to end up in litigation against each other. The income tax, by
contrast, enables the policymaker to transfer, in theory, from all rich
within the taxing jurisdiction to all poor within that jurisdiction. Thus,
the income tax is a more comprehensive-or less underinclusive-re
distributive policy tool than the legal system is.90
First, we should point out that the most extreme version of the un
derinclusiveness argument is wrong. That is, the redistributive reach
of a redistributive legal rule is not limited to parties who end up in
litigation. It is a bedrock assumption of the standard economic analy
sis of tort law that tort doctrine (including any redistributive aspect of
tort doctrine, such as a special tort tax on the rich) not only affects
actual tortfeasors and victims but also changes the ex ante incentives
89
90

Polinsky, note 5, at 126.
Kaplow & Shaven, Legal Rules, note

10,

at 823.
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of all parties who are potential injurers and potential victims (that is,
everyone who might possibly wind up in litigation governed by a re
distributive rule).91 It is this ex ante incentive effect that often is de
scribed as the deterrence function of tort law.92 As a result, if a
special tort tax were imposed on high-income tortfeasors, the ex ante
effect would be that all high-income potential tortfeasors (those
within the scope of the rule) would alter their ex ante conduct.93 For
example, they would make additional investments in accident avoid
ance, or they would reduce the frequency with which they engage in
the activity in question. This change in conduct-even if the potential
injurers never actually end up in court-is a redistributive transfer of
a sort. That is, only the relatively high-income members of the class of
potential injurers will be induced to make those additional care-level
investments or those activity-level reductions; and the resulting reduc
tion in expected accident costs would benefit both high income and
low income alike.
Still, although the most extreme version of the underinclusiveness
argument is wrong, there is some degree of underinclusiveness. Even
under the assumptions of the standard deterrence models, the income
redistributive tort rule just described would reach only high-income
tortfeasors. Some high-income folks, therefore, would not be in
cluded within the scope of the redistributive policy.94 With respect to
this version of the underinclusiveness complaint, there are three
responses.
First, Sanchirico has argued that, if policymakers added a redistribu
tive component to every aspect of the legal system, redistribution
through the legal system would be no less comprehensive than redis
tribution through the tax system.95 The legal system, as defined in this
literature, includes all nontax laws, both private and public. Thus, if
tort rules, contract rules, property rules, as well as environmental and
product safety regulations had a redistributive element, the under-in
clusiveness complaint would weaken somewhat. It would not disap
pear, however, because, as we discussed in the previous Section,
redistribution through many legal rules-namely contract-based legal
91
92

Steven Shavell, On Liability and Insurance, 13 Bell J. Econ. 120-21 (1982).
Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law
Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. Rev. 377 (1994).
93 Kaplow & Shavell, Legal System, note 5, at 669.
94 More precisely, the application of the income-redistributive tort rule would be a func
tion of not only of one's income but also of the probability of being involved in a tort suit.
Thus, for example, high-income individuals who face a high probability of suit would face a
larger tort tax than would high-income individuals who face a low probability of suit. At
the limit, those high-income individuals who face no risk of tort liability (whoever that
might be) would not be subject to the probabilistic tort tax at all.
95 Sanchirico, Efficiency Rationale, note 8, at 1052.
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rules-is at best highly speculative, owing to the contracting-around
phenomenon. With that qualification, the basic point is sound, if
somewhat self-evident: The more legal rules that are made redistribu
tive, the more comprehensive the system of redistributive legal rules
will be.96
The second response to the more modest underinclusiveness com
plaint involves the necessary relationship between legal rules and in
surance markets. The presence of insurance markets clearly reduces
the force of the underinclusiveness complaint.97 Insofar as potential
plaintiffs and potential defendants have insurance coverage for the
types of losses that can give rise to legal disputes, insurance premiums
would adjust to reflect any redistributive component inserted in the
applicable legal rule.
How precisely this would work would depend on the design of the
redistributive legal rule. Thus, consider for example a class-based, re
distributive pollution control law designed to burden relatively rich
polluting corporations and benefit relatively poor communities. To
the extent those polluters purchase liability insurance that covers
them against the cost of such laws, their insurance premiums would
reflect not only the risk of harm that their conduct poses to the com
munity but also the additional redistributive tax that the court would
impose in the event of liability. At the same time, some members of
the community who benefit under this rule would purchase first-party
property insurance that covered them against the risk of harm to them
and to their property caused by environmental pollution. For those
potential plaintiffs (or beneficiaries of regulation), their first-party in
surance premiums would go down to reflect the higher amount that
could be recovered (by them and by their first-party insurers via sub
rogation suits) from the polluters and the polluters' liability insurers.
Under this argument, then, the underinclusiveness complaint
reduces largely (though not entirely) to a problem of underinsurance.
That is, those individuals and firms who do not own insurance, in a
sense, would not be included in the system of redistributive rules, un
less they happened to end up in a lawsuit.98 There are two general
types of solutions to problems of underinsurance. One is to make in
surance more attractive by subsidizing it. That would be sort of a tax
and-transfer approach to dealing with the problem. The other ap96

Id.
Polinksy, note 5, at 126 n.83 (observing that the underinclusiveness problem "may not
be fully applicable" in situations where the potential plaintiffs have first-party insurance
and potential defendants have liability insurance that would cover the loss in question.
Thus, he concludes that the point of his underinclusiveness example "would apply only to
the extent that the insurance coverage is incomplete.") .
98 See id.
97
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proach would make insurance compulsory. If the parties did not
purchase the coverage, they would not be allowed to engage in some
activity. For example, the policymaker could require that manufactur
ers who wish to engage in certain pollution-emitting activities must
first purchase a certain amount of liability insurance coverage.
A final response to the underinclusiveness complaint is to dismiss it.
That is, if one is not arguing for replacing the income tax with a sys
tem of income-redistributive legal rules, but instead is calling for in
come-redistributive legal rules only to supplement the more
comprehensive tax-and-transfer system, the underinclusiveness argu
ment (by itself) has relatively little force. Put differently, if it could be
shown that income redistribution on occasion can be done at least as
efficiently through the legal system as through the tax-and-transfer
system (that is, it can be shown that the tax-and-transfer system does
not have a comparative advantage), it is not clear why underinclusive
ness should be a concern.99
3.

The Pareto-Superiority Argument

a.

Kaplow and Shavell's Contribution to the Redistributive Rules
Debate: the Double-Distortion Problem

In an article published in 1994, Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell
make an argument that, on first blush, seems to end the redistributive
rules debate once and for all, at least with respect to income-redistrib
utive legal rules. Specifically, Kaplow and Shavell argue that legal
rules should never be used to redistribute income, irrespective of the
contracting-around and haphazardness complaints.100 The argument
has several steps. First, they note that a tax on income or wealth will
distort work incentives, in the sense that individuals under an income
tax tend to work less than in a no-tax world.101 If legal rules are set to
achieve efficiency only (and therefore are not designed to be redistrib
utive), the work distortion associated with the income tax will be the
99 For a similar argument, see Dagan, Takings, note 40, at 788-89 (arguing that avoiding
certain discrepancies from an ideal distribution does not justify increasing disparities be
tween the better off and the worse off).
t oo Kaplow and Shaven note, however, that the contracting-around and haphazardness
arguments do provide additional reasons to prefer the tax-and-transfer approach to redis
tributing income. Kaplow & Shaven, Legal System, note 5, at 674-75. The basic insight of
the Kaplow and Shaven arguments was made first in Steven Shaven, A Note on Efficiency
vs. Distributional Equity in Legal Rulemaking: Should Distributional Equity Matter
Given Optimal Income Taxation?, 71 Am. Econ. Rev. 414, 414 (1981), and a similar point
was made in Aanund Hynand & Richard Zeckhauser, Distributional Objectives Should
Affect Taxes But Not Program Choice or Design, 81 Scand. J. Econ. 264, 264 (1979).
101 Kaplow & Shaven, Efficiency in Redistribution, note 10, at 667-68.
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only distortion.102 By contrast, if instead of using the tax-and�transfer
system to redistribute income, legal rules are designed to diverge from
efficiency in a way that provides the desired amount of redistribution,
there will be two distortions: the same work distortion that would
occur under an income tax plus the distortion of the activity regulated
by the (now inefficient) legal rule.103
Which leads to the final step: Because there is no reason to expect
that these two distortions offset each other, it seems reasonable to
conclude that two distortions are worse than one from an economist's
perspective.104 This part of the Kaplow and Shavell thesis has been
called the "double distortion argument."105 In addition, in their more
formal analysis, Kaplow and Shavell demonstrate that, under certain
assumptions, it is possible with respect to any income-redistributive
legal rule to design an alternative legal regime that is independent of
income and that leaves everyone as well off as under the income-re
distributive rule, but that also produces additional revenue for the
government.106 Thus, Kaplow and Shavell argue that there is always a
Pareto-improving tax-and-transfer alternative to any income-redistrib
utive legal rule. The implication of this argument is compelling: As a
matter of theory, any amount of income redistribution-even a single
dollar-always will be accomplished more efficiently through the tax
system than through the legal system. 1 01
A number of scholars have sought to undermine the theoretical or
empirical importance of the Kaplow and Shavell double-distortion ar
gument. In the process, this important debate has become confused.
1 02

See id. at 668.
Id. at 667-68; Kaplow & Shavell, Legal Rules, note 10, at 823 ("(I]f legal rules disad
vantage high-income individuals and help low-income individuals, that will tend to discour
age work effort in the same manner and to the same extent as making the income tax
system more redistributive. Whether it is the tax collector or the courts that take an addi
tional 1 percent of rich people's income and give it to the poor, the reward for work by the
rich is reduced by 1 percent, so the distortion of work effort will be the same.").
104 Sanchirico, Efficiency Rationale, note 8, at 1008.
1 0s Id. at 1008.
106 Kaplow & Shavell, Legal System, note 5, at 674 ("The conclusion is that adopting the
efficient legal rule, with an appropriate change in the income tax, leaves all individuals
equally well off but leaves the government with a surplus. With this additional revenue,
the government can make each individual better off-for example, by lowering taxes . . . by
a fixed amount for each individual or spending the funds on a public good that benefits
everyone.").
101 As Kaplow and Shavell put it, "even though the income tax distorts work incentives,
any regime with an inefficient legal rule can be replaced by a regime with an efficient legal
rule and a modified income tax system designed so that every person is made better off."
Id. at 669 (italics removed from entire sentence). This theoretical point explicitly assumes
away differential administrative costs. Kaplow and Shavell, however, contend ·also that
redistributive legal rules are probably more costly to administer than the alternative. Id. at
675 n.12.
1 03
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In the following Section, we summarize these responses, explain
where we agree and disagree, and generally try to clear up the
confusion.
b.

Objections to the Pareto-Superiority Argument

Two general categories of objections can be raised against Kaplow
and Shavell's argument. First, objections can be raised from within
the traditional law and economics framework. That is, even if we
grant the standard assumptions that individuals are rational and unbi
ased in their decisionmaking, it can be argued at least that the Pareto
superiority argument is overstated and perhaps that it is, in some im
portant ways, wrong.108 A second type of response to Kaplow and
Shavell's argument comes from outside of the traditional neoclassical
framework. Specifically, relying on observations from behavioral eco
nomics and cognitive psychology, some scholars have identified cir
cumstances in which income redistribution might be done more
efficiently through the legal system.109
1 08 One critique of the double-distortion part of the Pareto-superiority argument raised
by Sanchirico can be called the fallacy of distortion counting. The argument is that redis
tributive adjustments to otherwise efficient legal rules will not necessarily produce an over
all loss of social welfare (as compared with a world in which legal rules are set only to
achieve efficiency and the tax-and-transfer system is the sole means of redistribution), be
cause those adjustments may offset some other distortion in the economy. Indeed,
Sanchirico explicitly invokes the "theory of the second best," by noting that "eliminating
some distortions is not necessarily welfare-improving in a world in which other distortions
remain." Sanchirico, Efficiency Rationale, note 8, at 1017 (emphasis omitted). Thus, the
implication is that Kaplow and Shavell are wrong to regard two distortions as being worse
than one. As Kaplow and Shavell note in their response, however, there seems to be no
reason to expect that these two distortions-the regulated-activity distortion and the work
leisure distortion-will offset each other. Kaplow & Shavell, Legal Rules, note 10, at 824
n.5, 825-27. Sanchirico suggests that the two might be offsetting if, for instance, the regu
lated-activity distortion amounts to a tax on leisure, which would tend to reduce the work
leisure distortion. Sanchirico, Efficiency Rationale, note 8, at 1018. If that were so, it
would reduce the distortionary effects of (and might therefore be a useful complement to)
an income tax. Kaplow and Shavell's response to this argument is to point out that, first,
taxing leisure to reduce the work distortion associated with an income tax is entirely con
sistent with their framework and that, second, the better approach would be to use the tax
system rather than the legal system to impose a tax on leisure. Kaplow & Shaven, Legal
Rules, note 10, at 824 n.5. Indeed, a tax on leisure activities (or on goods that tend to be
used in leisure activities) has long been recognized as an efficient, counter-distortionary
source of tax revenue, in comparison with the income tax.
.
1 09 Another type of criticism of the double-distortion argument denounces the naive
political theory implied by such a regime. See, e.g., Scott Shapiro & Edward F. Mcclennen,
Law-and-Economics from a Philosophical Perspective, in 2 The New Palgrave Dictionary
of Economics and the Law 460, 463 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) [hereinafter New Palgrave
Dictionary]. We address that argument briefly in the conclusion. See text accompanying
notes 281-83.
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The Internal Critique

Our internal critique of the Pareto superiority argument involves
three steps.11 ° First, we argue that income-redistributive legal rules
probably would not produce a double-distortion in precisely the way
that Kaplow and Shavell suggest in their paradigmatic example of a
"tort tax." Second, following Sanchirico, we note that Kaplow and
Shavell's model depends importantly on the unrealistic assumption of
homogenous taxpayers. Third, we argue that, under the more realistic
assumption of heterogeneous taxpayers, designing a Pareto-superior
tax-and-transfer alternative to a tort tax would be administratively im
possible. We summarize these three points briefly here.1 11
In their tort-tax example, Kaplow and Shavell argue that "using le
gal rules to redistribute income distorts work incentives fully as much
as the income tax system-because the distortion is caused by the redis
tribution itself-and also creates inefficiencies in the activities regu
lated by the legal rules."112 For example, if a rule were introduced
making wealthy tort defendants pay an extra "tort tax," not only
would wealthy potential tortfeasors take excessive levels of care (ow
ing to the rule's inefficiency), they also would reduce their work effort
by precisely the same amount as they would under a direct income tax
where the legal rule was set to achieve efficiency only. We disagree.
Under an income-redistributive tort rule, wealthy potential tortfeasors
could reduce their overall income tax (as well as their overall tort lia
bility) either by changing their work effort or by changing their en
gagement in the regulated activity or both. (Thus, in a sense, the
income-redistributive tort rule gives wealthy potential tortfeasors two
degrees of freedom, whereas the income-independent regime gives
them only one.) And it is an empirical question whether, with the
introduction of an income-redistributive tort regime, there would be
more, less, or the same amount of care-level investments. 1 1 3
Kaplow and Shavell presumably would respond that, even if the
preceding argument were true (even if the introduction of a tort tax
would not necessarily result in rich potential tortfeasors taking exces
sive care), whatever combination of changes in work activity and care1 10 In our version of the internal critique, we draw heavily on a similar critique offered
by Chris Sanchirico. Sanchirico, Efficiency Rationale, note 8; Sanchirico, Taxes, note 10.
1 1 1 For a fuller development of this argument, see generally Ronen Avraham, David
Fortus & Kyle D. Logue, Revisiting the Role of Legal Rules and Tax Rules in Income
Redistribution (Univ. of Mich. Law & Economics Working Paper #02-004), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=31300 (May 31, 2002).
1 12 Kaplow & Shaven, Legal System, note 5, at 667-68.
1 1 3 It is worth emphasizing that nothing in Kaplow and Shavell's analysis contradicts our
conclusion in the main text. It is just their paradigmatic example (which we suspect many
people conceive as the intuition behind the theory) that we find misleading.
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level investments occurred, it would be possible to construct a tax
and-transfer regime (along with an efficient, income-independent tort
rule) that would leave everyone better off and would produce more
tax revenue.
As Sanchirico points out in his critique of the double-distortion ar
gument, the way that Kaplow and Shavell construct such a regime is to
assume that all individuals are identical in every way (they are homo
geneous) except for differences in income. 1 14 This assumption is not
merely for simplicity; it is an assumption that drives the results. 11 5 If
we allow for the possibility that individuals are heterogeneous at given
levels of income, however, Kaplow and Shavell's model does not
work. That is, under their model, it becomes impossible to construct a
general Pareto efficient tax-and-transfer regime, by which we mean a
Pareto efficient regime that applies the same tax function to all people
at the same level of income.
Working under the more realistic assumption of heterogeneous in
dividuals, it nevertheless may be possible in theory to construct a tax
and-transfer regime that has a tailored tax function that indeed would
leave every individual exactly as well-off as she was under the income
redistributive tort regime. The information burden that such an ap
proach would place on the policymaker and on the taxing authority,
however, would be heavy.
Consider the tort tax again. If we imagine that individuals differ
from one another not only with respect to work effort and earning
power but also with respect to how much they invest in accident
avoidance, how much harm they have caused, and how accident prone
they are (which seem like reasonable assumptions), the policy planner
who wanted to implement a redistribute tax-and-transfer regime that
was Pareto superior to the redistributive-legal rule alternative would
need to have a great deal of information-information that the tax
authorities are not in the best position to gather, such as the individ
ual's cost of care, harm suffered, or net expected damage payments. 116
Moreover, using a legal rule to do the same amount of redistribution
potentially would be feasible. 11 7 Given these informational demands,
1 14

Sanchirico, Efficiency Rationale, note 8, at 1056-69.
Id.
1 1 6 In Kaplow and Shavell's model of a tax-and-transfer alternative to an income-redis
tributive legal rule, they seem to say that the tax authority-that is, whoever is "construct
ing" the tax regime-would need such information. Kaplow & Shavell, Legal System, note
5, at 678 ("Note that . . . the new income tax . . . is constructed by beginning with the initial
income tax . . . , adding total accident costs under the initial, inefficient regime and sub
tracting total accident costs under the efficient regime. The former total (under the ineffi
cient rule) is the first term in large brackets: the cost of care, harm suffered, and expected
damage payments, minus expected damage awards received.").
1 1 7 See Avraham, Fortus & Logue, note 111.
1 15
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the claim that there always will be a tax-and-transfer alternative to the
income-redistributive tort rule that will be Pareto efficient seems, at
the least, overstated.
Our internal critique of the Pareto-superiority argument, of course,
does not demonstrate that the legal system is a better income redis
tributor than the tax system is. Rather, it merely calls into question
the Pareto argument as an independent justification for always prefer
ring the tax-and-transfer system as the best policy instrument for re
distributing income. We ultimately conclude that the tax-and-transfer
system probably is better than the legal system overall as a means of
systematically reducing income inequality, but we base our conclusion
on the fact that the tax system clearly seems to be the better proxy
observer when it comes to income and, as redistributor, the tax system
seems less susceptible to the contracting-around and haphazardness
problems. These conclusions assume that individuals are rational and
unbiased in their decisionmaking. As the following Section demon
strates, if that assumption is relaxed, the case for the exclusive use of
the tax system for income redistribution is weaker.
The Behavioralist Critique

ii.

As just mentioned, one of the key assumptions of the double-distor
tion argument is that individual taxpayers in their work-leisure deci
sions would respond to an income tax implemented indirectly through
the tort system in the same way that they would to an income tax that
is implemented directly through the tax system.1 1 8 Thus, the work dis
incentive would be the same under either regime. The behavioral eco
nomics critique calls that assumption into question in a very different
way than the neo-classical economic tradition: by pointing out two
well-known quirks in human cognition that suggest that the work-lei
sure distortion caused by a income-redistributive legal rule might be
smaller than the work-leisure distortion caused by a direct income tax
(accompanied by an efficient legal rule). 11 9
The most complete statement of the behavioralist critique appears
in an article by Christine Jolls. 1 20 Jolls first observes that redistribu
tion through a legal rule, such as an income-adjusted tort rule, has a
probabilistic element (or element of uncertainty) that is not present
1 1s

See text accompanying note 1 12.
As becomes clear as the argument progresses, the behavioralist critique is inconsis·
tent with our two-degrees-of-freedom argument in the previous Section. See text accom
panying notes 1 11-17.
120 Jolls, Behavioral Economics, note 36. Jolls explicitly restricts her analysis to tort
rules that operate between strangers. Id. at 1657. Mark Kelman has made some of the
same points made by Jolls. Kelman, note 39.
1 19
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when redistribution is accomplished through a direct tax.121 The prob
abilistic element has to do with whether the tort tax will apply at all.
Observe that under a direct income tax an individual who earns in
come above a given amount during a particular taxable period can be
sure of incurring a given, determinate tax liability. 122 Under the in
come-adjusted tort rule, however, even if the individual knows the
amount of income she will have in a particular year as well as the
amount of tax on that income, she does not know whether the tax will
apply to her, because there will be no tax liability unless the individual
is involved in an accident for which she is held liable. 1 23
Although the probabilistic character of redistributive legal rules has
been a source of criticism from traditional legal economists (the hap
hazardness argument is in a sense a critique of the probabilistic aspect
of a redistributive legal rule), it is quite useful from the cognitive per
spective. The basis of the argument is this: When faced with condi
tions of uncertainty, people often make decisions that are not
predicted by the standard rational-actor models of traditional eco
nomics. Instead, as cognitive psychologists have documented for de
cades, people in such situations often exhibit various cognitive
heuristics and biases, which behavioral economists argue should be
taken into account in the economic analysis of law. Jolls makes use of
two such cognitive quirks to argue that the economic analysis of redis
tributive legal rules is more complicated than the conventional view
(associated with Kaplow and Shavell) would suggest.
The first cognitive bias that Jolls explores is the well-documented
finding that individuals facing a very small likelihood of a loss tend to
behave optimistically; that is, they tend to underestimate the likeli
hood that low-probability bad things will happen to them, especially
bad things over which they have some control.124 Jolls' argument rests
on the claim that the same tendency may apply to probabilistic taxes
121

Jolls, Behavioral Economics, note 36, at 1 658-63.
Id. at 1656. There is of course some uncertainty inherent in the enforcement of the
income tax, and as Sanchirico argues, there may be uncertainty regarding how much in
come a person is likely to earn in a given taxable year. But those same uncertainties would
be present under a redistributive rule as well. Sanchirico, Efficiency Rationale, note 8, at
1053. What is significant is that, with a redistributive legal rule, there is an additional
uncertainty that is not present with an income tax regime: the uncertainty as to whether an
event will occur giving rise to a redistributive transfer through legal rules.
123 Jolls, Behavioral Economics, note 36, at 1658-63.
124. Id. Thus, "most people think that their probability of a bad outcome is far less than
others' probability [of the same sort of bad outcome], although of course this cannot be
true for more than half the population." Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, note 79, at 1524; see also
Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. Personality &
Soc. Psych. 806, 818 (1980); Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Susceptibility
to Health Problems: Conclusions From a Community-Wide Sample, 10 J. Behav. Med.
122

481, 494-96 (1987).
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implemented indirectly through legal rules.125 If we assume, for ex
ample, that an individual's likelihood of being subject to a tort tax in
any given year is small (because her likelihood of being in an accident
that causes damages for which she is held liable is small), we should
expect that the individual would behave as if such a tax had a lower
probability of occurring than is objectively so. By contrast, taxes im
posed directly through the tax system are less probabilistic than the
tort tax and hence would produce less of an optimism-bias effect. If
one grants all of these assumptions, assumptions that Jolls herself ad
mits must be verified empirically, the conclusion is intriguing: An in
come-adjusted tort rule would be less distortive of work incentives
than a direct income tax.126
Consider Jolls' example illustrating this point.127 Assume that the
policymaker wants to impose an additional $10,000 annual tax on each
"high-income" individual.128 There are two approaches to achieving
that result: the direct income tax and the income-adjusted tort rule.
Under the former, the policymaker imposes a new tax of $10,000 di
rectly on the high-income individuals and only on high-income indi
viduals. Under the equivalent tort-tax approach, the policymaker
determines that, given that the actual likelihood of a high-income per
son having to make a payout in a tort case is 2%, the amount of the
income adjustment to the tort damages would need to be $500,000.
The great majority of individuals believe themselves to be better than average
drivers, more likely than average to live past 80, less likely than average to be
harmed by products they use. [This is because] . . . the risk looks very small
from the perspective of each individual's experience. Consider automobile
driving: [d]espite driving too fast, tailgating, etc., poor drivers typically go trip
after trip without mishap. This personal experience demonstrates to them
their exceptional skill and safety. Moreover, their indirect experience via the
news media shows them that when accidents happen, they happen to others.
Given such misleading experience, individuals may feel quite justified in refus
ing to take protective actions such as wearing seat belts.
Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhof & Sarah Lichtenstein, Facts Versus Fears: Understanding
Perceived Risk, in Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and B iases 470 (Daniel
Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982).
12s Jolls, Behavioral Economics, note 36, at 1662 ("People will tend to underestimate the
probability that they will be hit with liability under a redistributive legal rules; therefore,
their perceived cost of the rule will be lower. As a result, their work incentives will tend to
suffer a lesser degree of distortion than under a tax yielding the same amount of revenue
for the government."). Note, however, "that the role of overoptimism is likely to vary
significantly with the context. In a case in which the threat of being found liable is highly
salient, individuals may tend to overestimate the likelihood of being sanctioned." Jolls,
Sunstein & Thaler, note 79, at 1525 (emphasis omitted).
126 Jolls, Behavioral Economics, note 36, at 1663.
121 Id. at 1655-56.
12s Jolls has in mind the use of a class-based redistributive rule, though she does not use
that specific terminology. Id. at 1670. Below we suggest some problems with the use of a
class-based rule to create a probabilistic income tax. See text accompanying notes 135-36.
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Hence, the expected value of this tort tax for a particular year is
$10,000, which is equivalent in expected value terms to the annual di
rect tax.
But here is the trick: If the high-income individual perceives the
likelihood of the tort rule applying to her-the likelihood of being in
an accident and then being found legally responsible-to be, say, 1 %
instead of 2 % , the perceived expected value of the tort tax would be
only $5,000. The perceived expected cost of the direct income tax,
however, would be $10,000 because there is no optimism bias. The
implication of this observation for the work incentives of the high
income individual is that, by raising the additional $10,000 from the
high-income individual through a tort tax rather than a direct income
tax, the work distortion is cut in half. Put more generally, if individu
als underestimate the likelihood of low-probability, uncertain bad
things happening to them (such as tort suits), then a redistributive le
gal rule may produce a smaller work disincentive than a similarly re
distributive income tax would.129
This observation is potentially important for the debate over the
appropriate use of income-redistributive legal rules. In fact, we think
the implications of the optimism bias may be more significant than
even Jolls suggests (again, ignoring liability insurance for now). If this
bias does apply to redistributive legal rules such as income-adjusted
tort rules, then not only would the work distortion be reduced, but the
second distortion (the regulated-activity distortion) would be reduced
as well. That is, if the tax that distorts the regulated-activity decisions
(how much or how carefully to engage in the regulated activity) were
underestimated systematically, the distortionary effect of that tax on
regulated activity also would be less. This would be true even if, in
response to the optimism bias, the legal rule were adjusted upward to
achieve optimal regulated-activity conduct.130
Indeed, if the optimism bias were to apply to individuals' percep
tions of the likelihood of being affected by legal rules generally (and,
as Jolls assumes, not to the likelihood of being affected by the tax
system),131 and if this optimism bias were sufficiently large, such a
conclusion would provide an argument for favoring income-redistribu
tive legal rules over the income tax-and-transfer system. 132 To empha
size this theoretical point, imagine that individuals actually behaved as
1 29

Jolls, Behavioral Economics, note 36, at 1663.
As Jolls notes, " [i]f potential tortfeasors underestimate the probability of liability,
the efficient (meaning optimal-deterrence-achieving) legal rule would be more generous to
tort victims than the efficient legal rule without underestimation of probabilities would
be." Id. at 1662 n.38.
1 31 Id. at 1656.
1 32 See id. at 1663.
130
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if the likelihood of their being held liable in tort were zero. In such a
scenario, legal rules would provide the perfect tool for income redis
tribution (again, putting aside the haphazardness complaint). There
would be no distortion whatsoever-no distortion of work decisions
or of regulated activity.133 A redistributive legal rule would be the
perfect lump sum tax. With the income tax, however, there always
would be at least some work-leisure distortion.134
There is one problem, however, with Jolls' use of the optimism bias
to construct a probabilistic (or lump sum) defense of an income-redis
tributive legal rule. Jolls leaves unspecified how the high-income sta
tus would be determined under such a rule. She does suggest that
what she has in mind is what we call a class-based redistributive
rule.135 There are problems with a class-based approach, however.
First, if she has in mind corporations as a class of defendants, it is less
clear that optimism bias would apply. 136 Second, if she has in mind a
class of rich individuals as the target of her probabilistic tax, it is un
clear how a class-based redistributive rule would be designed to target
such a group. Of course, a case-specific approach, as we describe
above, would allow such targeting of high-income individuals.137
In addition to the optimism bias, Jolls considers the implications of
the psychological phenomenon known as "mental accounting." As
Jolls puts the point, "[t]he idea behind 'mental accounting' is that peo
ple do not always view a dollar spent in the same way; it may matter
from which 'account' the dollar is coming. Money is not fungible in
the way that standard economics assumes."138 What this idea says
about income-redistributive legal rules, is this: Income-redistributive
dollars paid through the tax system are perceived as a tax on income,
whereas income-redistributive dollars paid through the tort system
(the proverbial tort tax) are perceived simply as extra tort damages.
Or, as Jolls notes, the tort tax may be viewed as "expenditures out of
income (rather than direct charges against income);" and the former
may cause less of a work distortion than the latter.139 Thus, according
1 33 Note, however, that the larger the optimism bias, the lower the deterrent effect of
tort law. Under the assumptions just stated, tort law would have no deterrent effect.
1 34 Let us be clear on this. We do not mean to suggest repealing the income tax and
doing all income redistribution through the legal system. We use this extreme example
only to make the point that the optimism bias, to the extent it would apply differentially
(more to redistributive rules than to redistributive taxes), is a potentially very important
phenomenon for redistributive policy.
1 35 Id. at 1620.
1 36 For an analysis of cognitive biases in firms, see generally Donald Langevoort, The
Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of
Independence and Accountability, 89 Geo. L.J. 797 (2001).
1 37 See text accompanying note 128.
1 38 Jolls, Behavioral Economics, note 36, at 1669.
1 39 Id. at 1670. This phenomenon has been demonstrated in a number of con' ·xts.
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to the mental accounting story, whereas income redistribution accom
plished through the tax system produces a relatively large work distor
tion and no regulated-activity distortiOn, income redistribution
through the legal system would produce a relatively small work distor
tion as well as a regulated-activity distortion. Hence, the relevant em
pirical question for the policymaker would be to determine whether
the reduced work distortion under a redistributive legal rule would
more than offset the regulated-activity distortion. 1 40
To summarize, the behavioralist critique raises some questions
about the real-world significance of the double-distortion argument.14 1
Because of the effect of the optimism bias (on both the work distor
tion and the regulated-activity distortion) and the mental accounting
effect (on the work distortion), income redistribution through the le
gal system may be no less distortive overall than·inc9me redistribution
through a tax-and-transfer system. We agree with that conclusion.
We also agree, however, with Jolls' qualification of her conclusion,
which says that there must be additional empirical work to determine
the ultimate significance of these theoretical observations.142 It is well
known that behavioral findings are not always qualitatively robust and
are often not quantitatively robust.143 Thus, what is needed is addi
tional research on the extent to which the optimism bias applies to
140 It is interesting to note that Jolls' mental accounting argument expressly depends on
the assumption that the redistributive legal rule in question will be a class-based redistribu
tive rule, one that is designed to redistribute from a class of potential defendants (or plain
tiffs) to a class of potential plaintiffs (or defendants) · based on a determination that the
average income of the former class is greater than the average income of the latter. Jolls,
Behavioral Economics, note 36, at 1670. With a class-based redistributive rule, there is a
disconnection between an individual's income and her tax liability that would not exist
with a direct tax on income. This distance between cause and effect may explain why
people would place indirect taxes into a different mental account and thus, in making their
work decisions, simply ignore them. Jolls also notes, however, that if legal rules are "ex
plicitly conditioned" on the income of the parties (what we call a case-specific redistribu
tive rule), this disconnection would disappear or diminish, and the mental accounting point
would be inapplicable or Jess powerful. Id. at 1670. Jolls observes that "such rules have
commanded little support among commentators." Id. This is true in one sense, but not in
another. See note 61 (discussing assumptions made by Kaplow and Sha veil and Sanchirico
concerning use of class-based rules).
141 Note that Kaplow and Shavell acknowledge the potential significance of cognitive
biases, but do not explore the issue. Kaplow & Shavell, Legal System, note 5, at 671 n.5.
142 Jolls, Behavioral Economics, note 36, at 1672-73.
143 For example, Jennifer Arlen, Matthew Spitzer, and Eric Talley found that the endow
ment effect does not exist in some contexts involving agency relationships. Jennifer Arlen,
Matthew L. Spitzer & Eric L. Talley, Endowment Effects Within Corporate Agency Rela
tionships, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=276110 (July 16,
2001). Moreover, even the endowment effect, which is usually thought to be robust, .ap
pears in different magnitudes in different contexts. For example, it is larger when public
goods are involved. See, e.g., John K. Horowitz and Kenneth E. McConnell, A Review of
WTA/WTP Studies, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
257336 (Feb. 11, 2001).
·

·
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perceptions of the likelihood that legal rules will apply to them. In
addition, however, there needs to be further research into how the
presence of insurance would affect the analysis.
The preceding analysis ignored the effects of insurance. As it turns
out, introducing insurance in the story would facilitate the redistribu
tive capacity of legal rules but would also exacerbate the regulated
activity and work-leisure distortions. To see this point, imagine that
everyone has complete and perfectly risk-adjusted liability insurance
as well as first-party insurance (life, health, disability, and property).
As is well known among tort and insurance scholars, if liability insur
ance premiums adjusted perfectly to reflect each insured's individual
expected costs at all times, those premiums would facilitate the deter
rence effect of tort law, by causing insureds to fully internalize all of
the external costs associated with their actions. Insured potential in
jurers would be induced to take efficient care in avoiding accidents,
because failing to do. so �ould cost them more in increased insurance
premiums than would investing in accident avoidance. Likewise, per
fectly-adjusting, first-party premiums prevent moral hazard on the vic
tim side as well, inducing individuals to take cost-effective measures to
reduce their own expected costs.
Although perfectly-adjusting insurance premiums are efficiency-en
hancing with respect to the deterrence portion of the legal rule, they
would be efficiency-reducing with respect to the redistributive portion
of that rule. That is, to the extent premium increases represent purely
an increase in insured's expected implicit tort-tax liability, those pre
mium adjustments would produce both the regulated-activity distor
tion and the work-leisure distortion that Kaplow and Shavell have in
mind. Thus, reconsider Jolls' example discussed above, in which there
was a $500,000 tax imposed on rich tort defendants who are held lia
ble, whereas no tort tax is imposed on the nonrich. 1 44 If we introduce
perfectly risk-adju!'ted liability insurance for this potential redistribu
tive damage award, the premium (again assuming a 2 % probability of
loss) for coverage for the risk of being forced to pay that tort tax
would be set at $10,000. Again, that would be the insurance premium
to cover only the redistributive tort tax.
A corollary assumption is that, if the probability of the liability
rule's applying were to change over time (say, it went from 2% to
2.5 % ), the insurance premium would change instantly to reflect that
fact; likewise, if the individual's income changed (hence causing a
change in the ex post tort tax from $500,000 to something else), the
insurance premiums would change accordingly. Because we are as
suming perfectly risk-adjusting premiums, the accuracy of the redis1 44

See text accompanying notes

127-28.
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tributive transfer also would be perfect, in the following sense: The
rich and only the rich would pay the higher premium/tax; everyone
else would pay the lower amount, which does not contain the tort tax.
In effect, the insurance companies would serve as a sort of private IRS
(in fact, insurance companies would compete to serve as the private
IRS), and they would have the responsibility of identifying the high
income and the low income, separating them into separate pools, and
collecting the higher premiums (that is, taxes) from the former and
the lower premiums from the latter. By assumption, the accuracy of
the redistribution would be close to perfect.
At the same time, and for the same reasons, with perfectly risk- and
income-adjusted premiums, both the regulated-activity and work-lei
sure distortions would be present even under the assumptions of the
behavioralist critique. Under the behavioralist argument, the individ
uals in our example would perceive the expected tort tax to be only
$5,000 (.01 x $500,000) rather than $10,000 (.02 x $500,000), which is
the unbiased assessment. But that bias was attributed to the probabil
istic nature of the tort tax. When the tax is made certain through the
insurance premium (which is, in fact, the whole purpose of insurance),
the optimism bias presumably would disappear, removing one of the
behavioralist justifications for preferring redistributive legal rule to re
distributive taxes. 1 4s
The next question is whether the mental accounting effect likewise
would also disappear. Maybe, maybe not. The answer probably de
pends on how insurance companies design their premium statements.
If, under the income-adjusted tort regime, insurers included a separate
line for the income tax portion of the premium, that practice certainly
would make dollars paid for the tort tax look a lot more like the dol
lars paid for the direct income tax. 1 46
1 45 Jolls acknowledges that the presence of insurance may undermine the optimism-bias
argument in favor of redistributive legal rules. Jolls, Behavioral Economics, note 36, at
1665. She notes, however, that "[b]ecause insurance almost always involves some combi
nation of deductibles, copayments, and experience rating (to mitigate problems of moral
hazard), even with insurance there will be some uncertainty about the degree to which a
redistributive legal rule will affect a given individual. . . . " Id. at 1663 (emphasis omitted).
Deductibles, copayments, and experience rating are rough substitutes for perfectly risk
adjusted premiums. Thus, Jolls is saying that to the extent that insurance is not perfectly
risk-adjusted, there will remain some uncertainty and hence some room for the optimism
bias to work. This conclusion, however, significantly weakens Jolls' main point about the
use of income-redistributive legal rules as probabilistic taxes.
1 46 Jolls acknowledges this point in her discussion of the mental accounting effect: "Of
course, the degree to which a redistributive legal rule or tax is viewed as a direct charge
against income, and hence a direct disincentive to work, may be influenced by the way in
which it is presented. If W-2 forms listed expected tort obligations under a redistributive
legal rule, then the costs of the rule might be more likely to be charged directly against
income. This would make redistributive legal rules more like taxes." Id. at 1671.
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Although we would not expect insurance premiums to be perfectly
or even nearly perfectly adjusted to reflect individual insureds' differ
ing risk characteristics (which are relatively difficult to observe), we
assume that insurers would do a reasonably good job of adjusting their
premiums to reflect differences in insureds' income levels. First, mar
ket competition would encourage insurers to income-adjust their pre
miums (just as it encourages them to risk-adjust their premiums), in
order to keep the middle- and low-income customers from self-insur
ing. Second, insurers would be able to determine an individual's in
come level, at least his annual income, at a relatively low cost. They
simply could insist on seeing the individual's W-2 form or several
months of pay stubs. In fact, it seems likely that income-adjusted in
surance premiums would be less costly administratively than risk-ad
justed premiums. If we are right about this, then we can conclude that
the presence of insurance generally would increase the accuracy and
the breadth of the income-redistributive legal rule, but also would in
crease the distortions caused by the redistributive element of the
rules.147
C.

Examining the Case for Always (Though Not Exclusively) Using
Legal Rules to Redistribute Income

In a pair of recent articles, Sanchirico, in addition to attacking
Kaplow and Shavell's case for never using legal rules to redistribute
income, offers a series of arguments in support of the conclusion that
legal rules should be used to redistribute income.148 In one respect,
1 47 If insurers are not able to discriminate among insureds on the basis of income (or if,
for some reason, they were forbidden by law from doing so), then the use of income
redistributive legal rules could lead to wildly regressive results. Consider the extreme case
in which, despite the differential income effect of the tort tax, all insureds, irrespective of
income, are required by law to be charged the same premium for liability insurance. In
effect, everyone's premium would equal the average expected loss of the pool plus the
average tax liability, and everyone would pay the same premium. The effect of these as
sumptions would be to produce a regressive tort tax. That is, income would be shifted to
the rich from the nonrich. In our example, the rich should pay a tort tax in their insurance
premiums of $10,000 (because, if they were held liable, which is a 2% probability, the
insurance company would have to pay out an extra $500,000 in damages) and the nonrich
should pay no such additional premium. With nonadjusting liability insurance, however,
both the rich and the nonrich would pay a $5,000 tort tax adjustment (assuming equal
numbers of rich and nonrich in the insurance pool). Thus, not only would the rich be
shifting the $500,000 ex post tax to the insurance pool, they would be benefiting from a
financing arrangement that, in effect, would impose a regressive tax structure on the mem
bers of the insurance pool.
148 In another part of his analysis, Sanchirico also points out that there are other proxies
for ability besides income-such as accident proneness-and that adjustments to legal
rules on the basis of those nonincome proxies will not produce the double distortion prob
lem. Sanchirico, Efficiency Rationale, note 8, at 1060. That, in our view, is Sanchirico's
most important contribution to the debate regarding redistributive legal rules, and we

Imaged with the Permission ofN.Y.U. Tax Law Review

202

TAX LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:

Sanchirico's position is the mirror image of Kaplow and Shavell's po
sition: Whereas Kaplow and Shavell argue that legal rules should
never be income-redistributive, Sanchirico seems to argue that his
analysis, taken to its logical conclusion, would lead to the result that
legal rules always should be income-redistributive (if income is deter
mined to be the dominant measure of well-being), although he quali
fies this conclusion. 1 49
We conclude that both claims are overstated. Instead, our view is
that whether legal rules should ever be income-redistributive (that is,
whether legal rules should ever be used to reduce income inequality)
depends entirely on whether there are circumstances in which the le
gal system has a comparative advantage either at observing income or
redistributing with respect to income. And the comparative advan
tage issue, in our view, ends up turning almost entirely on the con
tracting-around and haphazardness arguments. In this Section, we
explain why we are unpersuaded by Sanchirico's arguments in favor of
income-redistributive legal rules.
The first of Sanchirico's arguments is what he calls the "optimal-tax
argument for equity informed legal rules."150 At its core, the optimal
tax argument rejects Kaplow and Shavell's premise that all redistribu
tive adjustments to efficient legal rules necessarily produce a regu
lated-activity distortion. Recall Kaplow and Shavell's argument that,
as soon as a legal rule departs from the efficient design, it produces
inefficiency with respect to the conduct regulated by the rule. To take
the torts example, if we alter the liability rule or the damages calcula
tion to make the law redistributive even slightly (if, for purely redis
tributive reasons, we move even slightly in the direction of strict
liability when negligence is the efficient rule, or we raise damages
even one dollar above the efficient level), there will be a distortion
with respect to investments in accident avoidance. In this example,
too much care will be taken to avoid a particular type of accident. It is
this regulated-conduct distortion that, in Kaplow and Shavell's view,
always will tip the scale in favor of using the tax system to reduce
income inequality, since the work-leisure distortion always will be prebuild on that insight in the next Section. In this Section, however, we focus on Sanchirico's
arguments in support of income-adjusted legal rules.
1 49 See, e.g., id. at 1019 ("No claim is being made that the optimal-tax analysis provided
in this Part proves definitively that policymakers should always set legal rules with equity
in mind. The purely economic arguments in this Part do not address all relevant considera
tions. What is claimed-definitively-is this: The kind of analysis provided here, which
forms the most prominent argument for pure efficiency in law, not only fails to support the
claim that legal rules should never be redistributive, but leads to the more than opposite
conclusion that redistributive goals should always inform legal rules.") (footnote omitted).
He also qualifies this assertion at a later point in the article. Id. at 1026 n.56.
1so Id. at 1018.
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sent in precisely the same degree with respect to any sort of income
redistribution. 1 5 1
Sanchirico's response to this observation is clever, if somewhat
complex. Relying on basic assumptions commonly made by
microeconomic theorists, he argues that any initial adjustments away
from an efficient legal rule in fact will not produce inefficiency.152 The
reason has to do with the assumption that the social welfare function
that is being maximized is smoothly sloping, that is, it has no kinks or
jumps but is instead "continuous." Under this assumption, at the
point at which a rule is set to "maximize" efficiency, any small depar
tures from that efficient rule in either direction will not cause a loss of
utility, because the curve is by definition flat (that is, with a slope of
zero) at the point of maximization.1 53
Although Sanchirico cannot specify how large this flat range of the
curve will be, and thus how far the legal rule can depart from the
efficient rule before distortion would set in, he admits that range may
be small, perhaps "infinitesimal. " 1 54 The conclusion Sanchirico de
rives from this is that, if the redistribution-minded policymaker were
to limit herself to only a single redistributive policy instrument, she
essentially would be wasting resources. Loading all of the redistribu
tive work onto one redistributive system increases the likelihood that
the flat range on the social welfare curve will be exceeded, at which
point distortions (of the regulated-conduct variety) would occur. In
stead, the policymaker should spread the redistributive work among
all the available redistributive tools so as to get the full benefit of the
perhaps small (but nonzero) distortion-free redistributive capacity
available in each redistributive tool. As Sanchirico puts the point,
policymakers should spread the redistributive work around "because
every tool is initially perfectly redistributional, and no tool remains
perfect once employed."1 55
This argument is valid, as far as it goes. But its empirical signifi
cance is doubtful. Again, the key assumption in the argument is that
of a smoothly continuous social utility function, an assumption that
Sanchirico admits his analysis depends on and that he admits has no
basis in empirical fact. The assumption may be convenient for model
ing purposes, and it may even be an accurate picture of the world in
some contexts, but it seems a thin reed on which to hang such an imBut see text accompanying notes 108-47 (criticizing this latter assumption).
Sanchirico, Efficiency Rationale, note 10, at 1023-24 ("Thus, on the margin, move
ments away from the efficient legal rule have no impact on total utility, but-if we move in
the right direction-a beneficial impact on inequality.").
153 Id. at 1022.
1 54 Id. at 1024.
1 55 Id. at 1022.
1 51

1 52
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portant argument.156 Moreover, even if the assumption of a kinkless
utility function does hold, the range of distortion-free redistributive
adjustments-the flat portion of the curve-may be, as Sanchirico ad
mits, "infinitesimal."157 If that were so, then Sanchirico's point here
most likely would be small as well.158
In what appears to be a second, separate defense of income-redis
tributive legal rules, Sanchirico builds on the idea that the ultimate
target of a welfarist redistributive policy should be individual well-be
ing, 159 but that well-being is itself unobservable. Because well-being is
unobservable, the redistribution-minded policymaker must focus on
proxies or outward manifestations of the inner state of well-being. 160
Income is one such proxy (and indisputably an important one) but not
the only one. On Sanchirico's list of other proxies are the familiar
ones of wealth and consumption. 161 In addition, however, he adds the
proxy of "damages caused in accidents" 162 as a proxy for "accident
proneness." And the more of these proxies the policymaker takes
into account, the more accurate the redistribution will be with respect
to the true underlying target-differences in well-being. 163
All of this makes sense if one is working within a traditional
welfarist framework. 164 From this insight, however, Sanchirico seems
to conclude that both the legal system and the tax system should be
designed to take into account every possible proxy for well-being.1 65
156

See id. at 1023, n.51, 1026 n.56.
Id. at 1023.
1 58 More precisely, for his argument to have any real-world significance, the point of
maximization would have to be (coincidentally) at a point where even a minute amount of
redistribution was valued extraordinarily highly by society. The likelihood of such a coinci
dence seems remote.
1 59 Id. at 1022.
160 Id. at 1020.
1 6 1 Id. at 1027.
162 Id. at 1027. Sanchirico also mentions contractual activity, property owned, harm
caused, and the like. Id. at 1009.
163 Id. at 1009.
1 64 Recall that we generally have not adopted the welfarist framework for this Article,
nor any other specific political theory. Rather, we adopted an independence assumption,
which suggests that a redistribution-minded policymaker will make independent redistribu
tive decisions with respect to different types of inequality. See note 31. We do not think
that our conclusions hinge on this assumption. See discussion at text accompanying notes
259-72.
165 Sanchirico, Efficiency Rationale, note 8, at 1021-26. In fact, Sanchirico characterizes
the ideal redistributive policy instrument to be a sort of "multidimensional tax table" under
which each "individual's tax on each attribute [would be] a function of the levels of the
individual's other attributes. Taxes can thus be cross-dependent. Income tax rates, for in
stance, can be based on wealth, just as damages might depend on the individual's income
or wealth." Id. at 1028. As Sanchirico goes on to point out, we do in fact make adjust
ments to the existing income tax in order to take account of differences in consumption
decisions that matter to us on distributional grounds. Id. at 1030.
1 57
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We do not see how this follows. 166 Moreover, even this conclusion
does not explain why legal rules in particular should be used as a re
distributive policy instrument. Rather, it provides only a justification
for taking into account as many proxies for well-being as possible,
whatever redistributive instruments happen to be used. That is to say,
the cross-dependency goal could be achieved entirely through the tax
and-transfer regime, such as through a multidimensional tax table.
There is nothing in this analysis that identifies legal rules as being par
ticularly well-suited for such a function.
What seems to be Sanchirico's strongest argument for redistributing
through legal rules is a sort of diminishing returns-to-scale story. He
seems to be arguing that, even if the tax-and-transfer system is gener
ally the preferred redistributor with respect to income, at some point
(after some amount of income redistribution already has been accom
plished through the tax-and-transfer system) there are diminishing re
turns to doing additional redistribution through that system. At that
point, if policymakers wish to further increase the amount of overall
income redistribution, they should not do so through the tax-and
transfer system (which is, in some sense, overloaded) but should do
the additional redistribution through a different system, namely, the
legal system. Thus, he seems to be arguing that the more redistribu
tion with respect to a particular proxy is done through a given policy
instrument, the less effective that instrument becomes with respect to
that proxy; hence, we need to spread the income redistribution
around, using the tax system a little, the legal system a little, and so
on. We might call this a capacity-constraint justification for spreading
the redistributive work around.
Although in theory this argument could be right, it seems unlikely.
The argument assumes that there are diminishing returns to scale in
redistributing income through the tax system and that, over some rele
vant range of income redistribution, the legal system on the margin
would be more efficient than the tax-and-transfer system as a system
of redistribution. These assumptions strike us as highly unlikely. Al
though there is no empirical evidence that we know of that would
permit us to answer the question definitively, it is our intuition that,
when it comes to administrative costs, there are probably increasing
returns to scale, not decreasing returns to scale, in using the tax sys
tem to redistribute income. In other words, we suspect that over the
166 For example, under our approach, all of the relevant redistributive proxies would be
taken into account, but the mechanism would be different. Instead of adjusting all policy
instruments on the basis of every proxy for well-being, we would use the redistributive
policy instrument that best suited each proxy. Overall, from an ex ante perspective, taking
into account the redistributive aspect of the legal system and the tax system, the result
would be the same: a focus on inequality of well-being.
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relevant range of redistribution, the tax-and-transfer system would ex
hibit increasing marginal redistributive capacity rather than decreas
ing capacity.
To make this point more clearly, imagine a situation in which the
tax system already does some amount of income redistribution. Then
the policymaker decides that a greater degree of income redistribution
is desirable. In our view, it would make most sense to use the tax
system for this additional redistribution as well. For reasons discussed
above, the tax-and-transfer system has a comparative advantage in ob
serving income as well as in redistributing income. We believe this
advantage remains for the whole range of the relevant income redis
tribution space. In any event, there certainly is no obvious reason to
suppose that, if the tax system becomes stretched to capacity as a sys
tem of income redistribution, the most efficient means of adding addi
tional redistributive capacity to the overall system would be a new
redistributive role to the legal system, which is not designed primarily
with income redistribution in mind. It seems to us that a more effi
cient response would be to add more capacity to the income tax sys
tem rather than to call on the unused income-redistributive capacity
of the legal system.
An important part of our framework that Sanchirico's analysis over
looks is that the various redistributive policy instruments may have
different comparative advantages. In particular, even if equality of
well-being is the overarching target of the redistribution-minded poli
cymaker, such that the focus of redistributive policy is on "proxies for
well-being," it is still the case that various government policy instru
ments are not equally well-suited to redistribution with respect to all
aspects of well-being. Thus, putting our framework in welfarist terms,
the policymaker should ask, with respect to each proxy for well-being,
which policy instrument is the better proxy observer and which is the
better redistributor with respect to that proxy.
It may be, as we argue in the next Section, that the legal system has
a comparative advantage at observing certain characteristics that cor
relate with well-being, such as whether or not an individual is accident
prone or whether or not an individual has experienced nonphysical
pain and suffering. In such cases, the legal system should be used at
least to observe the relevant proxy. Then the question becomes
whether that information should be used in the legal system or in the
tax-and-transfer system to make the tax-and-transfer system cross
dependent.
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REDISTRIBUTION WITH RESPECT TO NoNINCOME INEQUALITY

Among those who favor some sort of redistribution, there is little
disagreement that large inequalities of income or wealth present an
appropriate occasion for redistributive transfers. But, as discussed
above, income is not the only proxy for well-being. Therefore, income
inequality should not be the only target of an egalitarian or even a
welfarist redistributive policy. Moreover, putting the welfarist frame
work to one side, a case can be made that there are other types of
inequality that a redistribution-minded policymaker would (and
should) care about, independent of income inequality.1 67
For example, even if income were distributed equally across society
(or if all income differences were considered the result of pure choice,
rather than a mix of choice and endowment), our intuition suggests
that redistribution still would be considered appropriate for large dif
ferences in nonincome dimensions of well-being that are attributable
to brute luck.168 Thus, for example, in an equal-income society, we
might tax those who do not have severe disabilities in order to make
cash or in kind transfers to those who do: That is, the presence of a
severe disability, by itself, would be considered sufficient grounds for
a redistributive transfer. The same might be said of inequality of edu
cation or healthcare.1 69
Under our comparative-advantage framework, if policymakers can
identify nonincome measures of inequality that society cares about,
they should ask the same questions that were asked above about in
come redistribution: Which system is the better observer of this char
acteristic or type of inequality? And which system is the better
redistributor with respect to it? Broadening the redistributive analysis
this way makes it clear that the standard categories-tax rules versus
legal rules-are inadequate to capture fully the various policy options.
For example, it is unclear into which category an unfunded mandate
such as the Americans With Disabilities Act would fall. The Social
Security or Medicare systems also are not easily categorized. In this
Section, we focus on a set of examples that, at least on first blush,
seem to fall under the rubric of legal rules. Even in these cases, how
ever, the distinctions become blurred. These are legal rules that have
the following interesting qualities: They tend to promote a plausible
vision of distributive justice (that is, they redistribute from those who
167 We discussed this independence assumption in the introduction, note 31, and we re
turn to it in the text accompanying notes 259-72.
1 68 See note 27.
169 Rawls, note 9, might call some of these characteristics "primary goods," and Dwor
kin, Law's Empire, note 9, might call them "resources." For our purposes, the terminology
is not important. What is important is that there are types of inequality, independent of
income, that might justify some sort of redistributive policy.
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are better endowed to those who are less well endowed), and they do
so in a way that is arguably more efficient than a pure tax-and-transfer
alternative. Our analysis, of course, does not depend on the absence
of a tradeoff between efficiency and redistribution, but only is made
more compelling by it. Thus, we do not reject a priori legal rules that
fulfill society's redistributive goals but are inefficient.
Our claim in this Section is that, with respect to some types of ine
quality, the legal system should play an important redistributive role,
either because the legal system is better at observing the relevant type
of inequality or because the legal system is the more efficient redis
tributor or both. Here again, however, one of the most important ob
servations of our analysis is that, at the margins, these categories-tax
rules and legal rules-begin to break down. The question thus be
comes, more generally, what institution or combination of institutions
is best suited to achieve the type of redistribution that is desired.
A.
1.

Redistributing Through Insurance Law

The Problem of Disease-Related Genes

A potentially important source of nonincome-based inequality in
volves disease-related genes, that is, genetic characteristics that sub
stantially increase an individual's likelihood of contracting a
devastatingly costly, incapacitating, excruciatingly painful, and per
haps fatal disease. Such genetic characteristics correlate with higher
than-average lifetime health costs, shorter-than-average life spans,
and presumably lower-than-average psychic income or noneconomic
well-being. Moreover, at least with respect to some such diseases, an
individual's genetic makeup is the sole determinant of whether the
disease will be contracted. Therefore, whether or not an individual
has such a disease gene is an important measure of inequality of well
being, the sort of inequality that likely would motivate a redistribu
tion-minded policymaker to engage in compulsory redistribution.17°
For diseases that are entirely the result of genetic inheritance and
thus are unaffected by an individual's choices or by her environment
(which we call "genetically-determined diseases"), the case for com
pulsory redistribution is especially strong. In fact, it is difficult to con1 10 As one prominent contemporary political philosopher and medical ethicist put it,
even philosophers who believe that differences among individuals in terms of ability or
talent do not present distributive justice concerns, "only the strictest libertarians treat
health status differences merely as 'unfortunate' variations and believe that there is no
social obligation to correct for the relative advantages and disadvantages caused by disease
and disability." Norman Daniels, The Genome Project, Individual Differences, and Just
Health Care in Justice and the Human Genome Project 1 10, 1 16-17 (1994) (citing H. Tris
tam Engelhardt, Jr., The Foundations of Bioethics (1986)).
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ceive of a better example of bad brute luck.171 Thus, with genetically
determined diseases, the only questions for the redistribution-minded
policymaker are how much redistribution is appropriate and what is
the best tool for doing the job. The first question we again leave un
answered. It is the second question that is the main focus of this Sec
tion, and we conclude that there are a number of reasons to prefer
redistributing through the legal rules to redistributing through tax
and-transfer rules. The most difficult question will be what to do, as a
matter of redistributive policy, about what we call "multi-factorial"
diseases: Diseases that are caused partly by an individual's genetic
makeup and caused partly by the individual's informed, voluntary
choices, such as cancer or heart disease.
2.

The Easy Cases: Genetically-Determined Diseases

Before we take up the hard cases, however, we begin with the easy
ones. Assume that some high-cost diseases are determined entirely by
an individual's genetic make-up. With respect to such diseases, in
other words, the individual's behavior-her choices regarding how
much or what to eat or whether to exercise or where to live-will have
no effect on her likelihood of getting the disease or how severe the
symptoms will be. Huntington's Disease is a good example. It is a
horrible neurological disease caused by a defect in a single gene.
For those who have the defective gene, once the symptoms begin to
appear (between the ages of 35 and 45), their health grows steadily
worse, causing them to incur enormous healthcare costs over a period
of 15 or so years and ultimately leaving them unable to care for them
selves. Moreover, the nightmare ends with the patient suffering an
inevitably premature and painful death.172 There is no known cure for
Huntington's Disease, and those with the defective gene can do noth
ing to reduce (or increase) their likelihood of contracting the disease.
With such purely genetically-determined diseases, there is an obvious
argument under our framework for transferring money from those
who do not have the gene to those who do. 1 73
111 An equally strong case for redistribution, however, can be made with respect to dis
eases (or any source of higher-than-average expected lifetime costs) that are caused en
tirely by environmental or social circumstances that are beyond an individual's control.
1 72 Gwen Terrenoire, Huntington's Disease and the Ethics of Genetic Prediction, 18 J.
Med. Ethics 79, 79 (1992) (describing the disease).
1 73 But see Richard A. Epstein, The Legal Regulation of Genetic Discrimination: Old
Responses to New Technology, 74 B.U. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1994) [hereinafter Genetic Discrimi
nation] ("no wealth transfer to victims of Huntington's Disease could ever hope to equal
ize their positions in life.").
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Choosing the Optimal Redistributive Policy Instrument

The next important question, then, for the redistribution-minded
policymaker is what redistributive policy instrument is best suited to
reduce this type of inequality. Again, the framework of this Article
suggests a comparison of the two general approaches-legal rules and
tax-and-transfer rules-to determine which has a comparative advan
tage at redistributing with respect to this source of inequality. The
legal-rule approach, for example, might entail a nondisrimination
norm. It might prohibit insurers from taking the Huntington gene
into account in their underwriting processes-that is, the processes by
which insurers determine whether and on what terms to insure a par
ticular individual. Similarly, the nondiscrimination rule might prohibit
employers from using such information in their decisions concerning
whether to allow particular employees to participate in employer-pro
vided health, disability, or life insurance plans.1 74 Put more generally,
insurers and employers would be prohibited from discriminating on
the basis of genetic information. For example, they might be prohib
ited from requiring applicants to submit to genetic testing, or they
might be forbidden to condition insurance coverage or employee ben
efits on the provision of genetic information.
The tax-and-transfer approach, by contrast, would entail no nondis
crimination principle. To the contrary, it explicitly would allow insur
ers and employers to use genetic information in the underwriting
process, which would exacerbate the inequalities presented by the
presence of genetically-determined diseases, as those with Hunting
ton's Disease, for example, would find themselves wholly unable to
find affordable health insurance. Then, under the tax-and-transfer re1 74 The concept of underwriting primarily is associated with the sale of individual insur
ance policies, that is, policies sold by an insurer to cover the risk of a particular individual
person or business. And it is in the underwriting process for individual health, disability,
and life insurance policies that insurers would take into account specific genetic informa
tion about individual risk characteristics. Insurers, however, also sell insurance policies to
groups, such as in the most common case of employer-provided group health, disability, or
life insurance. Sometimes employer-provided group insurance actually is insured with an
insurance company (that is, the employer shifts its employees' health risks to an insurer for
a premium), and sometimes it is self-insured by the employer. Either way, with group
insurance, the insurer or employer-qua-insurer has less of a need for individualized risk
information than in the case of individual insurance, because there is less of an adverse
selection problem. In fact, group insurers for the most part do not seek genetic informa
tion from their insureds, but instead insure everyone in the group on largely the same
terms. Thus, as we point out below, with respect to group insurance, there already is redis
tribution from the genetically better off to the less well off. As we argue, however, this sort
of cross-subsidization may not remain stable if science progresses to the point where insur
ers (including group insurers) with a low-cost genetic test, definitively can determine that
particular individuals have a much higher-than-average likelihood of contracting certain
high-cost diseases.
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distributive approach, either a tax-financed subsidy would be paid to
those who have the disease-related gene or the government itself
would become the insurer (or healthcare provider) of such
individuals.
A definitive determination of which approach would be optimal
(which would strike the best balance between efficiency and distribu
tional concerns) would require a considerable amount of empirical ev
idence. We argue, however, that the case for some version of the
redistributive-rule approach in this setting is stronger than the critics
of such antidiscrimination insurance rules have recognized.1 75 In addi
tion we point out that those who have been most strident in their calls
for legal rules prohibiting insurers and employers from using genetic
information on distributive-justice grounds largely have failed to rec
ognize that the key issue is not one of fairness per se, but one of com
parative institutional advantage.
To understand the efficiency and distributive tradeoffs presented by
the use of nondiscrimination rules, we first review some basic princi
ples of insurance economics in order to understand why insurance
companies have an economic incentive to use genetic information and
to see the efficiency benefits of allowing them to do so. First, consider
the insurance concept of risk classification. Insurers have an eco
nomic incentive to classify or segregate individuals into relatively nar
row risk pools. Put differently, it is in the nature of a competitive
insurance market that insurance companies will be induced to charge
each individual insured a premium that approximates that insured's
expected costs. Economists sometimes (and insurance companies fre
quently) refer to such premiums as "actuarially fair" premiums. If an
insurer fails to price its policies actuarially fairly, other insurers will
compete away the first insurer's business. And here's the kicker: Ge
netic information about individual insureds has the potential to enable
insurers to make accurate and low-cost estimates of those insureds'
expected costs and hence to facilitate more accurate pricing of individ
ual policies.
Second, genetic information can help insurers combat the well
known insurance problem of adverse selection.176 Adverse selection
is the tendency for relatively high-risk individuals to purchase insur
ance. It occurs when insurers cannot distinguish high-risk from low1 75 See, e.g., Colin S. Diver & Jane Maslow Cohen, Genophobia: What Is Wrong With
Genetic Discrimination?, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1439, 1468 (2001 ) (arguing that genetic infor
mation, if available to both the insurer and the insured, would increase the overall effi
ciency of group insurance markets).
1 76 In the case of multi-factorial diseases, genetic information also may help insurers
overcome the other principal problem facing insurance markets: moral hazard. We discuss
this issue at text accompanying note 182.
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risk individuals and so must charge the same premium to all. High
risk individuals (who know they are relatively high-risk) select into
insurance pools to benefit from the cross-subsidization, causing premi
ums for everyone to rise eventually. This process can result in low
risk individuals reducing their level of coverage or dropping out of
insurance markets altogether, which produces an overall sacrifice of
social welfare given that low-risk individuals are assumed to be risk
averse and would prefer to be insured.
Thus, from the perspective of the insurance company, it is entirely
fair and appropriate for insurers to charge premiums that approximate
expected costs as closely as possible. In fact, in state court regulatory
disputes over whether a given insurance company's rates are unfairly
discriminatory, insurance companies make precisely that argument,
arguing essentially that fair insurance premiums in the regulatory con
text should be interpreted to mean only actuarially fair premiums. 177
The parties on the other side of those ratemaking disputes, however,
typically argue, precisely for the brute luck/endowment sorts of rea
sons mentioned in the Introduction, 1 78 that the state law fairness re
quirement should prevent insurers from taking into account some
factors that bear on an individual's expected costs. And precisely that
argument has been made with respect to genetic information. As one
commentator put the point: "Since one cannot choose one's genetic
make-up, arguably there should be no duty to pay more for insurance
because of a poor genetic make-up."179
In our view the debate about whether fairness or distributive justice
requires insurers to take genetic information into account or to ignore
genetic information somewhat misses the point. At least in the case of
purely genetically-determined diseases, few would dispute that fair
ness or distributive-justice concerns call for something to be done
about the unequal allocation of the costs of those diseases in an unreg
ulated insurance market. But the question, again, is what is the best
approach. Which institution-the legal system or the tax-and-transfer
system-has the comparative advantage in doing this sort of redistri
bution? The proponents of restrictions on insurers' use of genetic
testing do not grapple with the fact that the important debate is not
really about whether to redistribute with respect to such measures of
111 See, e.g., Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Ins. Comm'r, 482 A.2d 542 (Pa. 1984),
excerpted and discussed in Kenneth S. Abraham, Insurance Law and Regulation: Cases
and Materials 125-35 (3d ed. 2000).
178 See text accompanying notes 1-40.
179 Eric Mills Holmes, Solving the Insurance/Genetic Fair/Unfair Discrimination Di
lemma in Light of the Human Genome Project, 85 Ky. L.J. 503, 563 (1996). In other parts
of his article, Holmes explicitly invokes Rawls as a justification for imposing such limita
tions on insurance companies. Id. at 577.
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well-being, but how best to do it.180 And to answer that question, we
return to the two questions we posed above with respect to income
inequality: Which institution (the legal system or the tax-and-transfer
system) is the best proxy observer with respect to disease-related
genes? And which system is the best redistributor with respect to
those genetic differences?
b.

Exploiting the Benefits of the "Invisible Redistributive Hand" of
the Market

As to the best-proxy-observer question, there is a sense in which the
legal system has a distinct advantage over the tax-and-transfer system,
an advantage unaddressed in the debates concerning insurers' use
(and proposals to restrict their use ) of genetic information. This ad
vantage is inherent in the redistributive legal rule in question: A rule
that prohibits insurers from using genetic information in their under
writing processes does not actually require that the relevant proxy be
observed at all. The whole idea, in fact, is to prevent the proxy from
being observed.
Of course, there would be administrative costs associated with en
forcing the nonobservation rule; the policymaker would have to deter
mine how much to spend on enforcement and what penalties to
impose on noncompliant insurers. But there would be no expense
t so Most proponents of restrictions on insurers' use of genetic information fail to address
the issue as one of comparative institutional advantage. They frame the question instead
as whether justice or fairness principles requires such restrictions or not, rather than what
is the best institutional approach if justice requires redistribution from the better off to the
worse off. See, e.g., Daniels, note 170, at 132 ("[A]Ithough [with genetic information] we
may better predict which individuals are prone to certain diseases, and thus which individu
als are worse insurance risks, justice requires that we not use this information in ways that
make it more difficult for such people to obtain appropriate health care."). Even in one of
the most comprehensive treatments of the genetic discrimination/insurance underwriting
question, the author explicitly deemphasizes the comparative institutional question.
Holmes, note 179 (surveying arguments for and against allowing insurers to use genetic
testing in the underwriting process, but explicitly deemphasizing the comparative nature of
the analysis). Holmes gives almost no attention to the tax-and-transfer alternative and
how it would fare against the redistributive-rule approach, which is the exclusive focus of
his article. The one exception is an early footnote in his article, in which he notes that
Richard Epstein has suggested a tax-and-transfer alternative approach, but then concludes
that "a public taxation solution would not constitute 'insurance' and issues of underwriting
health risks using genetic information would be irrelevant." Holmes, note 179, at 507-08
n.5. The footnote goes on to summarize briefly how public healthcare programs such as
Medicare and Medicaid interact with private health insurance, but it never explains why
Epstein's tax-and-transfer alternative proposal is "irrelevant." The lack of emphasis on the
comparative nature of the insurance/discrimination question is typical among scholars writ
ing on the subject. See, e.g., Deborah Hellman, Is Actuarially Fair Insurance Pricing Actu
arially Fair?: A Case Study in Insuring Battered Women, 32 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 355
(1997); Leah Wortham, The Economics of Insurance Classification: The Sound of One
Invisible Hand Clapping, 47 Ohio St. L.J. 835 (1986).

Imaged with the Permission ofN.Y.U. Tax Law Review

214

TAX LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:

necessary to determine which individuals have the gene and which do
not. Under the tax-and-transfer alternative, however, the taxing au
thority would have to adopt some means of determining those individ
uals with the relevant gene.
In addition to being the better proxy observer, the redistributive
rule/antidiscrimination approach has advantages when it comes to de
termining the amount of the redistributive transfer. (In terms of our
framework, this can be understood as a version of the better redis
tributor question.) Under the tax-and-transfer approach, the poli
cymaker would need to determine up front the precise difference
between the expected lifetime health costs of those individuals who
have the gene and the expected lifetime costs of those without the
gene so that the amount of the tax-and-transfer payments could be set
accordingly. Gathering such information is costly, and there is little
reason to believe that the tax collector would be able to do this on its
own. By contrast, under the antidiscrimination approach (where in
surers are simply forbidden from discriminating on the basis of genet
ics), the amount of the redistributive transfer, in effect, would be
determined by market forces via a sort of "invisible redistributive
hand." While insurers would need to determine how much to charge
everyone in the insurance pool (again, by law, being forced to charge
the same amount to those who have the disease gene and to those who
do not), they would not have to determine the precise portion of pre
miums attributable to the genetic difference.
Thus, over time, as insureds who have the gene begin to experience
health-related expenses and receive health-related benefits, those
costs naturally would be spread over the entire insurance pool, result
ing in cross-subsidizing transfers from those without the disease gene
to those with it. And the amount of the cross-subsidization attributa
ble to the antidiscrimination rule automatically would reflect the dif
ferences in health-related costs among members of the insurance pool
that are attributable to the morally arbitrary genetic characteristic. As
a result, it would not be necessary for insurers or for the policymaker
to make a separate, ex ante calculation of the appropriate amount of
the redistributive transfer; cross-subsidization within the insurance
pool and competition among insurers would produce something ap
proximating the right amount of redistributive transfer.181
1 8 1 Perhaps the most plausible tax-and-transfer alternative to our redistributive-rule/an
tidiscrimination approach would be to use the insurance industry's comparative advantage
at determining insured losses. Thus, if insurers were allowed to use genetic information
and as a result created separate risk pools· for those with the gene and for those without it,
they would develop (as a result of competition over time) a relatively accurate measure of
the relevant difference in economic well-being between the two groups attributable to the
disease gene. (That is, if the only difference between two insurance pools is that one con-
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Limitations and Objections

This redistributive-rule/antidiscrimination approach, of course, has
important limitations. For example, the invisible hand redistributive
transfer just described responds only to differences in lifetime health
care costs. It does nothing to respond to the noneconomic, psychic
costs of Huntington's Disease, which a tax system could address. In
addition the redistributive-rule/antidiscrimination approach presents
special costs. First, we should assume that, as scientists identify more
disease-causing genes, individuals would desire (and would get) access
to that information about themselves. As a result, if insurers are not
allowed access to that same information, adverse selection in the indi
vidual insurance market would occur. Individuals who discover that
they have the disease gene would leap at the chance to buy what
would be a heavily cross-subsidized insurance policy.
This phenomenon in turn would cause premiums to rise, and low
risk insureds would tend to reduce coverage or drop out of insurance
pools altogether, a result that would be nonoptimal from an efficiency
perspective. How serious the adverse selection problem would be in
the individual insurance market, however, would depend on a number
of factors: what percentage of the population had the gene, how large
the health costs associated with the gene were, and how large the par
ticular insurance pools happened to be. If the gene were present in
relatively few individuals, the adverse selection effect would be small,
especially in larger insurance pools.
Adverse selection is much less of a problem with group insurance,
which is the form that most health and disability insurance (and a consists of individuals with a particular disease gene, the resulting differences in Joss experi
ence between the two pools will be a natural measure of the differences in economic well
being) differences attributable solely to the gene. And this information conceivably could
be shared with the taxing-and-transferring authority, which would use it to determine the
appropriate redistributive transfer. In essence, we would be privatizing the calculation of
the appropriate redistributive transfer, which makes sense, given that determining the rela
tive costs presented by different groups of individuals, this is what insurers do best. It is
what keeps actuaries off the streets. In any event, if such a sharing arrangement could be
made administratively feasible, we agree that it represents a plausible alternative to a non
discrimination legal-rule approach. In fact, it might be even fairer because it spreads the
costs among the entire population and not a specific insurance pool. If that is the ultimate
conclusion (that is, the insurance market is used to gather the relevant information and the
tax system is used to do the actual redistribution), then inequalities with respect to disease
related genes would be one of those areas in which the optimal redistributive scheme is a
mixed one-one system for proxy observing, the other for the actual redistributing.
Another alternative would be to allow private insurers to refuse to insure individuals
who have particular disease-related genes and then to have the government insure those
individuals. That would eliminate the need for the government to determine ex ante the
difference in expected costs associated with the genes. It generally is believed, however,
that the government is not typically as good as the private insurance industry at dealing
with problems of moral hazard and adverse selection.
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siderable amount of life insurance) takes these days. With group in
surance, the insurer relies less on traditional insurance underwriting
practices (such as the use of health history questionnaires, blood tests,
medical exams, and the like) and relies more on the fact that most
insurance groups are relatively diverse in terms of their health-risk
profiles. This is because an individual's decision to join a group, such
as to become employed with a particular company, is a multi-faceted
decision. And whether an individual has discovered that she has a
particular medical condition would be only one of many factors bear
ing on the decision to take a particular job. By contrast, in the indi
vidual insurance market, an individual's decision to buy a health,
disability, or life insurance policy would be hugely affected by that
individual's perception of her own relatively poor health status. 182
Underwriting practices and group insurance, therefore, are alterna
tive, though not mutually exclusive, responses to the problem of ad
verse selection. 1 83 If adverse selection is, despite all of this,
considered a serious problem, the final, though perhaps drastic, solu
tion would be to make the purchase of insurance compulsory. 1 84
A second problem with the redistributive-rule/antidiscrimination
approach involves the concern that such an approach would tend to
reallocate the extra costs associated with genetically-determined dis
eases in an arbitrary manner. For example, how those costs would be
reallocated might depend upon whether individuals with the relevant
gene have a tendency to work in particular industries or live in partic
ular geographic regions of the country. If those individuals tend to
gravitate towards certain jobs or certain areas, their gene-related costs
would be borne primarily by the other members of insurance pools in
those industries and parts of the country.185 Such an allocation is con
sidered more arbitrary than, for example, allocating those extra costs
182 In fact, if health and disability insurers did nothing to prevent adverse selection (for
example, if there were no medical exams required of applicants, and there were no pre
existing conditions limitations on benefits), everyone could just go uninsured until they
became ill, and only then buy insurance. That is adverse selection in the extreme and
would render insurance markets unworkable.
183 Indeed, to the extent health, disability, and life insurance currently are provided
through group plans that do not discriminate on the basis of genetics (as is the case for
most of the health insurance market), cross-subsidization from individuals that are better
off genetically to those that are less well off already occurs without any government inter
vention. As we discuss below, cross-subsidization within group insurance pools is per
ceived to be a problem only for relatively small groups.
1 84 Adverse selection is a problem only if individuals have a choice of when and how
much insurance to purchase. If regulatory policy takes that choice away from them ad
verse selection ceases to be a problem.
185 Epstein, Genetic Discrimination, note 173, at 21 ("If workers with genetic defects
tend to gravitate towards certain industries, professions, or geographic regions, then how
ever neutral the anti-discrimination approach appears on its face, it will be heavily dispro
portionate in its impact.").
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across everyone in society, which a national tax-and-transfer approach
in theory would be able to accomplish. In other words, although
spreading the gene-related additional costs across the members of a
particular insurance risk pool is an improvement over leaving those
costs to the individuals themselves, it would be better still to spread
those costs over the largest possible pool-all taxpayers in the United
States.186
That complaint has some obvious merit. Whether the benefit of the
additional cost-spreading would be worth the administrative cost of
doing so and whether a straight tax-and-transfer approach would be
the best means of additional cost-spreading are open questions.
Again, there is the question of how big this problem really would be.
If the amount of the additional insurance premium paid by the subsi
dizing member of the insurance pool under such a rule were relatively
small on a per person basis, little would be gained by implementing a
more comprehensive tax-and-transfer approach. The prevalence and
sustainability of group insurance markets for health-related costs,
which already produces cross-subsidization of the sort we advocate,
suggests that the arbitrary reallocation problem may be relatively mi
nor. 1 87 More significant may be the problem of the uninsured. That
is, to the extent that individuals lack health insurance, they obviously
would not participate in-and could not contribute to or benefit
from-the antidiscrimination approach. The solution to this problem
may be greater subsidies for health insurance, perhaps coupled with
mandatory coverage.

1 86 Epstein relies on a version of this point to argue in favor of a tax-and-transfer alter
native to the problem of genetically-determined diseases. Id. at 20-21. He also argues that
the tax-and-transfer approach is better because it produces an "overt subsidy" rather than
a "covert subsidy" and because it presents a smaller risk of causing an explosion in health
care costs than does the redistributive-rule approach. Id. The tax-and-transfer approach is
not, however, Epstein's first choice. If he thought it were politically feasible, he would
prefer what he calls "benign nonintervention," by which he means that the government
should do nothing, a position that is entirely consistent with Epstein's libertarian philoso
phy. Id. at 20. For libertarians, distributive justice is a concept that should motivate volun
tary charitable giving, not compulsory government redistribution.
187 We should not expect, however, that the trend toward group insurance (which typi
cally does not use genetic information) would make the genetic discrimination issue moot.
If individual health, disability, and life insurers are allowed to use genetic testing in their
underwriting practices in a way that dramatically reduces their costs of identifying the rela
tively low-risk individuals, they eventually will begin to steal the relatively low-risk in
sureds away from group insurance pools, because they will be able to charge the low-risk
members of the pool a relatively low premium. If that were to continue, group insurers
might be forced to use genetic information as well. Thus, to some extent, the viability of
the group insurance market depends on whether individual insurers are allowed to use
genetic information. If there is to be an antidiscrimination rule, it must be imposed both
on individual insurers and on group insurers.
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Thus, the ultimate solution to the arbitrary reallocation problem
might be to facilitate the creation of relatively large, statewide, per
haps nationwide reinsurance pools-pools large and diverse enough
to eliminate the concern about the costs of genetic diseases being real
located insufficiently broadly. This could be done through govern
ment-subsidized or compulsory reinsurance programs.188 In fact, one
of the most prominent and widely supported proposals in recent years
for dealing with the problem of high health care costs borne by small
insurance groups (groups that do not have the large numbers over
which to spread the high costs attributable to individual group mem
bers who have particular diseases or conditions) involves the use of
larger reinsurance groups that, through market mechanisms, could
perform more efficiently the same sort of function that the tax-and
transfer system might accomplish.189
3.

The Hard Cases: Multi-Factorial Diseases

If purely genetically-determined diseases present the strongest case
for redistribution (and, we argue, a strong case for redistribution
through a legal rule), the case is somewhat weaker, or at least more
complicated, for multi-factorial diseases, those that are in part attribu
table to genes but also are affected by the individual's behavior.
Those diseases (such as lung cancer, diabetes, heart disease, hyperten
sion, and the like) represent the great bulk of health-related costs.
The likelihood of contracting such a disease is greater for those with a
particular gene than for those without the gene; however, their likeli
hood of contracting the disease also is (or may be) affected by other
t 88 See, e.g., Randall R. Bovbjerg, Reform of Financing for Health Coverage: What Can
Reinsurance Accomplish?, 29 Inquiry 158, 163-70 (1992) (discussing subsidized and
mandatory reinsurance programs); Holmes, note 179, at 661 ("A federal act could establish
tax incentives for the states to mandate pools that offer comprehensive health insurance to
all citizens, thereby fairly apportioning the social responsibility of providing health insur
ance to the uninsurable citizens.") (footnote omitted}.
1 89 For example, during the health care reform debates of the early 1990's, the Health
Insurance Association of America and the National Association of Insurance Commission
ers together drafted model legislation addressed directly to this problem. See Mark A.
Hall, The Political Economics of Health Insurance Market Reform, 11 Health Affairs 108,
108 (1992). The proposal included a number of provisions, including a commitment to
provide health insurance to all willing purchasers at a reasonable price. Id. at 1 10. One of
the most important provisions, though, was the proposed system through which small
group insurers could spread the costs of "high-risk cases" over a larger reinsurance pool.
Id. at 112 ("For commercial insurers, reinsurance is the most critical component of their
reform proposals, for it provides a private market mechanism for the equitable distribution
of high-risk cases."). The insurance industry argued that not only would reinsurance allow
for a more equitable distribution of the high-risk cases but also that it would reduce the
incentive of insurers to engage in surreptitious attempts to screen out risks that they do not
want to insure. Id. at 115.
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factors such as environment and behavior. In other words, unlike with
purely genetically-determined diseases, with multi-factorial diseases
individual choice makes a difference.
It is common knowledge, for example, that if one refrains from
smoking, adopts a low-fat diet that includes plenty of vegetables,
fruits, and whole grains, and gets regular aerobic exercise, one can
reduce one's risk of contracting cancer, heart disease, and hyperten
sion, which are perennially among the leading causes of mortality and
illness in the United States.190 By precisely how much one can reduce
one's risk of getting these diseases through lifestyle choices, however,
remains unclear. In any event, because of the choice element inherent
in these diseases, there are both efficiency and distributional argu
ments that cut against trying to redistribute from those who do not
have the genes to those who do, which means there are efficiency and
distributional arguments for allowing insurers to use such genetic in
formation in their underwriting decisions.
a.

Efficiency and Distributional Tradeoffs

On the efficiency side, the question again is whether the use of such
information by insurers would enhance their ability to combat adverse
selection and moral hazard. As discussed above, adverse selection can
be reduced by allowing insurers to use the genetic information in
sureds' have access to. As with genetically-determined diseases, insur
ers could charge higher premiums or refuse to insure those who have
a cancer-related gene as well. In addition, if an insurer were to learn
that an individual applicant had a particular multi-factorial cancer
gene, the insurer then could reduce the moral hazard effect of insur
ance by offering the applicant a special premium discount (potentially
above what is offered to the average insured) if she would agree to
take certain steps to reduce her risk of contracting that particular can
cer. Or the insurer might offer a special premium discount if the indi
vidual would agree to a higher-than-average deductible. 1 91
190 Frank B. Hu & Walter C. Willett, Optimal Diets for Prevention of Coronary Heart
Disease, 288 JAMA 2569, 2575 (2002) (concluding that diets that include nonhydrogenated
unsaturated fats, whole grains, fruits and vegetables together with regular physical activity,
avoidance of smoking may prevent the majority of cardiovascular diseases); Tim Byers,
Marion Nestle, Anne McTiernan, Colleen Doyle, Alexis Currie-Williams, Ted Gansler &
Michael Thun, Am. Cancer Soc'y 2001 Nutrition and Physical Activity Guidelines Advi
sory Comm., American Cancer Society Guidelines on Nutrition and Physical Activity for
Cancer Prevention: Reducing the Risk of Cancer With Healthy Food Choices and Physical
Activity, 52 Cancer J. for Clinicians 92 (2002) (recommending diet rich in fruits and vegeta
bles, exercise and no smoking to prevent cancer).
1 9 1 Whether as a practical matter an insurance company can do much to affect an indi
vidual's incentives to avoid cancer or heart disease or other life-threatening and debilitat
ing conditions is an empirical question. If an individual learns that she has a cancer gene
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Although the efficiency concerns seem to cut in one direction (that
is, in favor of allowing insurers to use multi-factorial genetic informa
tion), the direction in which the distributive-justice arguments cut is
less clear and may be in the opposite direction. As we have assumed
throughout, the redistribution-minded policymaker should aim to re
distribute in a way that reduces endowment-related inequality and, to
the extent possible, in a way that has no effect on choice-related mea
sures of well-being. 1 92
The difficulty is that a multi-factorial disease presents a blended
case. To some extent choice matters. An individual can choose
whether to eat right, whether to exercise regularly, and, at some level,
whether to smoke or whether to live next to a waste treatment facility.
Insofar as choice plays a role, the redistribution-minded policymaker
presumably should allow insurers to make distinctions-to charge dif
ferent premiums and to offer different amounts or types of cover
age-between individuals who have such genes and those who do not.
To the extent that genes play the major causal role, however, there
remains a distributive-justice argument for limiting insurers' use of the
information. How these competing concerns balance out depends on
the circumstances of each disease. In cases where the gene plays the
predominant causal role, perhaps the policymaker should forbid its
use by insurers, and in cases where behavior and not the gene is the
main causal factor, allow it.
Alternatively, the policymaker could allow insurers to use the ge
netic criterion but only to a limited extent. For example, insurers
could charge those with the disease gene 20% of the increased ex
pected costs associated with that gene. Such insurance pricing
"bands" are also a common part of healthcare-financing reform proand her doctor tells her she can reduce her risk of getting the disease by changing her diet
and exercising more, one wonders whether there would be any additional incentive effect if
her insurer also offered a premium discount if she followed the doctor's advice. Perhaps.
Because the harmful effects of one's current consumption choices often do not manifest
themselves until much later in life, some individuals may (myopically) ignore or underesti
mate those risks whereas, because individuals see and feel premium discounts in the here
and now, they may have a somewhat greater effect. In any event, even insofar as insurance
premiums can influence individuals to engage in less risky behavior, insurers always will
face the problem of monitoring and enforcing the insured's compliance with the restric
tions. For example, verifying representations by insurance applicants that they are non
smokers is a costly enterprise.
1 92 In each of these cases, of course, there is some element of involuntariness or brute
luck as well. Some individuals, because of the circumstances into which they were born,
have little choice about what to eat or how much to exercise. This fact applies most obvi
ously (though certainly not exclusively) to children, who often have little say in such mat
ters. There are also voluntariness questions with respect to smoking, given the well
documented addictive qualities of nicotine and given the fact that most long-term smokers
begin smoking as children.
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posals. 1 93 This middling approach has something in common with the
approach we currently take with respect to income inequality. Recall
that income inequality too is a blended concept, in the sense that it
arises partly because of individual choice and partly because of indi
vidual endowment. So what do we do? We redistribute in such a way
as to reduce but not eliminate income inequality. The same justifica
tion might be given for a limited use of insurance pricing bands. Pre
cisely what those bands should look like is worthy of further study, but
is beyond the scope of this Article.
b.

Implications of the Framework Beyond Disease-Related Genes

Before leaving the topic of insurance underwriting, this Section con
siders a few other implications of our framework. First, note that our
analysis applies to genetic information whatever its source-and not
only to information from specific types of genetic tests. That is, if it is
possible to determine that an individual has a particular genetically
determined disease, such as Huntington's Disease, without the use of
a specific genetic test (for example, by asking whether the individual's
parents had the disease), our framework would suggest disallowing
insurers' use of that sort of question as well. 1 94 It is not the genetic
tests themselves that concern us; it is the insurers' use of the genetic
information, whatever its source.195
1 93

E.g., Hall, note 189, at 1 10.
Assuming, of course, that the policymaker has determined that the adverse selection
problem does not overwhelm the benefits of such a redistributive rule.
1 95 Epstein, too, thinks there should be no difference between the two sources of infor
mation; he thinks, however, that insurers should be allowed to take everything into ac
count. Epstein, Genetic Discrimination, note 173, at 1 1-12 ("When an individual has
knowledge that he is at risk of incapacitation, perhaps from family history, then full disclo
sure should be the norm. When the individual knows to a certainty that he is a carrier of
the trait, from a reliable genetic test, the same is true. The principle does not change; all
that changes is the information that must be disclosed."). Some states, such as New Jersey,
protect all genetic information whether derived from family history or laboratory tests.
E.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17B:30-12{e) (West Supp. 2002). Other states, such as Georgia, pro
tect genetic information only if it is a result of laboratory tests. E.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 3354-2, -4 (1996). Insurance company officials have criticized the New Jersey approach on
the grounds that it prohibits insurers from relying on sources of information that have been
part of the underwriting process for decades. Small Business Access to Health Care Insur
ance: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Small Business, 107th Cong. 95 (2002) (testi
mony of Mary Nell Lehnhard, Senior Vice President for Policy and Representation at Blue
Cross/Blue Shield Association). The Georgia approach, however, leads to odd results. For
example, if a couple goes to have laboratory tests done and discovers that they are both
carriers of cystic fibrosis, Georgia law prohibits insurers from using this information for
underwriting purposes. In contrast, if this couple were to have a child with cystic fibrosis,
insurers could safely infer that both parents carry this gene and can make use of this infor
mation for medical underwriting.
1 94
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Second, the framework of this Article has implications for (though
it does not fully answer) the controversial questions concerning
whether insurers should be able to use factors such as gender, race,
and age in the underwriting process. All of those traits generally are
considered aspects of a person's endowment, in the sense that a per
son generally cannot choose her gender, race, or age. Gender and
race are genetically determined, and age is determined by date of
birth. In addition, insurers often claim that various factors that affect
insurable losses-lifetime healthcare costs, life expectancy, or even
automobile collision expenses-correlate with gender, race, or age.196
Thus, because these characteristics are relatively easily observable, in
surers want to use them in the insurance-underwriting process.197
Assuming for the sake of argument that insurers are correct about
the correlation issue, the question for the policymaker from the per
spective of our framework is to determine the extent to which the
differences in correlated expected costs are themselves endowment
related or are choice-related. Take gender, for example. It is fairly
uncontroversial that men and women on average pose different risks
for insurers.198 Women on average live longer than men and at every
age (again, on average) have a lower risk of dying.199 Insurers would
like to charge women less for a given amount of life insurance than
they charge men, but more for a given annuity. This makes economic
sense, given that life insurance in its purest form is simply coverage
against the risk of premature death (with respect to which risk women
fair better than men), and annuities are essentially insurance coverage
against the risk of outliving one's resources (with respect to which
risk, from a purely economic perspective, men fair better than women,
all else equal). The question for the policymaker is to what extent
these differences between men and women are attributable to their
respective endowments (genes, environment, social circumstances)
and to what extent they are attributable to informed, voluntary
choices. If the differences are purely endowment-related, insurers,
should not be allowed to use gender in their insurance underwriting
decisions. If it is purely choice-related, however, insurers should be
allowed to use gender.
1 96

Robert H. Jerry, II, Understanding Insurance Law 102-09 (2d ed. 1996).
Race is obviously not as easy to observe as gender. And the definition of various
racial categories can be contested. Still, to the extent race is observable and correlates with
expected costs, insurers, in the absence of legal prohibitions, presumably would be inter
ested in using classifications in the underwriting process.
1 98 Jerry, note 196, at 102 ("The statistical evidence is undeniable: men, on average,
pose different risks for insurers than do women, on average.").
1 99 Id.
1 97
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If we assume that the differences are purely endowment-related,
note that the effect of the prohibition would be to produce a transfer
from women to men in life insurance pools and from men to women in
annuity pools. That result is entirely consistent with our framework.
Obviously, if we assume that all individuals would rather live their
"expected" life span than die prematurely, a relatively low risk of pre
mature death is a good thing; it makes a person relatively well off.
Likewise, a relatively high likelihood of premature death is a bad
thing. If we view the life insurance purchase from the perspective of
the insured's dependents, the same conclusions hold: All else equal,
the dependents are better off if the insured lives his or her expected
life span. Along this dimension of well-being, then women on average
are better off than men. And assuming this difference in well-being is
purely endowment-related, a well-tailored approach to reducing that
inequality would be to use a redistributive legal rule that prevents in
surers from charging men more than women for life insurance and
hence forces women to cross-subsidize men.2oo
With respect, however, to the question of being able to provide for
oneself and one's dependents via investment income, longevity (nor
mally considered a good thing) is counterintuitively a negative. Put
differently, whereas longevity in the life insurance market makes one
better off, longevity in the annuity market makes one less well off.
Along this dimension of economic well-being, then, men are better off
than women. Here again, the cross-subsidizing transfer (from men to
women) produced by forbidding the use of gender in annuity sales
provides a relatively efficient system for reducing that particular ine
quality of well-being.
This justification for gender-blind insurance and annuity ratemak
ing is very different from previous justifications. For example, some
commentators discussing gender rating have characterized the ques
tion as turning on whether an individual or a group perspective is
taken. 201 From a group perspective, under this view, allowing insurers
to use gender is not "discriminatory" but "fair."202 Indeed, preventing
an insurer from using gender would be discriminatory or unfair to wo
men (in the case of life insurance) and men (in the case of annui
ties ). 203 As a group, women and men should get back roughly what
they put into insurance pools. If, however, one sees the question as an
200 Again, as a result of the invisible redistributive hand of the competitive insurance
market, the amount of the transfer would tend to be equal to the amount of the difference
in economic well-being along this particular dimension.
201 E g., Jerry, note 196, at 106. Others may favor allowing insurers to use gender if it
benefits traditionally disadvantaged classes, but not if it works in the other direction.
202 Id. at 104-05.
203 See id.
.
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issue of fairness to the individual man or woman applying for a partic
ular insurance policy, allowing insurers to discriminate seems unfair.
That is, it seems unfair on some level that an individual woman who is
no different from a man in any respect other than her gender should
pay more for a given annuity than a man would.204 From the perspec
tive of our comparative-institutional-advantage framework, however,
whether we choose the group or the individual perspective is irrele
vant. Either way, there is an important difference in well-being be
tween men and women: life expectancy or risk of death. And
continuing with our assumption that this difference is purely the result
(or at least largely the result) of differing endowments, there is a
sound argument for redistribution.
An alternative view might say that whether insurers should be al
lowed to use gender in the underwriting process should be determined
by whether, in the particular case, gender rating helps or hurts wo
men. On this view, in the case of health and disability insurance
(where women of a certain age pose higher average expected medical
costs than do men of the same age due to women's potential maternity
costs),205 gender rating should not be allowed. For automobile insur
ance, however, since women on average have lower auto-accident ex
penses than men,206 insurers under this view not only should be
allowed to use gender in setting premiums but should be required to.
The idea is that, because women are less well off overall economically
than men are, we should use the regulation of the insurance-under
writing process only to redistribute in a way that helps women.207
This conclusion is inconsistent with our comparative-institutional
advantage approach. Our framework would suggest that, if women
are less well-off than men along certain dimensions, we should choose
the redistributive policy instrument best tailored to redress that partic
ular inequality. Thus, if income inequality is the problem, the income
tax-and-transfer system probably should be used. If the differences
have to do with employment opportunities, employment-discrimina
tion law may be the best-tailored approach. If, however, women are
better off on average than men in some respect (such as, apparently,
longevity), then that inequity also should be addressed, and again
204

See id.
Id. at 102.
206 Id.
201 This is consistent with Sanchirico's view. That is, as we understand Sanchirico, if it
were determined that women were less well off overall than men, then every redistributive
policy tool should be used to redress that overall asymmetry, irrespective of comparative
institutional advantage. Presumably, in Sanchirico's world, women would get discounts at
the supermarkets, when purchasing domestic airline flights, and the like. See Sanchirico,
Efficiency Rationale, note 8, at 1009, 1018-31; see also text accompanying notes 163-65.
205
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through the institution with a comparative advantage for dealing with
that sort of specific inequity. In a perfect world, then, where the redis
tribution-minded policymaker responds to all inequalities using the
best observers and redistributors with respect to each type of inequal
ity, the result should be the same as in the perfect welfarist approach.
If we determined, however, that women have lower auto-accident ex
penses because they drive more safely for reasons that are choice
based, our framework would allow gender to be taken into account in
auto insurance ratemaking.
Precisely the same sort of arguments could be made with respect to
other risks that correlate with gender or age or race. If the differences
in correlated risks are attributable purely to differences in genes, envi
ronment, or social circumstances, insurers' use of those criteria in the
underwriting process should be limited or forbidden. If, however,
there is some element of choice that contributes to these differences in
risks, the analysis, as usual, is considerably more complicated, and a
judgment must be made as to how much of the difference must be
explained by pure endowment for the nondiscrimination rule to kick
in. The same was true, recall, with multi-factorial diseases and, for
that matter, with income.208 Thus, the fact that younger people tend
20s There are also separate, equally compelling reasons for forbidding discrimination by
insurers on the basis of characteristics such as gender, race, or age. First, the policymaker
may determine that insurers tend to get the correlation question wrong in the first place,
that insurers wrongly assume (without adequate statistical foundation) that gender, race,
or age correlates with relatively high expected costs. Although competition in the insur
ance market would tend to punish such mistakes, such market corrections are certainly no
guarantee that gender, race, and age stereotypes will play no role in the insurance under
writing process. In addition, whatever the statistical insurance data reveal, it may well be
that allowing insurers to discriminate on the basis of such characteristics perpetuates or
reinforces invidious stereotypes and, on that basis alone, should be prohibited. Under cur
rent law in this country, for example, the use of race in insurance underwriting is strictly
forbidden in any circumstance, no matter what type of insurance. Kenneth S. Abraham,
Distributing Risk 92-95 {1986); Leah Wortham, Insurance Classification: Too Important to
Be left to the Actuaries, 19 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 349, 360-70 (1985). This uniform prohibition
either could stem from a general consensus that the differences in insurable risks posed by
blacks are entirely a function of endowment factors {primarily social and environmental
circumstances stemming from hundreds of years of racism) or it could derive from a view
that allowing insurers to discriminate on the basis of race, in and of itself, would contribute
to invidious racial stereotypes. It is interesting that, by contrast, some states permit gender
to be used for certain types of insurance underwriting. E.g., Telles v. Comm'r of Ins., 574
N.E.2d 359, 362 (Mass. 1991) (holding that insurance commissioner lacks authority to pro
hibit "fair discrimination" where it is undisputed that men have higher mortality rates);
State Dep't of Ins. v. Ins. Services Office, 434 So.2d 908 {Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (holding
that insurance department could not prohibit automobile insurers from discrimination
based on gender so long as it is fair and not based solely on gender). In other states,
insurers are required to gender-rate certain types of insurance. E.g., Cal. Ins. Code
§ 790.03(f) {West 1993) (ordinary life insurance and individual annuities). Some states,
however, prohibit gender rating. E.g., Haw. Rev. Stat. § 431 :lOC-207 (1993) (auto insur
ance); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 175E, § 4{d) (West 1998) (auto insurance); N.C. Gen. Stat
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to have higher auto-accident expenses than older people may be
something that society would want to consider an issue of choice; that
is, it may be that young drivers simply choose to drive more recklessly.
If that were so, a redistributive rule forbidding age-rating in auto in
surance would be inappropriate. No redistribution would be called
for in that context; and hence insurers should be allowed to charge
higher auto insurance premiums to young men.
4.

Summary

We argued in this Section that, in the field of insurance law (which
encompasses among other things the rules governing private insur
ance contracts), it may be possible to identify important sources of
inequality-for example, inequality of lifetime expected health
costs-that can be traced entirely or primarily to differences in genetic
makeup. Such sources of inequality present a plausible case for redis
tribution from the better off to the less well off. Certainly, under our
assumption of a policymaker interested in reducing brute luck-based
inequality of well-being, redistribution on the basis of genetically-de
termined diseases presents a fairly compelling case, and some redistri
bution on the basis of unequal distribution of multi-factorial diseases
also seems defensible-at least as defensible as income redistribution.
More significant for the purposes of this Article, differential health
status (especially but not only to the extent genetically-related)
presents a situation in which a particular type of redistributive legal
rule-a nondiscrimination rule-which produces intra-pool cross-sub
sidization, may be the most efficient means of effecting such redistrib
utive transfers.209
This argument has implications not only for the laws governing pri
vate insurance contracts but also for the design of social insurance
programs. Take, for example, the Medicare program. As currently
designed Medicare produces a large amount of cross-subsidization
from the healthy to the sick. This occurs because Medicare coverage
is funded either through payroll taxes, which obviously make no dis
tinctions among individuals based on health risks, or through non§ 58-3-25 (West 2000) (auto insurance); see also Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 500.2027(c)
(West 1998) (no gender rating unless based on sound actuarial principles); Mont. Code
Ann. § 49-2-309 (2001) (no rating for insurance based solely on gender).
209 In fact, one might argue that the amount of redistribution from those without disease
genes to those with them via insurance cross-subsidization would be wholly inadequate.
For example, a good case could be made that the endowment-based difference in well
being between a person with the Huntington's gene and the person without it, all else
equal, is greater than the difference in their actuarial insurance premiums. Therefore, us
ing the insurance system as the tool of redistribution should be thought of as a starting
point.

Imaged with the Permission ofN.Y.U. Tax Law Review

2003]

REDISTRIBUTING OPTIMALLY

227

risk-adjusted premiums paid by participants.210 Either way, given that
the payouts from the system come in the form of medical care (which
obviously will be disproportionately valuable to the less healthy indi
viduals, all else equal), the system results in a large transfer from the
healthy to the sick. Thus, something like the nondiscrimination norm
discussed above has long applied to publicly-provided social insur
ance.2 1 1 We do not argue here that such a norm is necessarily a good
idea in the social insurance context. Our point is only that, if the poli
cymaker were to decide that redistribution based on unequal health
status were desirable, applying a nondiscrimination norm to a social
insurance arrangement would likely be more efficient than the pure
tax-and-transfer alternative, which presumably would entail some ef
fort to assess a tax on healthy individuals and to make a transfer to
unhealthy individuals. The nondiscrimination norm applied to a social
insurance arrangement eliminates the need for the calculation.212
B. Redistribution Through Tort Law
The field of tort law contains a couple of especially compelling cases
for our comparative-advantage framework for choosing the optimal
redistributive policy instrument. In the following examples, a good
case can be made that the legal system is at least the better proxy
observer and is perhaps the better redistributor as well. The first ex
ample involves the sometimes controversial tort law doctrine that al
lows damages in personal injury lawsuits for nonpecuniary or
noneconomic harms-sometimes called "pain-and-suffering dam
ages." In this Section we argue that pain-and-suffering damages in
210 Medicare covers those aged 65 or older. It consists of "Part A" coverage for certain
hospital-related expenses (such as inpatient care and skilled nursing home care) and "Part
B" coverage for certain other medical expenses. Payroll taxes fund Part A and premiums
paid by participants as well as general tax revenues fund Part B. Daniel Shaviro, Who
Should Pay for Medicare? 21-39 (August 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Tax
Law Review).
21 1 Likewise, Social Security benefits-which include retirement benefits, some disabil
ity insurance coverage, as well as life insurance-are funded entirely through payroll taxes,
which, again, are not risk-adjusted. Thus, the system produces transfers from the short
lived to the long-lived (insofar as Social Security provides benefits akin to private annui
ties) and from the long-lived to the (families of the) short-lived (insofar as Social Security
provides benefits akin to life insurance).
212 A nondiscrimination norm rather than a tax-and-transfer approach also has draw
backs. For example, it is more difficult under such an approach for the policymaker to
keep track of the total amount spent on redistribution. This fact will be a concern, how
ever, only if the policymaker wants to take some of those "extra" dollars in Medicare taxes
or premiums paid by the healthy individuals and spend it on something other than redistri
bution to the unhealthy-such as on tanks or roads. Imposing a tax on healthy individuals
to fund a general public good (one whose benefits are enjoyed roughly equally by all tax
payers) seems more than a bit odd. It would seem to make more sense instead to use a
more general tax base such as income or consumption or wealth.
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tort law can be defended entirely on distributive justice grounds, that
is, as a transfer from the better off (the class of individuals who have
not suffered a pain-and-suffering loss) to the class of individuals who
have suffered from such a loss.
The second example is drawn from the existing redistributive rules
literature, and it presents the question of how tort law should take
account of the differences in individuals' inherent abilities to avoid
accidents. For example, the disabled and the aged may be inherently
less able to avoid accidents. If so, that fact should be taken into ac
count in tort law for redistributive purposes, and it is a type of redistri
bution for which the tort system obviously seems better suited than
the tax-and-transfer system.
1.

The Problem of Nonpecuniary Losses

a.

Nonpecuniary Losses as a Question of Distributive Justice

One source of inequality of well-being that society might care about
is pain-and-suffering or nonpecuniary losses that arise out of personal
injuries.21 3 The tort literature has provided two types of justifications
for pain-and-suffering damages. The first involves the theory of cor
rective justice, which holds that pain-and-suffering damages are "a
means of punishing wrongdoers and assuaging the feelings of those
who had been wronged."21 4 The second type of justification is based
in efficiency. More specifically, law and economics tort scholars have
justified pain-and-suffering damages on deterrence grounds, arguing
that optimal deterrence requires that potential injurers bear the full
social costs of their conduct, including the nonpecuniary costs.215 In
addition, some law and economics scholars have argued in favor of
pain-and-suffering damages on insurance grounds.21 6 The insurance
justification builds on the claim that rational, informed individuals in a
hypothetical insurance contract would prefer to receive some or even
21 3 We use the terms "pain-and-suffering damages" and "nonpecuniary losses" inter
changeably to include all of the various categories of nonpecuniary costs recognized by
courts and the torts literature. For example, those terms comprise "noneconomic losses,"
"loss of consortium," "hedonic damages," "emotional distress," "mental anguish," "psychic
damages," and "emotional losses," to name the most conspicuous ones.
21 4 Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 364 P.2d 337, 345 (Cal. 1961).
21s William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law 18687 {1987); Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law 133-34 {1987); cf. Samuel
A. Rea, Jr., Nonpecuniary Loss and Breach of Contract, 11 J. Legal Stud. 35, 39 (1982)
(nonpecuniary losses taken into account for calculation of optimal damages).
21 6 It sometimes is said that the two efficiency goals of products liability law are deter
rence (giving optimal incentives to avoid cost-justifiably preventable accidents) and insur
ance (providing insurance to risk-averse parties for the unprevented accidents). See, e.g.,
Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The First-Party Insurance Externality: An Economic
Justification for Enterprise Liability, 76 Cornell L. Rev. 129 {1990).
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full coverage for their pain-and-suffering losses.21 7 Other law and ec
onomics scholars, however, while not disputing the deterrence ratio
nale, have argued that the insurance argument, taken alone, cuts the
other way. That is, they argue that rational individuals would not con
tract to receive such damages.218 Thus, the debate among legal econo
mists regarding pain-and-suffering damages boils down to a sort of
empirical question: Would rational individuals in fact demand pain
and-suffering insurance?
This Section provides a third justification for pain-and-suffering
damages. Pain-and-suffering damages can be justified purely as a
form of redistribution from the better off to the less well off. Based
on the framework set forth in this Article, the redistribution-minded
policymaker must answer two general questions with respect to non
pecuniary-loss inequality. First, is the inequality between those who
have suffered nonpecuniary losses and those who have not the type of
inequality that society cares to redress? Second, if the answer is yes,
what is the best redistributive policy instrument or combination of in
struments for dealing with this inequality?
Again, we do not have the answer to the first question. As in the
case of genetic endowment or income, whether nonpecuniary-loss ine
quality is something that matters to people is a question for voters or
politicians or maybe philosophers to answer. It seems uncontroversial
that there is a large disparity or inequality in well-being between those
individuals who have sincerely experienced severe nonpecuniary
losses as a result of a personal injury and those who have not suffered
such losses. Nonpecuniary losses are just as real as pecuniary losses.
That conclusion is supported by the fact that, from a deterrence per
spective, the nonpecuniary costs of accidents are uncontroversially
considered to be of equal status with pecuniary costs.219 Both types of
costs must be internalized in order to achieve efficient deterrence.
And at least in cases in which the injured plaintiff is not contributorily
negligent, the existence of "inequality" with respect to the distribution
211 E.g., Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents:
Pain-and-Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1785, 1914-17 (1995) (conclud
ing that consumers are likely to demand some level of pain-and-suffering insurance and
therefore that tort law should provide some level of pain-and-suffering damages); Patricia
M. Danzon, Tort Reform and the Role of Government in Private Insurance Markets, 13 J.
Legal Stud. 517, 533 (1984) (arguing that serious pain-and-suffering injuries should be
awarded on the basis of predetermined schedules).
21s E.g., John E. Calfee & Paul H. Rubin, Some Implications of Damages Payments for
Nonpecuniary Losses, 21 J. Legal Stud. 371 , 373, 402-03 (1992); Robert Cooter, Towards a
Market in Unmatured Tort Claims, 75 Va. L. Rev. 383, 392-94 (1 989); George L. Priest,
The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 Yale L.J. 1521, 1546-47, 1553
(1987).
21 9 See Landes & Posner, note 215, at 186.
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of nonpecuniary losses seems clearly unjust. But whether it is the sort
of distributive injustice that requires a remedy is a question for the
policymaker.220
b.

The Better-Observer/Better-Redistributor Questions

As to the comparative-institutional-advantage question, the key is
sue is the problem of observability. For nonpecuniary losses to be
considered real and hence a legitimate justification for compulsory re
distribution, there needs to be some way of verifying that claims of
nonpecuniary loss are sincere, not made up or exaggerated. Indeed, it
is the task of verifying and measuring claims of nonpecuniary losses
that distinguishes the redistributive role the tax-and-transfer system
might play and the redistributive role the legal system (particularly,
the tort system) might play.
Again, if the tax-and-transfer system is to play a major role in redis
tributing with respect to pain-and-suffering losses, policymakers
would need to develop fairly precise and reliable proxies for nonpecu
niary well-being that are easily observable, by which we mean difficult
to falsify or exaggerate. If such proxies can be identified, the tax-and
transfer system offers the advantage of comprehensiveness-in the
sense of taking into account the nonpecuniary well-being of everyone
in society and not just those who happen to be affected by the tort
system. If, however, the only plausible way of identifying, verifying,
and measuring relative nonpecuniary well-being is to do a case-by
case factual analysis, the legal system naturally has a comparative ad
vantage, although the scope of redistribution through the tort system
(that is, the number of individuals in society who would be affected by
this sort of redistribution) would be smaller.221
220 One possible way to answer this question would be to observe the market and see
whether there is a demand for pain-and-suffering damages. We reject this option below.
See text accompanying notes 224-36.
221 As with all redistribution through the tort system, some will argue that such redistri
bution, when compared with redistribution through the tax-and-transfer system, is haphaz
ard in the sense of being underinclusive. Whereas the tort system applies only to those
individuals who happen to be involved in accidents for which some third party can be held
legally liable, the tax-and-transfer system can apply to everyone who suffers a similar non
pecuniary loss, though not caused by someone else's tortuous conduct. Our response to
this sort of argument is simple: If individuals came equipped with reliable hectometers that
the policymaker could use to make precise nonpecuniary well-being comparisons among
individuals, then the more comprehensive tax-and-transfer approach would be all that we
need. Such hedometers do not exist, however. All we have are proxies for the underlying
psychological state of well-being. And, as argued in the text, if there are easily observable
and reliable proxies that reveal this underlying state, the tax-and-transfer system can do a
good job of redistributing with respect to those proxies. But if we want to redistribute in a
more targeted, precise way, the legal system is superior. Just as the tax system is designed
to do mass redistribution with respect to easily observable proxies for well-being, the legal
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What redistributive role might the legal system play here? The as
tute reader at this point should be able to predict where the analysis
will go: If the tax-and-transfer system were limited to redistributing
with respect to easily observable and measurable proxies for nonpecu
niary well-being, the legal system-especially the tort system-could
be used to perform a more modest though more precise redistributive
function. The courts in a personal-injury tort suit could consider evi
dence of various sorts, including direct testimony from the plaintiff,
regarding the sincerity and severity of the plaintiff's pain-and-suffer
ing losses. Then the jury can make a determination as to whether, in
this particular case, the individual has experienced nonpecuniary
losses that should be compensated and can make a plausible estimate
of how large those losses are.
This is what courts and juries have done in tort cases for years,
though presumably for deterrence and corrective justice reasons
rather than for distributive justice reasons. Considering these inde
pendent (nondistributive justice) rationales for pain-and-suffering
damages in tort law, one reasonably might ask what is the point of
offering an alternative distributive justice rationale.
For one thing, even if the other rationales for pain-and-suffering
damages were found to be unpersuasive, the distributive justice argu
ment would apply. For example, even if it were shown that imposing
nonpecuniary losses on tortfeasors did not have the effect of optimiz
ing potential injurers' ex ante incentives to avoid accidents (perhaps
because of some cognitive bias on the part of potential injurers), re
quiring tortfeasors to pay such damages would still increase overall
social welfare because of the distributive justice benefits of shifting
resources from the nonpecuniarily better off to the nonpecuniarily less
well off. Moreover, even if the other rationales for pain-and-suffering
tort damages are considered persuasive, introducing an independent
distributive justice rationale may make a difference.
Pain-and-suffering damages have been under assault for a number
of years. Many scholars and policymakers have called for abolishing
or severely curtailing such damages.222 A number of states have
passed laws doing just that.223 Our point is that the distributional ad
vantage of pain-and-suffering damages-shifting resources from the
system was made (in part) to do less comprehensive but more precise redistribution with
respect to less easily observed characteristics.
222 E.g., Calfee & Rubin, note 218, at 371 ; Priest, note 218, at 1546-47, 1553, 1587-90;
Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Product Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 Yale
L.J. 353, 362-67 (1988).
223 For a list of states that have limited the scope or magnitude of pain-and-suffering
damages, see Heidi Li Feldman, Harm and Money: Against the Insurance Theory of Tort
Compensation, 75 Tex L. Rev. 1567, 1567-68 nn.1-2 {1997).
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better off to the less well off-provides an additional justification (an
other weight in the balance) in favor of continuing to include pain
and-suffering damages as a part of standard tort recovery, or, in some
states, reversing the trend toward capping or eliminating pain-and-suf
fering damages. This conclusion does not mean, however, that a redis
tribution-minded policymaker should not place limits on pain-and
suffering damages. It may turn out that the observability problem is
so acute that such limits are necessary, both for deterrence and distri
butional reasons. Such a decision, however, should take into account
not only the deterrence but also the distributional benefits of a case
by-case subjective pain-and-suffering analysis.
c.

The Lack-of-Consumer-Demand Objection

One objection to our distributive-justice defense of pain-and-suffer
ing damages involves the claim, made by Ronald Dworkin, that ra
tional and informed individuals who are placed in some hypothetical
ex ante bargain (akin to a Rawlsian "original position") would not
want to purchase insurance for nonpecuniary losses.224 In a similar
vein some law and economics scholars have gone so far as to claim
that, if we look at the real world insurance market, we learn that indi
vidual consumers in fact do not "demand" insurance for nonpecuniary
losses.225 This empirical claim is important because, if one adopts a
"consumer sovereignty" notion of what constitutes society's prefer
ences with respect to nonpecuniary losses, the absence of market-pro
vided insurance for such losses suggests consumers do not value such
insurance. Therefore, the argument goes, society should not compel
the purchase of nonpecuniary-loss insurance in the form of pain-and
suffering tort damages.226
Our first response to this argument is simple: It strikes us as inap
propriate to look to market evidence of existing consumer demand as
a way of making judgments about redistributive policy. This is be
cause all existing markets (including insurance markets) allocate re
sources according to individuals' willingness to pay. And individuals'
224 The original position and the veil of ignorance are terms that refer to a hypothetical
state of the world in which people make basic decisions about the structure of society
without knowing their own exact position in the world. These terms most frequently are
associated with Rawls, note 9, at 17-22, although it was the economics Nobel Laureate
John Harsanyi who first suggested something like the original position as a tool for making
just societal decisions. John C. Harsanyi, Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium
in Games and Social Situations 48-51 (1977). Dworkin also has used a version of this tool
to construct a theory of justice. Dworkin, Equality of Resources, note 18, at 344.
225 Cooter, note 218, at 392-94; Priest, note 218, at 1546-47, 1553; Schwartz, note 222, at
362-67.
226 Priest, note 218, at 1546-47, 1553; Schwartz, note 222, at 362-67.
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willingness to pay obviously is a function of their wealth. Therefore,
markets necessarily systematically discriminate against the poor. In
deed, that fact is what creates the need for a redistributive policy in
the first place. 227
This insight, of course, was not lost on Dworkin. His insurance
based theory of justice includes an assumption that, before asking the
hypothetical insurance question, all individuals are given the same be
ginning material endowment.228 Thus, Dworkin too recognizes that
absent this initial egalitarian position, market outcomes cannot be
used to set distributional policy.
But even if markets are seen as good indicators of a just allocation
of resources, there are a number of other responses to the lack-of
consumer-demand objection that have been offered in the torts and
insurance literatures. First, some argue that in fact there are numer
ous examples of real world insurance for nonpecuniary losses, sug
gesting that there is indeed some "consumer demand" for such
insurance.229 Second, others point out that in areas where we do not
see a demand for pain-and-suffering insurance it is because there are
market impediments to consumers' demand. For example, consider
the problem of imperfectly informed consumers.230 Some have ar
gued that this problem is especially troublesome with respect to non
pecuniary losses inasmuch as "there are an infinite variety of accidents
that might occur, and each could lead to an infinite variety of nonpe
cuniary losses requiring an infinite variety of compensation levels."23 1
In addition, one could argue that noninjured consumers lack the infor
mation and the mental capability to perceive the post-injury state of
the world and make correct (especially nonpecuniary) insurance
decisions.232
Third, one also can argue that there are "supply-side" rather than
"demand-side" impediments to a market for nonpecuniary-loss insur
ance. That is, the lack of certain types of nonpecuniary-loss insurance
221 This is true in our second-best real world in which poor individuals face substantial
liquidity constraints and, therefore, cannot take out loans at competitive interest rates to
express their preferences through purchasing decisions.
228 Dworkin, Equality of Resources, note 1 8, at 289.
229 For example, Croley and Hanson argue that accident insurance (which provides.cov
erage for death, dismemberment, and various other injuries) constitutes a form of pure
pain-and-suffering insurance, given that all of the pecuniary elements of those losses tend
already to be covered under other types of policies, such as life insurance and health insur
ance policies. Croley & Hanson, note 217, at 1885-92.
230 See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Commercial Transactions 207 (2d ed. 1991)
("Consumers are relatively uninformed about the probability of defects and their potential
costs.").
23 1 Croley & Hanson, note 217, at 1 846.
232 Ellen Smith Pryor, The Tort Law Debate, Efficiency and the Kingdom of the Ill: A
Critique of the Insurance Theory of Compensation, 79 Va. L. Rev. 91, 1 1 1-16 (1993).
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can be explained as the result of various supply-side market failures.
For example, consider the problP,m of asymmetric information, which
can cause both ex ante and ex post moral hazard problems. That pain
and suffering is difficult to observe and verify, of course, is exactly
what makes it noncontractible.233 Asymmetric information also leads
to adverse selection. Individuals who happen to know that they are
more likely than average to suffer nonpecuniary losses would find in
surance for such losses a relatively good deal, forcing premiums up
ward as such high-risk individuals adversely select into the insurance
pools. Unfortunately, nonpecuniary adverse selection would be
harder for insurers to combat through risk classification than some
other types of adverse selection, precisely because nonpecuniary
losses are so difficult (perhaps impossible) to observe ex ante.
In sum, for many of the same reasons that the tax-and-transfer sys
tem cannot respond to individualized pain-and-suffering claims, the
private insurance market has difficulty offering insurance coverage for
such claims.234 A conventional conclusion in the law and economics
literature is that where there are market failures there is a need for
government intervention.235 This conclusion about the private insur
ance market failures is important to our argument, because it provides
a response to those who might argue that the best instrument for deal
ing with nonpecuniary losses is not the legal system or the tax-and
transfer system but the first-party insurance system.236 In fact, either
233 One way to overcome the impediments caused by the ex post moral hazard problem
is to market insurance coverage with scheduled coverage amounts.
234 In some instances, however, when the moral hazard and adverse selection impedi
ments are diminished, the market does seem to be able to provide pain-and-suffering cov
erage, again suggesting a certain level of consumer demand for such insurance. For
example, Croley and Hanson argue that flight insurance is a form of pain-and-suffering
insurance (because it is redundant of existing life insurance policies) that the market can
offer because the moral hazard and adverse selection problems are minimal. Croley &
Hanson, note 217, at 1 892-93.
235 See, e.g., Kaplow & Shaven, Fairness II, note 1, at 15-38.
236 To this point in our argument, we have talked about the legal system and the tax-and
transfer system as the only available policy instruments for achieving distributive justice
goals. Where, however, the source of inequality among individuals is some sudden, ran
dom event that occurs after birth (such as an accidental injury or an unexpected illness),
welfarists scholars often will argue that no compulsory government redistribution is called
for. Rather, such inequalities are dealt with best through the institution of insurance,
where individuals decide for themselves whether, in effect, to use the insurance mechanism
to redistribute from their noninjured or healthy selves to their injured or sick selves. Thus,
for accidental losses, Dworkin's insurance analogy ceases to be an analogy; it is the real
thing. And whether the government has any role to play here will be analyzed not in terms
of distributive justice but in terms of which institution or set of institutions, public and
private, provides the optimal form of insurance for a given type of risk. Thus, one way of
understanding our distributive justice rationale for pain-and-suffering damages is as a
reconceptualization of the efficient-insurance rationale. That is, we argue that the tort
system (working together with liability insurance and first-party insurance system) is the
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the tax-and-transfer system or the private insurance market might be
able to deal with nonpecuniary losses in circumstances in which there
is an easily observable proxy for nonpecuniary well-being that is relia
ble and difficult to exaggerate or falsify. An example of such a proxy
might be blindness or some other obvious handicap. If, however, the
policymaker decides in addition that some individualized case-by-case
redistribution with respect to nonpecuniary well-being is also desira
ble, the legal system or something very much like it would seem to be
the only available instrument.
2.

The Probl,em of the "Accident Prone"

In their debate over the proper role of redistributive legal rules,
Sanchirico, as well as Kaplow and Shavell, discuss the example of the
"accident prone," those individuals who, as the result of natural or
innate inability, are especially incapable of avoiding harm-causing ac
cidents. Sanchirico has argued that accident proneness is, in effect,
another measure of ability to pay, which in turn is a proxy for well
being and thus should be taken into account in any redistributive pol
icy.237 Kaplow and Shavell implicitly agree, although they question
the use of the proxy when it would call for redistribution from the
poor non-accident prone to the rich accident prone.238 We return to
that debate shortly. For now, we assume that large inequalities with
respect to accident proneness are a matter of redistributive concern.
In the abstract the accident prone may not seem to be a very sympa
thetic lot. Who can get excited about a redistributive policy that seeks
to benefit the klutzes of the world, even if their klutziness is beyond
their control? Fair enough. Society may decide that accident prone
ness should fall into that large category of sources of low well-being
(such as being physically ugly or lacking a winning personality) that do
not warrant a redistributive transfer. That conclusion, however, is not
forgone. The accident prone, at least some accident prone, may be
considered worthy of some sort of redistributive transfer. For exam
ple, consider individuals who are blind or wheelchair-bound or other
wise disabled or who are elderly and thus whose physical reflexes have
slowed with age. All of such individuals arguably might be substan
tially more accident prone, all else equal, than is the norm. Observe
that for this reason, for the purposes of this Article, one can treat the
blindness, disability, and the like, as an independent source for egalioptimal form of insurance for certain types of pain-and-suffering damages, namely, those
that are difficult to observe and that require a detailed factual inquiry of the sort that
courts have a comparative advantage in doing.
237 Sanchirico, Efficiency Rationale, note 8, at 1060-64.
238 Kaplow & Shavell, Legal Rules, note 10, at 828-29.
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tarian concern, and not necessarily as a proxy for accident proneness
or low welfare.
Granting this premise, the question then becomes how should soci
ety go about redistributing in favor of the accident prone. Again, we
ask the same questions as before: Which system is the better observer
with respect to accident proneness and which the better redis
tributors? This is an example of a source of inequality with respect to
which the legal system almost certainly has a comparative advantage
over the tax system. This comparative advantage can be seen in two
different approaches to redistributing from the less accident prone to
the more accident prone.
a.

The Across-the-Board Damage Adjustment

One approach, suggested by Sanchirico, would be to make an
across-the-board adjustment to the damages paid by tort defendants
to tort plaintiffs.239 If the tort damage adjustment were used to redis
tribute solely with respect to accident proneness, presumably the ad
justment would be downward, below the efficient level of damages,
that is, below the level necessary to provide optimal deterrence.240
Such an adjustment would tend to redistribute in favor of the acci
dent-prone as a class, because accident-prone individuals are, by defi
nition, inherently more likely than the average person to be injurers in
an accident that gives rise to a tort claim and thus are more likely to
benefit from the downward adjustment. The benefit of this approach
is that, by using the existing tort system and by making an across-the
board adjustment to damages, no special expense would have to be
incurred to identify who is accident-prone and who is not. A simple
downward adjustment in tort damages below the efficient level auto
matically would redistribute to the accident prone.241
As Sanchirico points out, such a redistributive rule would not be
perfect. Its imperfections, however, are no different in kind or degree
from the imperfections that can be found with any redistributive pol
icy instrument, including the income tax. For example, determining
precisely how much of an across-the-board, accident-proneness ad
justment should be made to tort damages would not be easy. It would
require an analysis of how much worse off than the average person
239
240

Sanchirico, Taxes, note 10, passim.
Id. at 804. As discussed more fully below, Sanchirico (wrongly, in our opinion)
seems to back off from the view that tort damages should be adjusted to alleviate accident
proneness inequality. Rather, he takes the position that, if income turns out in some sense
to be the "dominant" measure of well-being, then tort damages should be income-adjusted
rather than accident proneness-adjusted.
24 1 Kaplow & Shaven, Legal Rules, note 10, at 828-29.
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the accident-prone person tends to be. But that sort of analysis is no
different from the sort of analysis necessary to determine how much
income redistribution would be appropriate.242
One also might argue that Sanchirico's accident-proneness adjust
ment would involve a large degree of imprecision. Some of those who
would benefit from the adjustment would not be accident-prone but
would have caused the accident and become tort defendants because
of their own choices, such as the choice not to invest in accident avoid
ance. But again, there is always this sort of imprecision when using
any proxy for well-being. Although the idealized version of welfarist
redistribution would be entirely endowment-sensitive and choice-in
sensitive, that ideal is impossible whenever we redistribute on the ba
sis of proxies for well-being (which is always).243
b.

The Subjective Due Care Standard

There is a second approach to redistributing with respect to acci
dent proneness through the legal system that in theory would not in
volve a regulated-activity distortion; indeed it would not involve any
distortion. This alternative, however, has a somewhat narrower appli
cation than does the across-the-board proposal. It would apply only
to tort settings in which negligence is the efficient liability rule. To see
this alternative, recall that the tort system, from an economic perspec
tive, exists primarily to serve the function of minimizing the costs of
accidents, including the costs of avoiding accidents.244 According to
the standard economic analysis of liability rules, for certain classes of
cases the optimal liability rule is a negligence rule, a rule that holds
the injurer liable only if she failed to take "due care" in avoiding the
accident.245 If the courts define the negligence standard efficiently
and apply it properly, it will give potential injurers the incentive to
invest efficiently in accident avoidance-that is, it will give them an
242

Sanchirico, Taxes, note 10, at 808-10.
That is certainly true with respect to income redistribution. Some high income indi
viduals are rich primarily because of their superior natural endowment or because of luck
more generally (for example, inheritance); others are rich primarily (or at least to a greater
degree) because of their choices to work hard and apply their relatively modest gifts. Nev
ertheless, we do not hesitate to use income as a redistributive proxy for well-being.
244 Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents 26-31 (1970).
245 The negligence rule is capable of optimizing the potential victim's care and activity
levels and the potential injurer's care level, whereas a strict liability rule is capable of opti
mizing the injurer's care level and activity level and the victim's care level. Thus, except in
certain cases, neither rule can optimize the activity levels of both parties. The standard
conclusion is that the choice between a negligence and a strict liability rule, from an eco
nomic perspective, should turn on which activity level is more important to regulate. E.g.,
Shavell, note 215, at 29. A negligence standard will be optimal when the victim's activity
level is the most important.
243
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incentive to invest in care up to the point at which the next dollar
invested in care equals the gains in accident cost reduction.
One important part of defining the efficient negligence standard is
the potential injurer's "cost of taking care," that is, what it costs a
potential injurer to take the care-level steps necessary to avoid a par
ticular type of accident.246 As it turns out, if a particular individual's
cost of taking care is lower than average, the optimal level of care for
that person would be higher than for others, because it is efficient (it
saves resources) to ask more from that person in the way of invest
ments in care. Likewise, if a particular individual has a higher-than
average cost of taking care, the optimal care-level standard would be
lower. Hence, "it may be desirable for a young, able-bodied [low
cost-of-care] person to clear a sidewalk of ice, but undesirable for an
elderly [high-cost-of-care] individual to do so."247
Ideally, therefore, from a deterrence perspective, if it costs a court
nothing to gather information concerning each individual's particular
costs of care, the negligence standard would be finely tuned in each
case to fit the individual circumstance of each tort defendant.248 Thus,
as Shavell illustrates, "[i]f courts can distinguish the young and able
bodied person who can readily clear a sidewalk of ice from the elderly
person who cannot, the first but not the second should be found negli
gent for failing to clear ice. "249 This subjectively defined due care
standard is understood to be desirable on efficiency grounds.
This concept of "cost of care" is similar to what the redistributive
rules literature means by accident proneness. Both concepts apply to
something like an individual's ability to avoid accidents. Therefore, it
can be shown that the ideally efficient negligence regime also would
provide an ideally targeted redistributive mechanism. Under the sub
jective due care regime, more is expected from high-ability people
than from average- or low-ability people. In addition, there is no
double-distortion problem: There is no work-leisure distortion, be
cause the redistribution is not income-based; that is, reducing work
effort has no effect on one's likelihood of being held liable in tort.
And there is no regulated-activity distortion. To the contrary, as the
example from Shavell made clear, this type of subjective care-level
standard enhances rather than detracts from efficiency. Indeed, it is
essential to achieving optimal care levels under a negligence regime.
246 Shavell, note 215, at 73 ("The socially optimal level of care of a party will generally
depend on his cost of taking care . . . . ).
247 Id. at 74.
248 Landes & Posner, note 215, at 123 ("If the costs to the courts of informing them
selves about an individual's ability to avoid accidents were zero, they would set a different
due care level for each individual in every accident case.").
249 Shavell, note 215, at 74.
"
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Where might such a rule come into play? Consider the run-of-the
mill negligence case, for example, the residential slip-and-fall case of
Shavell's hypothetical. Should the elderly or disabled be held to the
same level of care in maintaining the safety of their sidewalks, or
other aspects of their homes, as other individuals? Or should the eld
erly or disabled individual who attempts to assist someone who is
drowning or choking be held to the same standard as those who are
younger or, in a relevant respect, more able to assist in such situa
tions? From an efficiency perspective (according to the standard anal
ysis), a rule that imposed such a burden on the less able (or more
accident-prone) would be inefficient, inasmuch as, on the margin, it
would induce individuals to invest super-optimally in accident avoid
ance-perhaps shoveling snow to the point of inducing a heart attack
or perhaps discouraging them from ever even attempting the Good
Samaritan role. What is more, there are distributive justice reasons
for the same conclusion: Imposing the same duty of accident preven
tion on all individuals irrespective of their innate ability to avoid acci
dents is arguably inconsistent with widely shared notions of
distributive justice. It would be like a head tax, without the lump sum
efficiency benefits.
It is interesting that existing tort law in this country already seems
to be responding to this observation. As all first-year law students
learn, according to the general rule in most jurisdictions, tort defend
ants are held to the standard of an average man or woman placed in
the particular accident situation.250 Such a rule invovles relatively lit
tle redistribution. There are, however, a number of exceptions. For
example, the care-level burden placed on the blind, the lame, or the
infirm is sometimes less than on the average person;251 whereas rela
tively more sometimes is expected of those with special strength, size,
knowledge, or skill. In cases involving children, courts typically take
into account the level of intelligence, strength, and maturity of a rea
sonable child.252 Likewise, historically there have been tort cases in
which old age was taken into account as well.253
250

E.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts § 283 (2002).
E.g., Breunig v. Am. Family Ins. Co., 173 N.W.2d 619 (Wis. 1970) (mental delusions);
Fletcher v. City of Aberdeen, 338 P.2d 743 (Wash. 1959) (blindness).
252 E.g., Restatement (Second} of Torts § 283(a) (2002).
253 E.p., Johnson v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 69 N.W. 900 (Minn. 1897); Roberts v. Ring,
173 N.W. 437 (Minn. 1919}; Daniels v. Evans, 224 A.2d 63 (N.H. 1966). In general, how
ever, if a high-cost-of-care (accident-prone) person is engaged in certain extremely risky
activities, such as driving a speedboat, no discount is given. The general due care standard
applies in such cases. See, e.g., Dellivo v. Pearson, 107 N.W.2d 859 (Minn. 1961). Apply
ing the general reasonable person standard to accident-prone individuals in such cases is
akin to applying strict liability, which makes sense because these are cases in which strict
liability-and its optimizing effects on injurer activity levels-is called for.
251
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In addition to using such rough proxies for accident proneness
(which is a type of class-based redistributive rule), the redistribution
minded policymaker might decide to take the next step. That is, if it
turns out that society were really serious about redressing accident
proneness inequality per se (and were willing to spend money to do
it), courts hearing negligence cases in each case could attempt a more
thorough and subjective analysis of the accident proneness of the par
ticular tort defendant.
Such an individualized accident-proneness analysis (a type of case
specific redistributive rule) would entail additional administrative
costs, as commentators have recognized when discussing the efficiency
(deterrence) benefits of such an analysis.254 And at some point, of
course, the costs of further precision would outweigh the benefits. In
fact, some of the same legal economists who have described the deter
rence benefits of a subjective negligence standard have concluded that
a truly subjective analysis would not be cost effective.255 Even if the
costs of additional precision would at some point exceed the benefits,
it certainly is not clear where that point is or whether we are anywhere
near that point now. Moreover, once the distributional benefits of a
rule are taken into account, it may be that the question of the opti
mally subjective reasonable person standard should be revisited.
In sum, our argument is this: The additional precision that would
come from an individualized subjective negligence analysis not only
would produce efficiency gains (as traditional economic analysis has
long recognized) but also would produce distributional gains that pre
viously have not been recognized.256 A similar sort of argument ap254

E.g., Landes & Posner, note 215, at 123-31.
Id. at 124.
256 A potential critique of this suggestion takes the following form: What about activity
levels? Requiring disabled or elderly potential injurers only to act as a reasonable disabled
or elderly person would act (taking their higher costs of care into account) would have the
effect of inducing such high-cost-of-care individuals to engage in excessive levels of acci
dent-causing behaviors. The most extreme example involves the blind driver. Should a
blind person be held only to the driving standards of a reasonable blind driver? This is, of
course, absurd. But recall the premise of this analysis: It applies only in situations in which
the negligence standard is the appropriate liability rule, that is, when the injurers' activity
levels are not the key deterrence variable. Obviously, the key deterrence variable for blind
drivers is the injurer's activity level: Blind people, at least under current automotive tech
nology, should not be driving at all. Indeed, it is illegal for them to drive. (Recall the eye
test from when you last renewed your license.)
But take a less extreme example, which presents a harder case: elderly drivers. The
elderly can get a driver's license. Although some might argue that this is a bad idea, it is
still the law, even though people above a certain age almost certainly have slower reflexes,
poorer vision and, in extreme cases, somewhat impaired judgment. Nevertheless, society
has determined that the sort of personal mobility that accompanies the right to drive is so
important that elderly individuals must not be systematically deprived of it. Given that
background rule, what should the due care standard be for elderly drivers? Arguably, it
255
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plies to efforts to fine tune the progressivity of the income tax. That
is, it is well known that, if, in an effort to increase the distributional
"fairness" of the income tax, we adopt an system that has a steeply
progressive rate structure consisting of numerous tax brackets on dif
ferent levels of income, we also will increase the administrative costs
of complying with and enforcing the tax laws. We also increase the
precision with which we can achieve our distributional goal of allocat
ing tax liability on the basis of ability to pay. Thus, there is a tradeoff
between accuracy and administrative cost. Where the line is drawn
depends in part on how much accuracy means to us, that is, how much
value accuracy receives in the social welfare function. The same goes
for the question of redistributive legal rules: How much we are willing
to pay (in the form of lost efficiency or greater administrative costs) to
fine tune a redistributive rule depends on, among other things, how
much we care about the type of inequality in question.
How would the presence of insurance affect the application of these
two tort-based efforts to achieve distributional fairness with respect to
accident proneness? Under Sanchirico's across-the-board damage ad
justment, the insurance system would facilitate the redistributive func
tion, assuming insurance companies can do a reasonably good job of
risk-adjusting their premiums. Assume for the moment that everyone
has full liability insurance, and assume that insurance premiums are
perfectly risk-adjusted so that each individual's insurance premiums
always represent that person's expected losses. In that scenario the
adoption of an across-the-board downward adjustment in tort dam
ages, compared with a world without such a rule, would tend to re
duce the liability insurance premiums of those who present a
relatively high risk of causing an accident (a class in which the acci
dent prone would be overrepresented) and would leave unchanged
the premiums of the non-accident prone.
should be a reasonable elderly driver standard, for the reasons already discussed. Such a
rule would be efficient, from a care-level perspective, and it would be distributively just
(again, if we wish to cause a transfer from the less accident prone to the more accident
prone). The point is that, with respect to some types of activities and potential injurers, the
activity-level question may be dealt with best through licensing or other types of direct
regulation, leaving the care-level regulation (and redistribution) to the tort law.
All of this is not to say that it would be inconsistent with distributive justice for society,
in some situations, to impose activity-level limits on various classes of individuals. For
example, one could imagine a regime in which some classes of individuals were allowed to
drive only in emergency situations, that is, situations in which society has determined that
the benefits exceed the costs. Even then, the question about defining the appropriate due
care standard would arise: With respect to the specific situations in which the activity itself
is deemed to be cost-justified, should the potential injurer be held to a subjective or objec
tive standard? Excessive administrative costs may suggest the latter, but efficient deter
rence and distributive justice would cut in favor of the former.
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Thus, the accident prone, relative to the non-accident prone, would
be made better off. To the extent insurance premiums are not risk
adjusted at all, however, the desirable redistributive effect of the ad
justment-from the non-accident prone to the accident prone-would
be reduced. Everyone's liability insurance premiums would drop, re
gardless of whether they were accident prone or not. Simultaneously,
everyone's first-party insurance premiums would increase by roughly
the same amount as a result of the across-the-board downward adjust
ment in tort damages to make up for the reduction in the amount that
first-party insurers could expect to get in subrogation suits against
tortfeasors. 257
In the real world then, assuming the existence of less-than-full and
imperfectly-adjusting liability and first-party insurance, the redistribu
tive consequences of an across-the-board downward adjustment in
tort damages would depend on who tends to have which type of insur
ance and the relative degree of risk adjustment one sees in various
types of liability and first-party insurance.
c.

Coordinating the Tort System With the Tax System

We return now to the comparative institutional advantage question:
Could the tax-and-transfer system redistribute with respect to acci
dent proneness more efficiently than the tort system? If there are reli
able measures of accident proneness that are also easily observable,
the tax-and-transfer system may have an important redistributive role
to play. For example, if it could be shown that disabled individuals or
elderly individuals are more accident-prone (that is, have higher costs
of care) than the average person, a transfer might be made directly to
the disabled and the elderly, or they might be given a special tax de
duction or credit, to redress this inequality.258
'257 This conclusion assumes that the subrogation system works well, in the sense that
first-party insurers generally are able to recover all of their payouts to insureds that are
caused by the tortious conduct of third parties and that they (the first-party insurers) are
able to predict these recoveries in advance in the calculation of the premiums they charge.
zss Kaplow and Shaven suggest something along these lines:
The importance of unobservability of klutziness is reinforced by considering a
different case: people who are blind. Because the blind can be identified, it is
possible to assist them directly, by lowering their income taxes or otherwise.
Only if we could not tell who was blind would we need to resort to indirect
(less well targeted and less efficient) means of assisting them, such as adjusting
legal rules.
Kaplow & Shaven, Legal Rules, note 10, at 829 n.18. Thus, Kaplow and Shaven argue that,
where the relevant nonincome proxy for well-being is difficult to observe, we may want to
use redistributive legal rules because the legal system is the better proxy observer, even
though some inefficiency may result. Our argument in this Section is that, at least in some
cases, the legal system can be used to redistribute with respect to nonincome proxies for
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Such an approach presumably would not produce a regulated-activ
ity distortion, as tort rules could be set solely to achieve efficiency.259
The tax-and-transfer approach, however, would entail some loss of
precision at least as compared to the individualized subjective reason
able person standard, depending on how accurate and targeted the
accident-proneness proxies turn out to be. If, in contrast, there are no
reliable measures of accident proneness that are also easily observa
ble, tort law should play the major distributive role.260
d.

The Existing Debate Over Accident Proneness: Highlighting Our
Independence Assumption

Redistributing with respect to accident proneness has become a
central point of contention in the debate between Sanchirico, on the
one hand, and Kaplow and Shavell, on the other. Both Kaplow and
Shavell and Sanchirico are working from within the traditional
welfarist framework. Thus, for them, accident proneness is relevant
not as a measure of an independent source of inequality-but as a
proxy for well-being, which, for the welfarist, is the one, true target of
redistributive (or any) policymaking. They disagree, however, as to
how the welfarist redistributor should approach accident proneness.
On the one hand, Sanchirico regards accident proneness as a sort of
nonincome measure of individual ability to pay.261 Under Sanchirico's
conception of accident proneness, then, those individuals who have
the innate characteristics that make them relatively more "able" to
produce income also will likely have characteristics that make them
more able to avoid accidents. Hence, Sanchirico initially proposed the
across-the-board downward adjustment in tort damages.262
Whether accident proneness is a good proxy for ability to produce
income, however, is an open question. Obviously, some of the traits
that facilitate income generation also will facilitate some level of acci
dent avoidance, but there will be differences as well. For example, it
might well be that those with the greatest ability to generate income,
because they have mental capacities that are most highly valued in the
marketplace, would not be those with the greatest ability to avoid acwell-being in ways that do not necessarily produce inefficiency but may actually enhance
efficiency.
259 Moreover, such an approach arguably would be less haphazard than the tort-based
alternatives; that is, it could apply to all accident-prone individuals and not just to those
who happen to be involved in tort suits.
260 See Subsection IV.B.l .b.
261 See note 237 and accompanying text.
262 See discussion in Subsection IV.B.2.a.
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cidents, which arguably might require physical skills and reflexes that
are less well remunerated in the rriarket.263
This possibility leads to Kaplow and Shavell's main criticism of
Sanchirico's accident-proneness analysis: They argue that redistrib
uting from the less accident prone to the more accident prone can just
as likely involve redistribution from the income poor to the income
rich as the reverse.264 The result depends on whether accident prone
ness correlates positively or negatively with income, a question that
Kaplow and Shavell admit can be answered only with additional em
pirical research.
Nevertheless, building on Sanchirico's example of a hypothetical
world involving rich (though accident-prone) yacht owners and poor
(though non-accident-prone) boat owners, Kaplow and Shavell sug
gest a plausible story in which accident proneness (or, to use their
term, "klutziness") might correlate positively with ability to earn. In
that case, Sanchirico's accident proneness-based redistributive rule
would involve lowering tort damages paid by the income-rich yacht
owners. Kaplow and Shavell suggest that this result is counterintuitive
at best.265
Interestingly, Sanchirico seems to agree that such a result is
counterintuitive, even perverse.266 In response, however, he insists
that Kaplow and Shavell's yacht-boat analysis reflects a misunder
standing of his argument. His position, properly understood, is that
redistributive policy should focus on making transfers from the better
off to the less well off "overall;" and, if it happens that income (and
not accident proneness) is considered the "dominant" measure of
overall well-being in our society, we should adjust legal rules not on
the basis of accident proneness but on the basis of relative income.267
Thus, if it turns out that yacht owners, though more accident-prone
than boaters, are relatively income rich (and, again, income is the
dominant measure of overall well-being), then tort damage awards
against yacht owners should be adjusted upwards. The rich yacht
owners would then be subsidizing everyone else. Sanchirico seems to
be arguing, then, that Kaplow and Shavell's yacht-boat example in
which the rich subsidize the poor is a red herring. If it is income ine-

263

Kaplow & Shavell, Legal Rules, note 10, at 831-32.
Id. at 829-32.
265 Id. at 829-30.
266 Sanchirico, Efficiency Rationale, note 8, at 1034-35.
267 Id. at 1035 ("[I)f income were the dominant indicator of overall well-being, being
income-poor would be closely identified with being less well-off overall, and, accordingly,
the proper equity adjustment to all legal rules would tend to help the poor.").
264
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quality that we care about, legal rules can be made income
redistributive.268
Therefore, both Kaplow and Shavell and Sanchirico suggest that re
distribution from the less accident prone to the more accident prone
would be unacceptable (or at least highly questionable) if it meant
transferring from the income poor to the income rich. This conclusion
derives from their welfarist approach and from their assumption that
income is a more important measure of well-being than accident
proneness is. That is, the redistribution-minded welfarist policymaker
cares only about the unobservable characteristic of well-being; thus,
income inequality and accident-proneness inequality are only proxies
for inequalities of well-being. And if income is the more important
proxy for well-being than accident proneness (that is, if rich but
clumsy yacht owners tend to be better off overall than poor but nim
ble boat owners), then the welfarist redistributive policy would call for
transfers from the high income to the low income (from yacht owners
to boat owners), whatever transfer mechanism is used, although the
transfer might be somewhat smaller than if the accident proneness
proxy cut the other way.
We reach a different conclusion. First, we assume that different
types of inequality can matter to a policymaker independent of other
types of inequality. This is what we call our "independence assump
tion."269 Thus, when we say that if the redistribution-minded poli
cymaker or society in general decides to do something to reduce the
inequality of X (be it accident proneness or pain-and-suffering losses
or genetically-caused diseases or any other source of brute luck-based
inequality of well-being), what we mean is that the policymaker has
determined that that source of inequality is problematic, not as a
proxy for well-being, but in and of itself.
Therefore, if we assume: (1) that accident-proneness inequality is a
type of inequality that society cares about (a question on which we
take no position); (2) that the tax system is best suited for dealing with
income inequality; and (3) that the legal system is the superior redis
tributive policy instrument with respect to accident-proneness ine
quality, then there would nothing perverse or absurd about a
redistributive tort rule that resulted in transfers from the less accident
prone to the more accident prone, even if it meant transferring from
the income poor to the income rich.
This conclusion follows from our comparative-institutional-advan
tage framework. Income inequalities that exist between the accident
268

See Section IIl.C for a discussion of Sanchirico's defense of income-adjusted legal

rules.
269

See note 31 and accompanying text (introducing our independence assumption).
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prone and the non-accident prone should be dealt with largely
through the tax system (with potentially some modest role for legal
rules, if the random-taxation argument holds up). Which system
should be used to deal with accident proneness inequality is a separate
question, a question to which the relative incomes of the accident
prone versus the non-accident prone are irrelevant.
Although our comparative-advantage argument is strongest if we
make the independence assumption (described above), it is not neces
sarily dependent on it. That is, our argument can be made from
within the traditional welfarist framework as well. Under the welfarist
framework, the only thing that should matter to the redistributive
policymaker is the single concept of inequality of well-being and what
the various proxies for well-being say about that type of inequality.
This assumption, however, does not necessarily mean that every policy
instrument should be adjusted with respect to every proxy for well
being. It still could be the case that the best approach is to have each
policy instrument focus on the proxy for well-being for which that in
strument has a comparative advantage at either observing or redistrib
uting or both.
Thus, for example, redistribution with respect to the income proxy
could be achieved solely through the tax-and-transfer system (if that
system is deemed to have the comparative advantage with respect to
that proxy); redistribution with respect to accident proneness could be
achieved solely through the legal system; and so on-with no reason
for each tool to address each and every proxy. The result would be
that the overall redistributive system (including both tax rules and le
gal rules) would respond to differences in overall well-being as accu
rately as possible.
To see this point, contrast two hypothetical welfarist redistributive
regimes. To simplify, assume that the only two proxies for well-being
that the policymaker has are income and accident proneness, both of
which can be expressed in terms of dollars, and that the only tools for
redistribution are the income tax and the tort system. Imagine further
that there are only two people in this hypothetical society, whose total
well-being is the sum of the dollar value of the two proxies mentioned
above. It is this total well-being the policymaker wants to fully equal
ize through the redistributive system. Assume that individual A has
$90 of income whereas individual B has only $10 of income. Assume
also that A has $5 and B has $25 worth of innate accident-avoiding
capacity. Thus, initially A 's overall well-being is $95 (measured in
terms of money) and B's overall well-being is $35. In each case, the
dollar figure represents the individual's relative well-being as mea
sured by that proxy. Under these assumptions, the ultimate goal for
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the welfarist redistributor is to have A somehow transfer $30 to B.
That would leave A and B each with $65 of total well-being, as mea
sured by the combination of these two proxies as valued in dollars.
But how to do this? One way would be to have the income tax
system do all the work, effecting an income tax transfer from A to E
via deductions, credits, or whatever-of $30. This result seems consis
tent with the Kaplow and Shavell model, although they do not take a
firm position on how best to deal with accident proneness. Alterna
tively, the policymaker might use the tax system to transfer $40 from
A to B, equalizing "dollars of income," and then have the tort system
transfer $10 from B to A, equalizing "dollars of accident-avoidance
ability." This approach is closer to what we have in mind.
The question is which is the better approach. First, observe that
both approaches result in the equalization of overall well-being, as
measured by these two proxies. In this example, we assumed that all
of the information about which party had which level of each proxy
was known by everyone and there were no inefficiencies associated
with the transfers. In fact, however, information is costly, and, in our
view, the tax system is better at gathering information about income,
whereas the tort system is better at gathering information about acci
dent proneness. Thus, if we decide to use the tax system to do all of
the redistributing (for example, because of the haphazardness prob
lem),270 we at least should use the legal system to gather the relevant
information about accident proneness. In addition, we argue that
there are efficiency reasons to redistribute through the legal system
with respect to accident proneness-enhancements in deterrence
that would not exist if accident-proneness redistribution were done
through the tax system.
Where does this leave Sanchirico's preferred option, which would
call for adjusting both tools-taxes and torts-for differences in both
proxies-income and accident proneness? Under either of the ideal
ized regimes mentioned in the previous paragraph, it is not clear what
the benefit would be of making both tools redistributive with respect
to both proxies. If the income tax system can completely equalize
with respect to income (that is, completely eliminate income differ
ences) and accident proneness (the first situation above), there is no
inequality left for the tort system to address.
If, however, one were persuaded by our comparative-advantage ar
gument that income inequality can be handled best by the tax system,
and the accident proneness inequality by the tort system, and the sec
ond approach from the example above was taken, all of the inequality
again would be eliminated. Under neither of those scenarios (Kaplow
210

See Subsection IIl.B.2.
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and Shavell's and ours) does it seem to be necessary also to adjust the
income tax for accident-proneness inequality or the tort system for
income inequality. (Both A and B already have $50 total; what redis
tribution is left to be done?)
Sanchirico's world, of course, is one of incomplete information in
which the different redistributive tools "statistically sample" individu
als' different characteristics. As we argued above, however, there is
no obvious reason why every redistributive tool should sample with
respect to every proxy rather than have the income tax system sample
for information on income and the tort system sample for information
on accident proneness. If, however, Sanchirico is right in his empirical
claim that there is some capacity constraint on the amount of income
redistribution the tax system can do (say, the amount of information
the tax authority is able to gather justifies a redistribution from A to B
of only $20), or if a behavioralist-probabilistic tax story could be
told,271 then there would be an argument for using the tort system (as
well as the tax system) to redistribute to reduce the income inequal
ity.272 But not otherwise.
C.

Revisiting Old Objections

As we described above, there are a number of arguments that have
been used to support the traditional view-that income-based redistri
bution should be limited entirely to the tax-and-transfer system.
Those included the contracting-around argument, the haphazardness
argument, and the double-distortion argument. In our view, at least
the first of those two arguments, though often overstated, does tend to
support relying primarily on the tax-and-transfer system to reduce in
come inequality. An important question for our framework, then, is
whether the same is true for other types of inequality. In particular,
we focus here on the sorts of inequality that our examples involve:
inequality due to differing disease-related genetic endowments, ine
quality of pain and suffering from personal injuries, and inequality
with respect to ability to avoid accidents.
The Contracting-Around Argument Revisited

1.

Previously we summarized what has come to be one of the most
important criticisms of using legal rules to redistribute income: the
argument that redistribution through legal rules is not feasible-it
cannot be done-in settings in which the parties (those being redis211
272

See generally Jolls, Behavioral Economics, note 36.
See text accompanying notes 119-47.
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tributed to and from) are in contractual relationships with one an
other.273 In such settings, the argument goes, market forces would
tend to undercut the redistributive effect of the rule. For example, a
rule designed to redistribute "vertically" from manufacturers to con
sumers, on the theory that the former are richer than the latter, would
run into problems of the following sort. Holding consumer demand
constant, part of the redistributive effect would be reduced when the
price of the products rises in response to the redistributive rule. And
because consumer demand for the product would rise as well, it would
be very difficult for the policymaker to design a rule that redistributes
vertically in a way that makes consumers better off.274 As a result,
income redistribution through contract-based legal rules is extremely
difficult, albeit not impossible.21s
One of the most interesting findings of our analysis is that, with
respect to some nonincome measures of inequality, it is possible to
design a contract-based legal rule that redistributes "horizontally" in a
way that the contracting-around problem does not affect. Perhaps the
best example is the class of insurance law rules that prohibit various
types of discrimination in the underwriting process. For example, a
rule forbidding insurers from discriminating on the basis of genetic
information-such as on the basis of whether or not an insured has
the Huntington gene-clearly is a contract-based legal rule. But the
effect is not to redistribute vertically from insurer to insured; rather, it
is to redistribute horizontally from one class of insureds (those with
out the Huntington gene) to another class of insureds (those who do
have the gene). This is a type of redistribution through "pooling" or
"cross-subsidization." With that sort of redistribution, there is no
market force that will push those two classes of parties to contract
around this result.276
The example of pain-and-suffering damages, at least in the products
liability context, provides another case in point. A rule requiring
product manufacturers to pay pain-and-suffering damages to individu
als who are injured by the manufacturer's products can be viewed as a
contract-based redistributive rule. Obviously, consumers are in some
sort of a contractual relationship with manufacturers. But the redistri213

See discussion in Subsection 111.B.1.
This conclusion assumes that consumers are heterogeneous with respect to their pref
erences for the redistributive rule.
275 See text accompanying notes 68-83.
276 While it is true that competitive forces will give insurers an incentive, in a sense, to
evade this result by finding other proxies that are not prohibited by law, the law ideally
should respond by prohibiting all such additional proxies as well (to the extent they re
present brute luck-based measures of differences in well-being) . This is another example
of the distinction between the contracting-around problem and the income-shifting prob
lem discussed above.
274
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bution accomplished by such a rule, at minimum, occurs horizontally.
That is, as product prices rise to reflect what is in effect an insurance
premium being charged for pain-and-suffering losses, all consumers
contribute equally. Once the accidents occur, however, it is only those
who have suffered the nonpecuniary harms who actually recover from
the pool of funds. Thus, the products liability doctrine imposing pain
and-suffering damages on the manufacturer of a defective product
that causes injury involves, at minimum, a type of redistribution from
those who do not suffer nonpecuniary losses (who pay the higher
price, but get no payment in return) to those who do suffer nonpecu
niary losses (who pay the same higher price, but also recover an award
after the accident). Under our framework there is no reason to rule
out a priori horizontal redistribution as unwarranted.
A similar conclusion applies to our accident-proneness example:
Changing the due care standard from an objective one to a subjective
one, in general, should not have much of a redistributive effect on the
class of defendants. Such a shift, however, would cause a horizontal
transfer to the less able.
2.

The Haphazardness Argument Revisited

The haphazardness complaint that is lodged against income-ad
justed legal rules also does not have the same force when applied to
nonincome-based redistributive legal rules, when the nonincome char
acteristic is not easily observed. Recall that the haphazardness cri
tique includes both a complaint about inaccuracy and a complaint
about underinclusiveness. The problem with this critique is that, with
respect to nonincome characteristics, the tax-and-transfer system will
not necessarily be more precise or more inclusive.
For example, the advantage of a subjective due care standard (and
of pain-and-suffering damages) in tort law from a distributional per
spective (as well as from an efficiency perspective) would be its poten
tial for precision beyond what could be imagined in a broad-based tax
approach. That is, a court hearing a tort case would be better able to
observe whether the individual defendant is above average or below
average with respect to accident proneness than a tax collector would.
The court would have a comparative advantage at observing an indi
vidual's ability to avoid accidents (or costs of care) because making
that assessment would enhance the efficiency of the legal rule as well.
The same holds if defendants ex ante could observe the below-average
potential victims and take excessive care in those instances.
In the case of insurance discrimination on the basis of disease-re
lated genes, denying the use of such genes-to produce cross-subsi
dizing transfers from those without the genes to those with them-
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would seem to provide a considerably greater degree of accuracy in
the amount of the transfer than could be accomplished through the
tax-and-transfer alternative.
As for the underinclusiveness complaint, it is of course true that all
of the rules we describe in this Section are underinclusive in the fol
lowing sense: There will be some accident-prone people who will not
be affected by the rule (either because it will not affect their accident
avoidance incentives or because they will not have insurance), there
will be some individuals who will experience pain and suffering not in
connection with a tort suit (and thus will not be able to collect dam
ages), and there will be some individuals with disease-related genes
who will not have insurance (and who thus would not benefit from the
cross-subsidization our proposed rule would engender). All of those
statements are true. It is not clear, however, that the tax-and-transfer
system could do a better job. With respect to accident proneness, the
tax-and-transfer system conceivably could be more comprehensive,
but, again, at some considerable cost in terms of reduced accuracy or
substantially higher administrative costs. The same could be said for
nonpecuniary losses and disease-related genes.
3.

·

The Double-Distortion Argument Revisited

The double-distortion argument does not apply to the rules dis
cussed in this Section (redistribution with respect to accident prone
ness, nonpecuniary losses, or genetic diseases), since redistribution on
the basis of proxies other than income does not entail a work distor
tion. It is not that we have found a way to avoid the use of proxies for
well-being. To the contrary, proxies for well-being would have to be
used in these settings as well. Thus, if society were to get serious
about reducing accident-proneness inequality (which, again, we are
somewhat skeptical of), then courts would have to make use of some
sort of proxy or set of proxies. Likewise, in the context of pain-and
suffering damages in tort cases, when it comes to determining the ap
propriate amount of the redistributive transfer (that is, damage pay
ment), a range of proxies is possible, from case-by-case testimony
concerning the degree of emotional distress associated with a particu
lar injury to a more standardized approach (where certain injuries au
tomatically give rise to certain amounts of pain-and-suffering
damages). The point is that the well-being proxies we identified in
this Section (unlike, say, income or wealth) do not correlate with work
effort in any obvious way. Genetically-determined diseases, of course,
may be the best example, the purest instance of a well-being proxy
that is representative of brute-luck inequality-and hence uncon
nected to work effort.
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Furthermore, as we argued above, we have identified examples of
redistributive legal rules in the tort and insurance contexts that either
produce no distortion or tend to reduce distortions. For example, the
subjective-negligence standard (rather than a standard based on the
"reasonable person") not only has redistributive benefits-shifting re
sources from the more able to the less able-but also enhances the
deterrence function of tort law. The same goes for pain-and-suffering
damages. Awarding pain-and-suffering damages actually enhances
deterrence by forcing potential injurers to bear the full costs of their
decisions, not just the pecuniary costs.277 Moreover, even if these
rules were considered inefficient, we have identified independent, dis
tributive justice grounds for adopting them.
v.

CONCLUSION

The conventional wisdom among law and economics scholars seems
to be that redistributive policy should focus on income inequality and
that the task of redistribution should be left exclusively to the tax-and
transfer system. As to this latter conclusion, political theorists seem to
agree as well. One aim of this Article is to question this conventional
wisdom. Although we agree that income or wealth inequality should
be a primary target of the redistribution-minded policymaker
(whether from a welfarist or a nonwelfarist perspective), we also be
lieve that other types of inequality (or other proxies for unequal wel
fare) ought to be considered as well.
As to income inequality, according to our comparative-advantage
framework, legal rules in some circumstances (in particular, as a
small-scale income-based lump sum tax, along the lines that Jolls has
suggested278) can usefully supplement the tax system in reducing in
come inequality. As we have emphasized, however, the effects of in
come-redistributive legal rules are complicated because of the
presence of liability insurance, which will exacerbate some of the inef
ficiencies of such rules but, at the same time, will enable liability insur
ance companies to serve as privatized tax collectors, supplementing
the role currently monopolized by the Service.
With respect to nonincome measures of inequality, there may be
many situations in which the legal system-or some hybrid of the legal
system and the tax system-is either the better observer of the ine
quality in question, the better redistributor with respect to it, or both.
We have focused on a few examples-genetically-determined dis211 See sources cited in note 215. This conclusion assumes that the cost of tailoring the
negligent rule and the moral hazard effect of awarding pain-and-suffering damages are
minimal.
278 Jolls, Behavioral Economics, note 36.
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eases, pain and suffering from personal injuries, and accident prone
ness. With respect to all of those types of inequality, redistribution
through the legal system may be able to reduce brute luck-based ine
quality in a way that avoids the traditional conflict between efficiency
and distributive justice.
Throughout this Article we assumed that there is a "redistribution
minded policymaker," who has decided that some type and amount of
redistribution is called for. In other words, some unspecified poli
cymaker has chosen the type of inequality that is to be reduced and by
how much. That assumption has allowed us to focus on the question
of principal concern to us: how that policymaker might choose the
optimal redistributive policy instrument, whether it be the legal sys
tem or the tax-and-transfer system, or some combination of the two.
As a result of this assumption, however, we have evaded the ques
tion of which policymakers-legislators or judges-should be respon
sible for making those initial decisions. Put more pointedly, should
the legislature always be the policymaker that decides what type of
redistribution and how much? Or is there some role for judges, acting
to some extent independently of the legislature, in making such deci
sions? For example, should a court, acting independently of the legis
lature, attempting to implement what it sees as society's redistributive
aims, adopt an income-redistributive tort tax or a subjective due care
standard or pain-and-suffering damages in tort or a nondiscrimination
principle in insurance law with respect to genetically-determined dis
eases? Or, instead, should the court implement such redistributive
rules only after the legislature has first explicitly expressed its (and
society's) "preference" for such redistribution?
There is a view that only legislatures should be allowed to make
those initial redistributive determinations, never the courts. Most who
hold this view seem to fall into one of two camps.279 First, some argue
that there is (and should be) a theoretical and practical "isolation"
between legal rules or private law on the one hand (the reasoning of
which is somehow is considered "scientific" and devoid of value judg
ments) and society's distributive values, which are manifest through
the legislature.280 Other critics of redistributive judicial initiatives ar279 Another possible view to support the division of labor conclusion is that the tax-and
transfer system is less intrusive to people's liberty than private law. We briefly touched
upon this point at note 9. For a response see Kronman, note 9, at 501-07.
280 E.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law 3-14 (1 995). Weinrib argues, among
other things, that private law, when rightly understood as being based on corrective justice
(and not distributive justice), is "purely juridical and completely nonpolitical." Id. at 214.
Weinrib also argues that social purposes, extrinsic to the relationship between the parties,
even if they otherwise seem desirable, cannot be accommodated to the nature of private
law justifications. Id. at 204-16. For a discussion of Weinrib's "isolation thesis," see Ha-
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gue that, even if court decisions are not isolated from society's values,
the institutional role of the courts always should be to enforce the
distributive status quo ante. This is because that status quo reflects
the legislature's distributive values, which in turn reflect society's
values.
In our view, the private law purist argument is based on a naive
conception of private law. It should come as no surprise, given the
general tenor of this Article, that we hold the view that private law
can be legitimately redistributive. Moreover, there is much to be said
for the view that private law is, in an important sense, inevitably dis
tributive in character.281 Under this view, any judicial decision,
whether it enforces the status quo ante or deviates from it, has some
distributional consequences; there are winners and losers (besides the
parties who litigate) in every court decision. And because, for any
given violation of a legal rule or standard, there is always a menu of
remedies for a court to choose from, by choosing one remedy and not
the other, courts necessarily make a general distributive decision
general in the sense of influencing not only the parties disputing
before the court but also the "potential" parties that are subject to the
court's jurisdiction.282 Thus, there is an important sense in which pri
vate law must be at least distributive, if not redistributive.283
noch Dagan, The Distributive Foundation of Corrective Justice, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 138, 14254 (1999) [hereinafter Distributive Foundation].
28t Dagan, Distributive Foundation, note 280, at 147 (arguing that a nondistributive pri
vate law is an impossibility). Dagan argues that private law in general and the idea of
property in particular cannot be seen as having an "inner intelligibility that can be deci
phered without recourse to public values." Id. at 139. In Dagan's view, for example, prop
erty, as a human-created institution, is an open-textured term that is subject to different
interpretations about its content and scope and always can be modified in accordance with
society's changing values. Id. at 148.
282 To give a simple example, consider a case of nuisance. There are several different
decisions courts can make, ranging from an injunction against the polluter to different
levels of damages for the plaintiffs. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property
Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev.
1089 (1972). As is well known, all of these decisions have different distributive conse
quences, not only for the parties disputing before the court but also for parties who may
later be bound by the rule. For a menu of remedies in the law of restitution, see Dagan,
Distributive Foundation, note 280, at 149.
283 In addition, not only do courts have a menu of different remedies to choose from for
any given violation, but they also have a menu of efficient remedies to choose from. To
mention just one example, it is well known that there are several Pareto optimal rules for
the classic nuisance dispute. See Calabresi & Melamed, note 282; James E. Krier & Stew
art J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 440 (1995); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liabil
ity Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 713 (1996); Ian Ayres & Paul M.
Goldbart, Optimal Delegation and Decoupling in the Design of Liability Rules, 100 Mich.
L. Rev. 1 (2001); Ronen Avraham, Modular Liability Rules (John M. Olin Ctr. for Law &
Econ., Univ. of Mich. Working Paper No. 01-003, 2001), at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa
pers.cfm?abstract_id=272816. Thus, a court's task, even according to the holders of the
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The second argument for limiting court-initiated redistributive poli
cies-that is, the view that courts should always privilege the legisla
ture-endorsed distributive status quo-goes to the question of what
we mean by the term redistributive. The proponents of this view, un
like the private law purists, acknowledge that legal rules cannot be
detached from their distributive consequences and thus from society's
distributive values. In addition, however, they seem to believe that
the legal status quo ante fully reflects society's distributive prefer
ences. Hence, if a court renders a decision that upsets the distributive
status quo, that court is redistributing. According to this view, courts
should not redistribute; rather courts should avoid deviating from the
distributive result inherent in the existing status quo, because, if the
status quo did not reflect the legislature's (and by extension the citi
zenry's) distributive preferences, the legislature would have changed
the laws.284
This privilege-the-distributive-status-quo argument has some intui
tive appeal. There are, however, a number of responses to it. We
briefly summarize some of those responses here, without defending or
endorsing any of them. As already mentioned, the basic thesis of our
Article-and the comparative-advantage framework-can usefully
apply however one reacts to the following arguments. Our objective
at this point is only to get the relevant issues on the table.
First, it could be argued that the privilege-the-distributive-status
quo view ignores the teachings of public choice theory. For example,
an adherent of public choice might contend that there is no single
"preference" of the legislature with respect to anything (including dis
tributional questions) but rather only the preferences of the different
rent-seeking interest groups that lobby the legislators. Of course,
there are good reasons to be skeptical of the strongest normative
claims of public choice theory. For example, a radical public choice
perspective would have difficulty explaining the strong and widely
shared intuition that legislative outcomes-that is, statutes-generally
are regarded as having the force of law.
privilege-the-distributive-status-quo view, cannot be stripped completely from distributive
considerations, because the Kaldor-Hicks criterion in itself is indeterminate. Duncan Ken
nedy, Law-and-Economics From the Perspective of Critical Legal Studies, in 2 New Pal
grave Dictionary, note 109, at 470. This has led Kennedy to argue that "it is hard to take
seriously the proposal that the courts should just apply Kaldor-Hicks and stay out of dis
tributive questions." Id.
284 To take an example of such legislative overruling from our framework, consider the
case of pain-and-suffering damages in tort law. In many states, the legislatures became
unsatisfied with state court rulings regarding pain-and-suffering damages.· The result was
that most state legislatures capped pain-and-suffering damages in all tort cases, some lim
ited their scope to only some types of torts, and some did both. See generally Feldman,
note 223, at 1567-68, and sources cited therein.
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Still, what we know about legislative interest group dynamics at
least should make us also somewhat skeptical of the legislative status
quo ante with respect to the worse off in society-those whom redis
tributive policy is supposed to benefit. Indeed, some hold the view
that courts should have a leading role in protecting the welfare of dis
advantaged groups, whose disadvantage sometimes is maintained by,
if not the result of, the legislative dynamic in Congress. Thus, when
the legislative process gives rise to systematic biases against a disad
vantaged group, so goes the response, the courts might play an impor
tant role in initiating a redistributive response.285
Second, even if we think that Congress, in some important sense,
can have a unified preference about distributive matters, it is unlikely
that the existing legislative status quo ante always will reflect that
preference. Given the complexity of the legislative process and the
costs of statutorily changing the law, it may be that in some cases the
status quo does not reflect the existing legislature's distributional pref
erences. On this view, legislative "transaction costs" may prevent the
legislature from enacting what are, in some sense, its true preferences;
and courts adopting redistributive rules might be viewed as attempting
to capture the legislature's unspoken (as yet unenacted) true
preferences.
Of course, the contrary view is that those "legislative transaction
costs" are really "benefits" in the sense that they prevent legislation
from being enacted that has not met a sufficiently high threshold of
support in Congress; and courts that try to adopt Congress' unenacted
preferences are being unduly activist. Our point is only that the latter
interpretation need not always trump the former. At least sometimes,
we can imagine courts getting ahead of the legislature in a way that
the legislature, in an important sense, approves of. What is more, we
are not talking about constitutional lawmaking. Whatever redistribu
tive rule the court might adopt could be reversed by the legislature, if
the court in fact has misread the legislature's intent.286
A final response to the privilege-the-distributive-status-quo argu
ment is at base an undemocratic one. It can be argued that, even if
legislative decisions (including their silences) fully reflect the prefer285 As one obvious example, consider the fact that for many years Congress' endorse
ment of (or inaction with respect to) racial discrimination was clearly (and to some extent
still may be) responsible for the existing distribution of benefits and burdens along racial
lines.
286 See generally Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes (1982).
Thus, taking our example of the subjective due care standard in tort, there is no reason to
presuppose that state legislatures' silence on the issue is a deliberate distributive decision.
It is just as likely that the silence is due to the legislatures' unawareness of the regressive
cross-subsidization embedded in the objective, untailored standard.
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ences of the society as a whole, universal principles of justice some
times should trump society's preferences. Of course, identifying the
occasions when judges, rather than legislators, should be the exposi
tors of such "universal principles" is notoriously difficult. Still, to say
that courts should never engage in such an enterprise seems difficult
to defend.2s7
2s1 Some scholars also contend that the privilege-the-distributive-status-quo position ig
nores important expressive dimensions of the law. According to this view, it is problematic
to accommodate in the same legal culture a purely self-interest-driven, efficiency-based,
ostensibly nonredistributive private law with an egalitarian, expressly redistributive system
of taxation and transfers. As Hanoch Dagan puts it, " '[i]t seems artificial . . . to expect that
the same person who is not required to pay (almost) any attention to the fate of others'
with respect to her private property 'will recognize the legitimacy of the claims of others
(equally strangers) [with regard] to fragments of her resources when the tax collector asks
his due. ' " Dagan, Takings, note 40, at 792 (quoting Hanoch Dagan, Unjust Enrichment: A
Study of Private Law and Public Values 57-58 (1997)).
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